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Contemporary literary theorists, very much aware of
themselves as constituting a break in, and a refutation
of, an entire classical metaphysics, are trying to prove
that James Joyce, the foremost prose writer of the
twentieth century, writing when that classical view was
falling from grace and the modern perspective was
forcing itself upon the intellectual world, is, in fact,
in his work—all works considered as one work--undermining
the very tradition which critics consider his foundation.
Consequently, the way in which Ulysses and Finnegans Wake
are read and valued will be linked to an entire theory
of literature.
The body of this paper will comprise a general overview of criticism which has attempted to measure Ulysses
subsequent to its publication; an analyzation of the
direct influence of one of the earliest language
theorists, Giambattista Vico, on Joyce's Ulysses; a
brief review of the classical metaphysics; a detailed
presentation of the Deconstructionist position; and an
investigation into ways in which Joyce, and Ulysses, may

be viewed as Modern and as Contemporary.

In the conclu-

sion, the writer, using E. D. Hirsch's probability theory
as presented in Validity in Interpretation, will set
forth her criteria for measuring the likelihood that
Deconstructionists will be able to move Joyce from his
Modern position to a Contemporary one.
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Chapter I
Double Visions and Revisions
Upon the celebration of the one hundredth
anniversary of the birth of James Joyce, much stocktaking and measuring centers on his most influential
book, Ulysses.

Joyce, writing toward the end of the

period labeled Modern, using, among many others, the
ideas expressed in Vico's New Science, produces a book
so highly structured and multifarious that literary
critics for the following three decades were fully
occupied trying to find the "key" that would unlock the
unique meaning of the book and its author.

Because Joyce

freely admits to using Vico's concepts and structures in
his works, it is not surprising that much early criticism of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake deals with discovering
and revealing the Vichian influences.
The varied and voluminous investigations of the
early critics were, for the most part, carried out along
the lines of traditional Western thought.

Most of

these critics viewed Joyce as being among the last of
the writers in the Modern period, when "Modern" is
applied to a period of literary creativity falling
roughly between the years of 1900 and 1930, a timespan
2
treated both broadly and deeply by Michael Bell.

Joseph A. Buttigieg, however, gives Maurice Beebe's
delineation for the period as follows:
[Modernism] is an international current of
sensibility which dominated art and literature from the last quarter of the nineteenth
century until about 1945—from the exhibitions of the 1870's and the first writings
of Henry James to about the time of the
Second World War. 3
Paul de Man notes that such confusion over the
dates for a period is inherent in the ambivalent status
of the term, which "is itself partly pragmatic and
descriptive, partly conceptual and normative."

4

For

purposes of this paper, Bell's limits will apply, and
the terms "Modernism" or "Modernist" will be used
pragmatically to refer to the suggested timespan, while
the term "modern" will be a more movable feast, a
conceptual reference to an attitude or the spirit which
characterizes an age.
For longer than two thousand years prior to the
Modern period, a worldview had obtained which was based
on the assumptions of Greek and Judeo-Christian thought.
Modernity challenges these assumptions, however, and
contemporary Deconstructionist theorists are trying to
prove that Joyce, the foremost prose writer of the
twentieth century, writing when that classical view was
falling from grace and the modern perspective was forcing

itself upon the intellectual world, is, in fact, in his
work—all works considered as one work—undermining the
very tradition which critics consider his foundation.
Therefore, a possible manner of viewing Joyce is
through an investigation of ways in which he remains
within the Modern tradition and ways he can be seen as
joining those who see Western tradition being demolished
and new ground being prepared.

Good criticism, says

Robert Langbaum, must reanimate familiar texts by asking
contemporary questions of them, "thus clarifying the
texts and deepening their mysteries."

The question

for today's literary theorists is not "What does the
book mean?" but "How does meaning arise?"

Here, within

the apparently straightforward presentation of two
questions, appears one of the hazards and difficulties
of writing about contemporary literary criticism:
Deconstructionists use common words in uncommon ways;
thus, in the two questions the word "meaning" does not
"mean" the same thing.

One who would study these matters

must learn an entirely new vocabulary, and the way in
which Ulysses and Finnegans Wake are read and valued
will be linked to an entire theory of literature.
Regardless of their theoretical biases and the eras
in which they write, critics have acclaimed Ulysses as
unique.

Because of its uniqueness, contemporary literary

critics would like to displace Joyce from his Modernist
position and move him to a position within their purview.
From its publication in 1922 until the present,
Ulysses has elicited thunderclaps of critical response.
The 1982 centennial celebration is the second major
focus on Joyce.

The first one, ten years earlier, noted

the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Ulysses.
In 1972 appeared critical works such as Ulysses: Fifty
Years, edited and with an introduction by Thomas F.
Staley.

Staley notes that fifteen years earlier, Richard

Ellmann had begun his biography of Joyce with the statement that we are still learning to be James Joyce's
contemporaries, to understand our interpreter.

Staley

says that the essays in his volume, written from a fiftyyear perspective and focusing on a variety of persistent
critical and interpretive problems, have also in a
large way "measured the influence of Ulysses on modern
literature" (p. vii).
Hugh Kenner, in his Ulysses, offers a concise and
helpful section on critical sequels to Joyce's Ulysses
from its publication in 1922 through Marilyn French's The
Book as Word (1976) up to 1978, when Kenner's Joyce's
7
Voices was released.
In his preliminary remarks Kenner
notes that there has always been controversy over what
kind of book Ulysses is.

He quotes Alfred Noyes, who

said that no foulness conceivable to the mind of man
had not been "poured forth into its imbecile pages,"
which Noyes also found "bad simply as writing" and
"obscure through sheer disorder of the syntax."8
Though Carl Jung was one of the more perceptive
early appraisers of the importance of Joyce's work,
Hermione de Almeida gives the following remarks of Jung
on the stylessness of Ulysses: "If worms were gifted
with literary powers they would write with the sympathetic
nervous system for lack of a brain. . . . something of
Q

this kind has happened to Joyce.

..."

The uniqueness of Joyce and of Ulysses has been
hailed by many writers.

Ellmann calls him "the major

prose stylist of his century."

H. A. Kelley, comment-

ing on the stream of consciousness technique which Joyce
employs, says that "the only really significant works
that have made extensive use of stream of consciousness
are Ulysses and Strange Interlude."

Kelley concludes

his article with these words: "And it seems also to be
true that only in Ulysses has the method been completely
successful.

It is another of the ways in which Ulysses

is unique" (p. 12).
Referring to Joyce's refusal to be confined by any
subject, de Almeida says,"The story of the novel's
accretion (by a third more its original size) is probably

unique in literature" (p. 138). Bell calls Ulysses
"the most substantial and comprehensive expression of
literary modernism by a British writer" (p. 3 ) .
Fortunately, the major Joyce scholars from the past
are still able to take part in the latest celebration.
Writing in the centenary year, Kenner pays tribute to
Joyce in these words: "Writing as we know it is
unthinkable without him: imagine physics without
12
Einstein."
Anthony Burgess comments wryly that no
other author "so drives people to extravagance, madness,
13
sober devotion, and academic pedantry."
Not only are the major Joyce scholars alive and
well and writing centenary tributes, but one of them,
Ellmann, whose James Joyce has been called "the best
literary biography of our time," a work which, since its
initial publication in 1959 has established itself as
the ultimate authority on Joyce's life, now offers a
revised edition in honor of the Joyce centenary.

Ex-

pressing gratitude to the Oxford University Press for
the "indulgent view" which it has taken toward the
project over the past twenty-three years, Ellmann makes
the following statement as the second edition is released:
"I have been moved and amused by fresh instances of
14
Joyce's originality and bizarreness."

Buttigieg says that anyone attempting an authentically new approach to Joyce must steer clear of the tireless quest for "systems and systems within systems."
Ideally, notes Buttigieg, the task of liberating the
reader of Joyce's work from the boundaries within which
traditional literary interpretation has confined him
should involve a detailed study of the history of
Western metaphysics, a careful examination of the
novelistic tradition, and a close consideration of the
massive body of criticism which now surrounds and obscures
the texts.

Such a mammoth task of deconstruction would

be, notes Buttigieg, a "breakthrough" for the readers
of Joyce, for all those interested in the study of the
novel, and, most importantly, for anyone engaged in an
exploration of Modernism.

Indeed, he says, it would be

"a necessary and desirable move in the direction of
rewriting literary history" (p. 145).

Buttigieg's

program serves as a major structuring device for this
paper.
First, a review of the classical metaphysical
tradition will be presented, along with a brief
presentation of the traditional concept of language
and literature.

This will be followed by an analyzation

of the direct influence of Vico on Joyce's Ulysses,
with particular emphasis on the first three chapters.
Because contemporary literary critics—both Structuralists
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and Deconstructionists--employ concepts and a vocabulary
derived chiefly from the writing of the Swiss linguist
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), a detailed section
dealing with these concepts and key phrases will follow
the Vico segment.

Included will be a general introduc-

tion to the structuralist movement and a focus on the
writing of Jacques Derrida.
Derrida was selected for special emphasis because,
as Jonathan Culler says, his readings combine what is
ordinarily thought of as the literary play of language
with philosophical rigor,

not in some mild-mannered

compromise, but "in their most radical forms."

What

gives Derrida's writings their special power, says
Culler, is this combination: he argues within a
particular philosophical system but at the same time
attempts through the productivity of language to breach
or exceed that system (Sturrock, p. 179). The productivity of language is also one of Joyce's passions, so it
may appear that he and his would-be captors are not so
far apart theoretically as might appear at first glance.
A Derrida perspective will follow the general
introduction to the Structuralist and Deconstructionist
positions, with "Derrida" being used both as the name of
the theorist and as an example of synecdoche, in the
sense that he is representative of a certain approach.

This perspective will be enriched by contributions from
other critics who voice opinions close to those of
Derrida.

In this portion, ways in which each cherished

notion from the Western metaphysical tradition is
currently being subverted will be shown.
In reference to Buttigieg's outline, a "careful"
examination of the novelistic tradition is beyond the
scope of this paper, though the topic will be broached
at appropriate points in the text.

However, a considera-

tion of the body of criticism which now surrounds the
texts can be made.

Because the Deconstructionist

position is less familiar than the traditional one, the
decision has been made to touch upon several passages
and techniques in Ulysses which delight current theorists,
passages which Deconstructionists seize upon in order to
demonstrate that Joyce really is a Contemporary writer,
after all.

Such a treatment will necessarily be more

shallow than that in the Vico section, but it will be a
beginning, an indication of the scope of current
activity and of the potentiality for further investigation,
The conclusion of this paper will comprise a more
specifically Derridean approach and the writer's
measurement of the likelihood that the Deconstructionists
will be able to claim Joyce for their own.
ment

Such an assess-

will be carried out in a manner suggested by

10

E. D. Hirsch's probability theory, as he presents it in
Validity in Interpretation.

It is hoped that, rather

than presenting dogmatic answers at the end of the paper,
the writer can reanimate a familiar text by asking
contemporary questions.

This paper is only a beginning,

such a one as Edward Said speaks of:
A beginning is what I think scholarship
ought to see itself as, for in that light
scholarship or criticism revitalizes itself.
. . . a beginning methodologically unites a
practical need with a theory, an intention
with a method. For the scholar or researcher,
a beginning develops when the condition of
his reality becomes equal to the generosity
of his, of everyman's intellectual potential.
To call this a radical beginning is to risk
repeating a hackneyed expression. Yet a
root is always one among many, and I believe
the beginning radically to be a method or
intention among many, never the radical method
or intention. Thus beginnings for the critic
restructure and animate knowledge, not as
already-achieved result, but "as something to
be done, as a task and as a search."16

Chapter II
Language and Literature:
The Mirrors of Ourselves?
The first thing to be done, according to Buttigieg's
program, is a detailed study of the history of Western
metaphysics.

The long-standing Western tradition is too

familiar to require elaboration, but its chief characteristic, primarily as presented in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, will be mentioned for purposes of contrast
with contemporary beliefs.

Beginning with Parmenides,

an attempt is made to understand the universe by means
of a logical investigation that is a priori, appealing
to meanings of terms rather than to the evidence of the
senses.

The use of very general principles is viewed as

sufficient for arriving at a true account of reality,
where the truly real is associated with singleness and
changelessness.
Plato's theory of Ideas or Forms and his notion that
all things come under the form of the good not only
influenced thinkers in the past, but his ideas continue
to be a force to be reckoned with: deconstructionists
must have some solid structure to tear down in order to
build back.

Soul, or mind, as the ultimate source of

observed motions is a Platonic (or Socratic) idea, as are
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considerations of being, sameness, difference, rest,
and motion.

Plato uses generic concepts in the mythical

account of the construction of the physical universe by
a godlike artisan using an ideal pattern as a blueprint.
From Aristotle come the concepts of being and unity
and of categories, under which all the types of truth
claims that possibly can be made are made.

In regard to

language, Aristotle believes that language uses all of
these types (and no more) and that the words used to
convey the ideas correspond to objects in the world of
sense ["real" world?].

For Aristotle, to be is to be

an individual, and the being of a thing is primarily its
nature or identifying features, rather than the fact that
it is.
With the birth and death of Christ and subsequent
meditation and speculation on his significance comes,
among other concepts, that of the Christian logos theory.
Plotinus, usually considered the founder of Neoplatonism
and an extremely influential thinker, adds to the more
ancient theories that of salvation to be found by the
human mind tracking up to the mind of the divine Logos.
His philosophy also asserts the unreality, or halfreality, of the things of everyday experience, as well
as the illusory character of change, motion, space, and
time.

He claims the superior reality of soul or mind

over matter and conceives of goodness and intelligence

13

as substantial things.
During the Middle Ages the problem of universals
dominates.

Species and genera are regarded as paradigms,

archetypes, or exemplars of particular things.

Christian

Platonism—for example, St. Anselm's proof of God's
existence—is a viable theory.

Thanks to translations

of Greek and Arabic texts into Latin in the late Middle
Ages, Aristotle becomes, in effect, a new philosopher
appearing on the scene and dominating it as if he were
a contemporary; the Metaphysics is the stimulus for such
thinkers as St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of
Ockham, and others in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries.
Aquinas's metaphysics is an attempt to explain the
distinctions between essence and existence, necessary
and contingent existence, and particulars and universals,
using the language and much of the metaphysical outlook
of Aristotle.

God, for Aquinas, is immaterial and,

hence, one and unchanging.

Finitude, contingency,

plurality, and change Aquinas associates with matter.
The successors of William of Ockham push his views
in a direction that anticipates Hume and even twentiethcentury logical positivism, saying that persons can talk
meaningfully only about what they are acquainted with
through the senses, and, since humans are acquainted

14

only with particulars, all discourse about things refers
ultimately only to particulars.

The existence of a

particular is never an analytic necessity or an analytic
consequence of the existence of some other; hence, all
meaningful statements about things are only probable.
Rene Descartes is traditionally considered to be
the originator of modern philosophy, but the ideas most
commonly associated with him are not original with him.
For example, the cogito ergo sum argument and the view
that our own existence is the ultimate certainty since
we can be certain of it while the existence of all other
things is in doubt can be found in the writings of
St. Augustine, as can the argument that nothing less
than God could have produced the idea of God in the
human mind.
The Ontological Argument had a famous history in
the Middle Ages, and the view that physical objects
have only geometrical attributes of shape and motion was
held by early Greek atomists.

But to say this is to

say only that Descartes uses a good deal of material
from old ruins in his work of building from the foundation in order to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences.
Deconstructionist?

Was Descartes the first

More recently, Husserl correctly

insists that before the cogito can be stated, the
construct "I" would have to be validated.

15

The originality of Descartes is most evident in his
conceptions of pholosophical method and pholosophical
truth.

No metaphysical assertion is to be believed

unless it is understood with the kind of clarity and
distinctness that mathematical propositions have, and
its truth either must be so intrinsically obvious t h a t —
like the postulates of geometry—it cannot be doubted,
or it must be proved with the same rigor with which
theorems are proved in geometry.
Descartes's philosophy can be viewed in large part
as an effort to show that if metaphysical propositions
are understood clearly and distinctly, their truth is
certain.

These revolutionary and influential claims, as

Descartes and his followers understand them, amount to
a demand that metaphysics be subject to a kind of
rigorous intellectual discipline best illustrated in
mathematics and the exact physical sciences.
Spinoza, following one interpretation of Descartes's
demand for clarity and distinctness, thinks of metaphysics
as a deductive account of the universe to be developed
from a few definitions—notably, the definition of
substance as a being that requires nothing outside itself
to be or to be conceived—and self-evident assumptions.
For Spinoza, the universe, described in terms of the
attributes extension or thought, is a mechanical system

16

in which all happenings are links in a chain of physical
causation.
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz is famous, among
other things, for his assertions that a complete
description of any one substance would be a description
of the entire universe "from a point of view" and that
space and time are relations among things, not things in
their own right.

Furthermore, Leibniz believes that the

appearance of causal relations between things is illusory, reflecting God's deliberate prearrangement rather
than any real influence exerted by one thing on another.
John Locke's main contribution lies in his critical
discussion of substance and essence.

His most important

and original criticism concerns the notion of essence—
the notion of what a thing is in contrast to what it
is made of, how big it is, its locations, its age, and
the like.

Nietzsche expresses a similar view when he

says that what someone essentially i.s_ begins to be
revealed when his talent abates, when he stops showing
what he can do, talent being a form of cosmetics.
Locke reasons that we cannot explain why things appear
as they do but can only describe the way they do appear.
The effect of Locke's position is to deny the possibility
of metaphysical knowledge.
George Berkeley, one of the earliest theorists of

17

language, asserts that the grammatical distinction
between subject and predicate has no counterpart in a
distinction between things and properties.

Concluding

that meaningful talk can take place only about mental
entities, ideas in the mind, he arrives at a kind of
phenomenalism (things existing exactly as they appear
to the senses) and idealism (things existing only as
objects of conscious perception, their being consisting
in their being perceived).

Berkeley is not thoroughgoing

in these positions, also thinking it meaningful to talk
about other minds and about God, even though such phenomena cannot be perceived directly.
Thoroughgoing phenomenalism appears with David
Hume, according to whom the notion of existence itself
signifies nothing beyond a greater or less degree of
force and vivacity attaching to sense impressions and
mental images.

Beliefs in the continuous existence of

physical objects and the presence of causal connections
between them are explained as effects of habitual associations of ideas for which there is, strictly speaking,
no evidence.
Immanuel Kant asks whether metaphysical knowledge
is even possible and, if not, how the questions that
gave rise to metaphysics in the past can be answered.
From Kant's point of view, the history of metaphysics

18

is a story of dogmatism versus skepticism.

Dogmatists,

sharing a confidence that a metaphysician can give an
account of the nature of reality using a priori reasoning,
believe that metaphysics can, on the basis of purely
logical or conceptual considerations, answer with absolute certainty questions about the origin of the universe,
the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul.
Skeptics, on the other hand, are empiricists; for
them there are no universal and necessary truths of
fact, and reasoning alone, in contrast to observing and
experimenting, is of no use whatsoever in answering
questions about the existence or nature of things.
Accordingly, Kant's critical philosophy is an effort to
show what human knowledge is like and what its limits
must necessarily be.

For Kant, the mind itself has its

own categories which give order to all human action, but
they do not correspond with the external world.

There

is an ego shared by all, a transcendental ego, and there
are a priori and necessary truths which can be justified
and can even be supported by arguments—but by moral
arguments, not speculative arguments.

Dogmatic meta-

physics can thus be explained and even in a sense
vindicated.

It cannot be taken seriously as a source

of knowledge, however.
Kant's own metaphysical position is idealistic.
Aristotle's categories reappear somewhat altered in

19

Kant's philosophy as forms of judgment.

The most

immediate and obvious effect of Kant's thought can be
seen in the idealistic systems of his younger German
contemporaries and successors, Fichte, Schelling,
Schopenhauer, and Hegel.

Among the idealists, it is

Hegel whose metaphysical outlook has probably had more
general intellectual influence than that of any other
single recent philosopher.
Hegel concludes that all things shade off into
their opposites and that the connections between things
we establish in thought are as much a part of the things
as their so-called inherent properties.

His idealism

is an evolutionary pantheism which contrasts not only
with materialism in the traditional sense but with any
metaphysical position associating reality with some
kind of hard definiteness.

For Hegel, reality is asso-

ciated with self-expression and all-inclusiveness, not
with given things or fact.
Largely through the influence of German idealism
and especially of Hegel, metaphysics in the nineteenth
century generally meant a priori cosmology and particularly an idealist cosmology contrasted (and even opposed)
to the alleged mechanistic and materialist assumptions
of science.

Though much philosophical speculation has

has gone on since Hegel's day, this review of traditional

20

metaphysics will conclude, because it is at this point
of intellectual development that a rupture occurs, a
phenomenon which Roland Barthes calls a "crisis of
confidence" in the mid-nineteenth century, as noted by
o
Terence Hawkes.

More will be written about this rupture

in a later section.
Growing out of the metaphysical speculations which
had engaged the greatest minds over the centuries, and
closely connected with them, is a traditional view of
language and literature, of artistic endeavor.

In this

view, notes Jennifer Levine, language is transparent,
3
able to represent and to communicate.
The goal of
criticism is communication, and criticism is seen as a
descriptive tool at the service of the work of art,
continues Levine.

Arguments "unroll," and there is a

distinction made between artistic, or literary,
language on the one hand and critical, or ordinary,
language on the other (p. 19).

Categories such as

"novel" or "fiction" or "oeuvre" are important, and
there is a sharp distinction drawn, says Levine,
between fact and fiction, that is, between a language
which is responsible to an external world of reference
and a language which is allowed to "lie" (p. 19).
The subject in the traditional view, notes Levine,
is considered to be "there," a given which language

21

struggles to represent.

Within this aesthetics of

harmony and consistency there is a center—such as God,
Father, Author, or meta-language—which may fix the
text (or even the subject) in some privileged way. The
dominant image Levine sees is that of a line of development or of the totality of a circle, reinforcing the
idea of a final resting place, or resolution (pp. 19-21).
A unique meaning is sought, writes Levine, and
discourse is grasped as an identity (that is, word
equals thing).

In this view, language is seen to be

"repressed" when it functions as the instrument of
communication, and an etymological search for origins is
valorized (p. 24). Regarding Joyce, critics bemoan
the difficulties of his works, and the aim of Joyce
studies is to place him firmly within the classical
literary tradition (p. 18).
Additionally, words refer to reality in an unambiguous way in stories that have distinct beginnings,
middles, and ends.

Pattern and order are assumed and

valued, and progress is shown through a process of
ricorso in works by stable, purposeful authors with moral
purpose who create harmony and reveal consistency in the
face of reality.

The concept of validity is tied to a

concept of the author, and the writer exerts total
authority over his creation analogous to that of God over
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his.

Diachronic, historically projected images go

outward to God, oscillate inward to man.
is stressed, and identity is important.

Individualism
Readers see

"through" the words to the meaning "beyond," and meanings
are located above language, rather than being tied to it.
As an example of the kind of interpretation used
for many years by critics seeking a "key" to Ulysses
(which approach Buttigieg pejoratively calls "the tireless quest for systems within systems"), the following
section will comprise three divisions: an overview of
Vico's New Science, a presentation of Vichian influences
on the first three chapters of Ulysses, and an investigation of some of the many meanings of Stephen's names and
epithets.

Chapter III
Beginnings: An Investigation into the
Influence of Vico's New Science on the
First Three Chapters of Joyce's Ulysses
Vico, says Harry Levin, was James Joyce's favorite
philosopher.

More has been written, however, about

Vichian influences on Finnegans Wake than on Ulysses.
Levin cites a passage from Finnegans Wake (p. 255)
wherein "the producer (Mr. John Baptister Vickar)" is
referred to.

Vickar, says Levin, is better known as

the philosopher Giambattista Vico.

Calling Vico a

rhetorician as well as a historian, Levin says Vico
shares Joyce's twofold preoccupation with language and
myth (p. 142). Richard Ellmann, writing of the structural problems Joyce encountered while writing
Finnegans Wake, says that Joyce restudied Vico.

2

Ellmann

says that Joyce, in addition to admiring Vico's use of
etymology and mythology to uncover the significance of
events, admires Vico's positive division of human history
into recurring cycles, each set off by a thunderclap of
theocratic, aristocratic, and democratic ages, followed
by a ricorso or return.

Joyce does not share Vico's

interest in these cycles as literal chronological divisions of "eternal ideal history," says Ellmann, but as
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psychological ones, ingredients which keep combining
and recombining in ways which seem always to be deja vus
(p. 564).

"I use his cycles as a trellis," he tells
3
Padraic Colum.
Writing to Harriet Weaver about Vico,
as he is working on Finnegans Wake, Joyce says, "I
would not pay overmuch attention to these theories,
beyond using them for all they are worth, but they have
gradually forced themselves on me through circumstances
4

of my own life."

Ellmann cites a letter which Joyce

wrote to Harriet Weaver on May 24, 1924, in which he
urges her now to read Vico's New Science, as with
Ulysses he had urged her to read the Odyssey (p. 575).
Ellmann reports a conversation Joyce had with the Danish
writer Tom Kristensen.

Kristensen, it seems, was trying

to learn whether he had been correct to write in a
review that Bloom was God, Stephen Jesus, and Molly Earth.
Joyce, says Ellmann, would neither confirm nor deny,
evidently preferring not to explain himself.

Joyce

refers Kristensen to Vico when he asks for clues about
Work in Progress [Finnegans Wake].

Kristensen asks,

"But do you believe in the Scienza Nuova?"

Joyce is

supposed to have replied, "I don't believe in any science,
but my imagination grows when I read Vico as it doesn't
when I read Freud or Jung" (p. 706).
From the above examples, one can easily recognize
the influence of Vico's New Science on Finnegans Wake.
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Though Joyce mentions Vico by name only once in the first
chapters of Ulysses, other Vichian influences can be
noted by the careful reader.

The fact that Joyce

restudies Vico and says that Vico's ideas gradually
forced themselves upon him shows that Vico's influence
has not been negligible during the earlier years.
Before some of these influences are suggested, an
overview of the New Science is in order.

An understand-

ing of the terms used in the title will serve to introduce the text.

Principles of New Science of Giambat-

tista Vico concerning the Common Nature of the Nations
is the title of the third edition, which appeared in
July 1744, six months after Vico's death, says Max
Harold Fisch, modern translator and editor of that same
edition.

The first edition (1725) had an additional

clause: by which are found the Principles of Another
System of the Natural Law of the Gentes.

Vico evidently

referred to the first edition as his work on the
principles of humanity, says Fisch (p. xix).

Fisch's

introduction explains in great detail the meaning of
each work in the title and Vico's justification for
having chosen just these words.

Succinctly put, the

etymological meaning of Principles is "beginning"
(cf. B 1-9) (p. xx).

In the translators' preface,

Fisch and Bergin note that they have sometimes rendered
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principio as "principle" and sometimes rendered it as
"beginning."

As a quasi-technical term with Vico, say

the authors, "it means both at once, and it may fairly
be said that the ambivalence of this term is one of the
keys to Vico's thought" (p. viii).

This ambivalence may

have been one characteristic which spurred Joyce's
imagination and led him to prize Vico.
Leon Pompa, after giving a brief account of the
structure of the New Science, says it appears that
Vico's work is largely concerned with the questions of how
to understand and establish the truth in human history.
Truth says Vico, has come down to us enveloped in falsehood, because of the passage of time and changes in
in languages and customs.

He says it will be another

great labor of his science "to recover these grounds of
truth" (N£[ 150). The matters about which Vico seeks the
truth, the beginnings, are laid out in Book Four: The
Course the Nations Run.

Here Vico treats of three kinds

of natures, of customs, of natural law, of governments,
of languages, of characters, of jurisprudence, of
authority, of reason, of judgments, and of three sects
of times.

Vico's theories are cyclical, so it is not

surprising that discussion of one aspect involves
consideration of other aspects.

Pompa notes that each

phase in Vico's genetic sequence is a necessary condition
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of the next phase, because in it man acquires a certain
human capacity or disposition without which the institutions of the next phase could not be created (p. 126;
NS 238-244).

This same situation obtains in Ulysses,

says Clive Hart: "The technique is 'reflective'—an
understanding of any one part involves a grasp of the
whole."
for Joyce.

"Reflexive" is a key term both for Vico and
Related terms are "reflection" and

"advertence."

Advertence, notes A. Robert Caponigri,

is the proper Vichian symbol for the presence of reflecQ

tion in any context.
In Element 53, Vico shows the following progression:
"Men at first feel without perceiving, then they perceive
with a troubled and agitated spirit, finally they reflect
[advert] with a clear mind" (NS 218). Men, as it were,
become human by reflecting on their past.

In earlier

stages, they "have the experience, but miss the meaning."
Pompa calls Vico's science the most complete yet
economic causal explanation of human history accessible
to man (p. 144). Vico himself makes the same claim:
"Then let us ask ourselves if, among all human possibilities, so many and such various and diverse institutions
could in any other way have had simpler or more natural
beginnings" (NS 630)•
What is the content of The New Science?

If everything
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is cyclical and each phase depends on the development of
the previous phase, how can one say what it is, if it
always is becoming something else?

Pompa helps answer

these questions by noting that Vico takes for granted
that there are irreducible social aspects to human
history (p. 21). Vico puts it this way:
In view of the fact that the human race,
as far back as the memory of the world goes,
has lived and still lives conformably in
society, this axiom alone decides the great
dispute still waged by the best philosophers
and moral theologians against Carneades the
skeptic and Epicurus--a dispute which not
even Grotius could set at rest—namely,
whether law exists by nature, or whether man
is naturally sociable, which comes to the
same thing [309]. (NS 135)
Caponigri uses these words: "The proper study of mankind is . . . man in society, because here alone, in the
social structure, is the reality and fullness of man to
be discovered" (p. 56). Man, says Vico, beginning in
self-love, desires principally his own good.

Having

taken a wife and begotten children, however, he desires
his good and the good of his family.

Groups of families

compose civil life, so the man comes to desire the welfare of the city along with his own welfare.

The

progression of concern extends to groups of cities
(nations) and groups of nations (the entire human race)
(NS 341).

Levin, considering all of Joyce's works as

one work, says (surely not accurately) that Joyce rounds
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out Vico's cycle by showing the self-centered man in
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the common man in
Ulysses, and mankind in Finnegans Wake (p. 168).
The first three principles of the science are that
all nations, barbarous as well as civilized, keep three
human customs: all have some religion, all contract
solemn marriages, all bury their dead (NS 333). Vico
traces the origin of gentile society and thereby gentile
humanity to the origins of these three institutions and
shows how the rest of culture is involved in them or
derives from them.

Paragraph 629, for example, gives a

detailed description of the way in which everything
grows out of religion.

In another place, Vico points to

religion as the basis of societal man in these words:
By reason of all this, we must start from
some notion of God such as even the most
savage, wild, and monstrous men do not
lack. That notion we show to be this:
that man, fallen into despair of all the
succors of nature, desires something
superior to save him. But something
superior to nature is God, and this is the
light that God has shed on all men. Confirmation may be found in a common human
custom: that libertines grown old, feeling
their natural forces fail, turn naturally
to religion. (NS 339)
Poetry is the master key to the new science.
asserts the following:
We find that the principle of these
origins both of language and of letters

Vico
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lies in the fact that the first gentile
peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of
nature, were poets [216] who spoke in poetic
characters. (NS 34)
Caponigri explains the relationships this way: as poetry
is the key to the mind of primitive man, and myth is
the key to poetry, so is language the key to myth (p. 8 ) .
The proofs of the new science Vico sees as these: the
naturalness of the means, the unfolding institutive order
in which the means are employed, and the end thereby
served—the preservation of the human race (NS 343,344).
The central, controlling methodological postulate
of Vico is that doctrines must take their beginnings
from that of the matters which they treat (NS 314), or,
as Fisch states more clearly, "Doctrines or theories
must begin where the matters they treat begin" (NS,
p. xx).
The path of the new science is both oscillatory and
cyclical, and the two types of movement can be, and
often are, simultaneous.

Vico's theory of history is

that the world of civil society has certainly been made
by men, and its principles are therefore to be found
within the modifications of the human mind.

He wonders

that philosophers have bent their energies to studying
nature, since only God can understand nature, because
he made it.

Philosophers should, instead, have studied
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the civil world, because, since men have made it, they
can understand it (NS 331).
Caponigri calls the essence of this theory of
history "the synthesis of time and idea" (p. 53). Man's
distention between his own finitude and the infinity
toward which he tends is "the very essence of time,"
says Caponigri (p. 77). This oscillatory movement
traces a dynamic path, as Caponigri sees it, between a
belief in the existence and power of God, a custom of
the burial of the dead (inseparably associated with the
immortality of the soul), and a primitive rite (marriage)
whose chief function Vico believes to be to insure the
sense of origin and perpetuity, "in which presence and
idea must abide" (p. 66).
Thus, man is continuously going back and forth
between what he is and what he may become.

The oscil-

latory path also can be seen in the tension between
knowledge and consciousness, that is, between philosophy
and philology, between the true (il vero) and the
merely certain (il certo).

Classical natural law7 says

Caponigri, had tended to sustain il vero and il certo in
radical opposition, but Vico wants a synthesis of the
two (p. 59). This is the way Vico phrases it:
Men who do not know what is true of things
take care to hold fast to what is certain,
so that, if they cannot satisfy their
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intellects by knowledge (scienza), their
wills at least may rest on consciousness
(conscienza). (NS 138)
Vico quotes Aristotle, who says that science has
to do with what is universal and eternal (NS 163).
The true, then, which is the object of knowledge, is
the universal and eternal.

Vico ties it all together

this way:
Philosophy contemplates reason, whence
comes knowledge of the true; philology
observes that of which human choice is
the author, of which comes consciousness
of the certain. (NS 138)
In spite of the scope and variety of the oscillatory
movement, a person who spends his time, energy, and
intellectual effort merely in going back and forth
never gets anywhere.

A way out for Vico is explained by

Caponigri as an "irrepressible tendency" which opposes
man as spirit to nature (p. 76). While this notion may
at first glance seem like another oscillatory movement,
Caponigri is calling our attention to further development
For nature is always commensurate with itself
and with the diversity of forms which may
arise within it; and for this reason nature
has no history, but returns ever upon itself
in the endless cycle of the deployment and
reabsorption of its forms and energy, with
no window on the infinite. (p. 76)
The inference to be drawn is that man can go beyond mere
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repetition toward some superior form of existence.
Caponigri expresses the goal when he writes that the
spirit of man is the time-spirit, "suspended between
the limited timelessness of nature and the unbounded
and timeless self-commensuration of God" (p. 77).
The "window on the infinite" serves to introduce
that aspect of Vico's theory which is perhaps best
known, that of ricorso, or recourse, and providence is
the operative force in what now becomes the cyclical
movement.

Vico states it this way:
Our new Science must therefore be a demonstration, so to speak, of what providence has
wrought in history, for it must be a history
of the institutions by which, without human
discernment or counsel, and often against the
designs of men, providence has ordered this
great city of the human race [B9]. For
though this world has been created in time
and particular, the institutions established
therein by providence are universal and
eternal [F6]. (NS 342)

Caponigri calls the program of the new science "the
supreme ricorso of the human spirit."

The spirit

descends into the inferno of its own beginnings only to
reascend, full of the reality of its own past, into the
light of its own idea (p. 165).

Caponigri sees this

movement as providence directing the finite subject of
history to his ideal term by movements back on its own
finitude (p. 98). Pompa wants it noticed that Vico
(NS 330-31) believes that the principles of historical
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knowledge are "rediscovered" rather than being merely
"found" in the human mind (p. 155).
That this movement is not simply up and down, back
and forth, Caponigri makes clear when he calls ricorso
"a reflective process by which the spontaneous life of
spirit is assumed and re-lived on the level of reflection and freedom.

It is lifted and advanced while it

retreats" (p. 133). A few pages later, he graphically
likens ricorso to a great hound circling to pick up the
trace which it has lost for the moment (p. 138).
Vico's work presents only the beginnings of the
new science, and the part it does present focuses on
beginnings.

This initial look into Ulysses focuses on

the first three chapters in concord with Harry Blamires's
view that the first three episodes are "the acorn to the
oak of the other fifteen."

They are the beginning of

a quest book, one of whose concerns is for the truth
about beginnings.

The primary source is the 1946 Random

House edition.
When we read "Aristotle's phrase formed itself
within the gabbled verses and floated out into the
studious silence of the library of Saint Genevieve where
he had read, sheltered from the sin of Paris, night by
night" (p. 26), one thing is immediately obvious: Joyce
is forthrightly letting the reader know whose ideas
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Stephen is thinking about.

As with almost every other

Joycean sentence, several other things are going on at
the same time,

but the use of "Aristotle" is comforting

to the reader who approaches Joyce in fear and trembling,
The reader may not understand what Stephen means when
he says in the previous sentence "It must be movement
then, an actuality of the possible as possible," but he
appreciates being told that if he wants to make the
effort to know more about what's going on, "Aristotle"
is the place to start.
Joyce is not so obliging toward the reader in
regard to Vico's influence.

The only direct reference

to Vico appears on page 25: "Vico Road, Dalkey."

The

casual reader probably would not even pause at this
point to wonder why Joyce gives that address for one of
Stephen's pupils.

Even the reader who is looking for

Vichian influences will wonder at first reading about
its significance.

To tell the truth, merely reading

the book involves employment of the Vichian ricorso
method.

Ulysses, as Hart quips, "cannot be read—it

can only be reread.

Material in early pages is unintel-

ligible until we have grasped material from later pages"
(p. 39). The final answer to the puzzlement of Joyce's
Vico Road reference, Levin believes, appears only in
Finnegans Wake, where Joyce has a time machine, the
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"wholemole millwheeling vicociclometer."

The hero "moves

in vicious circles," while Vico himself is brought back
to Ireland to become the eponymous hero of the rocky
road to Dublin, of a street in Dalkey mentioned during
the history lesson.

Levin calls our attention to this

sentence in Finnegans Wake: "The Vico road goes round
and round to meet where terms begin" (pp. 145-46).

Thus,

Joyce's use of the name during the history lesson
probably indicates that history can be seen as repeating
itself, that boys (and historians) have always struggled
over history lessons and will continue to do so, that
memories are going round and round in Stephen's mind.
Also, figrolls lie in Armstrong's sachel

and he

curls them between his palms.

A moment later, Armstrong

looks round at his classmates.

These images of round-

ness reinforce Joyce's reference to Vico's cyclical
theories and warn the wary reader that more convolutions
can be expected as the book unfolds.

Joyce says his

imagination grows when he reads Vico, and it is reasonable to think Joyce hopes that his readers' imaginations
also may grow as they read him.
One such imaginative venture is a suggestion that
the use of "Vico Road, Dalkey" might point to something
in addition to cyclical theories.

It is possible that

Joyce uses the name here as an indication of his and
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Vico's concern with the nature of the relationship
between fathers and sons, between parents and children.
It will be recalled that Vico considers the move from
self-centeredness to concern for family the first step
in the civilizing process [NS 341]. When Ulysses opens,
Stephen is presented as a son troubled by questions
concerning these relationships.

The memory of his having

refused to humor his dying mother haunts him, and he is
living in rented quarters because he and his father
don't get on.

Proof that the trauma of the circumstances

surrounding his mother's death haunts Stephen is seen in
the fact that twice (pp. 7, 12) he refers to her in
this manner:
Silently, in a dream she had come to him
after her death, her wasted body within
its loose brown graveclothes giving off
an odour of wax and rosewood, her breath,
that had bent upon him, mute, reproachful,
a faint odour of wetted ashes.
On page 28 he refers once more to "an odour of
rosewood and wetted ashes."

As an aside, it can be

noted that Hart calls this inward-turning technique,
whereby words and ideas are given meaning as much by
their reference to other parts of the text as by their
accumulation of dictionary denotation, "the principal
unifying method used by Joyce in A Portrait; later, in
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, it becomes an even more
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important means of communication" (p. 34).
Mulligan's cynical remarks about the sea's being a
grey sweet mother, his reference to the "scrotumtightening
sea," and his statement that his aunt believes Stephen
killed his mother (p. 7) must have further roiled
Stephen's already unquiet mind.

Stephen's theory about

Hamlet, which is introduced on page 17, is, among other
things, a study of the relationship between Hamlet and
his father.

Mulligan describes the theory for Haines

in these words: "He proves by algebra that Hamlet's
grandson is Shakespeare's grandfather and that he himself is the ghost of his own father" (p. 19). This is
the first of several parallels that are drawn between
Stephen and Hamlet as the day progresses.

To mention

only two, both are troubled sons, both see the ghost of
a departed parent.
When Stephen's students beg him to tell them a
ghost story, he gives them instead a riddle, the answer
to which is a fox burying his grandmother under a hollybush (p. 28). But there is a very real sense in which
Stephen views his life as a ghost story, or ghost's
story; history and ghostory are closely related.

His

mother is "a ghostwoman with ashes on her breath" (p. 39).
References to breath connect the dead mother with the
live students.

Armstrong has "a sweetened boy's breath"
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(p. 25) from having eaten the figrolls.

Looking at these

boys, Stephen is reminded of girls their age whom he
has known—Edith, Ethel, Gerty, Lily.

"Their likes:

their breaths, too, sweetened with tea and jam . . ."
he muses (p. 26).
Blamires points out that when Uncle Richie, in the
hypothetical visit Stephen makes to his Aunt Sara,
sings Ferrando's aria from the first act of II Trovatore,
a mysterious father-son relationship is introduced
(p. 14).

In Ulysses, words not actually heard cause

Stephen to remember having lied about his family when
he attended Clongowes School, because he wished to have
relatives he could brag about (p. 40). The parents who
live in Vico Road, Dalkey, are "well-off people, proud
that their eldest son was in the navy" (p. 25). The
implication is that they are equally proud of this son
who quietly nibbles on figrolls during history lesson.
Armstrong, were he a mind to brag on his relatives,
could do so without having to stretch the truth.

It is

surely not reading too much into the text to say that
Stephen wishes he could enjoy such a relationship.

In

fact, Joyce tells us "With envy he watched their faces"
(p. 26). Messages for these boys can be delivered to
their fathers' addresses; they are living away from home
temporarily because indulgent fathers are treating them
to the best.

If Stephen's father were as wealthy and
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fond as the fathers of these boys, then Stephen would
not have to be struggling for his very existence.
These, then, are some of the images that may "go
around" the Vico Road reference.

There will be no way

to prove other Vichian influences, but if it can be
shown that Joyce puzzles over some of the same questions
Vico puzzles over and that some of Joyce's methods match
Vico's theories and methods, then an inference of
influence will be valid.

There is a sense in which Joyce

begins Ulysses, as well as Finnegans Wake, with reference
to the Vichian thunderclap which he admires.

In the

opening scene, Mulligan, addressing Stephen, says "0, my
name for you is best: Kinch, the knifeblade" (p. 6 ) .
The etymological root of "blade" is bhel , one of whose
derivatives is "thunderbolt," according to the appendix
of The American Heritage Dictionary.

Also, one of the

two midwives swings her midwife's bag "lourdily" (p. 38),
which is a variant of "lower," which means "with a dark
and ominous look, as of thunderheads."
In addition to a shared concern for the nature of
the relationship between fathers and sons, parents and
children, which has already been mentioned, Joyce shares
with Vico the following interests, evidence for all of
which can be found in the first three chapters: the
importance of language, poetry, philology; religion;
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irrationality; beginnings, creation; history, memory,
time, the past; pattern, rhythm, design; search for
truth; providence, God.

Just as an overview of the

New Science was deemed necessary because each principle
is related to another principle, so is it impossible to
isolate each of the objects of concern from its neighbors.
The unifying principle for the group is that interest in
each reflects an interest in a search for the truth
about beginnings.
The importance of language can serve as well as any
other arbitrary beginning for noting correspondences
between Vico and Joyce.

Chapter Three of Ulysses is

chiefly concerned with language, though words and what
they can be made to do are always one of Joyce's chief
concerns.

Here is an example of his talking about

words and playing with them: "Wavewhite wedded words
shimmering on the dim tide" (p. 11). Another reference
appears on page 45.

Stephen, walking on the beach, steps

toward the edge of the sea until his feet begin to sink
into the sand.

The flood follows him when he turns to

regain a vantage point and sit on a rock to contemplate
the carcass of a dog and the gunwale of a boat stuck
in the sand.

Seeing the gunwale in the sand reminds

Stephen that Louis Veuillet has called Gautier's prose
un coche ensable.

"These heavy sands," says Stephen,
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"are language tide and wind have silted here."

Tide and

wind (flux) have silted the language just as they have
silted the gunwale (cf. NS 150). He goes on to say that
sands and stones are "heavy of the past" (p. 45). More
of that later.
One of Vico's delights is to assign origins to all
the articulated languages of the world, linking philosophy
with philology by means of a "mental dictionary," which
he discusses in Element XXII (NS 161-64).

Joyce shares

that delight in languages and generously sprinkles words
from many of these languages—along with some original
creations of his own—throughout his works.

In Ulysses,

we find Introibo ad altare Dei (Latin, p. 5 ) , epi oinopa
ponton (Greek, p. 7 ) , Begob, ma'am (Irish colloquial,
p. 14), Norn de dieu (French, p. 22), Uebermensch (German,
p. 24), and maestro di color che sanno (Italian, p. 38).
He uses forms of words altered so drastically that
they are scarcely recognizable: "gossoon" for "garcon,"
for example (p. 4 4 ) . He uses common Irish words that
are unfamiliar to most English readers: "tanist" and
"sept" for "heir apparent" to the "clan" (p. 44), which,
when one realizes what is going on, is just one more
way of viewing relationships between fathers and sons.
"Contransmagnificandjewbangtantiality" (p. 39) is heavy
with meaning, if ever word were.

The fact that Stephen
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teaches history and poetry cannot be without significance,
for the relationship between the two has been shown by
Vico to be a paramount importance.

Joyce's concern with

the technique of language appears on page 48 when a
phrase comes into Stephen's mind which pleases h i m —
"Mouth to her kiss."

Next he says "No.

'em.

Mouth to her mouth's kiss."

Glue 'em well.

Must be two of
Just

following that, Stephen mouths and lips unspeeched
breaths: "ooeeehah . . . wayawayawayawayawayaway" (p. 49).
Unspeeched speech is epitomized in the micturated "fourworded wavespeech: seesco, hrss, rsseeiss, oos."
Having finished, Stephen watches the residue, and Joyce
exuberantly uses poetic language to describe silence:
"It flows purling, widely flowing, floating foampool,
flower unfurling" (p. 50). The carefully chosen images
reflect both the cyclical theories and a concern for
language.
In satiric writing, a time-honored custom is to call
attention to a matter quite effectively by presenting
its opposite.

This device Joyce employs in his presenta-

tion of Vico's first three principles—burial of the
dead (and immortality of the soul), marriage (which
insures a sense of origin and perpetuity), and a belief
in the existence of God and the power of religion—as
viewed by Buck Mulligan, who denigrates all three
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vociferously.

His attitude toward death, burial, and

immortality is shown when he taunts Stephen for not
bending to his mother's dying wish.

It is ironic that

Mulligan calls Stephen "sinister" (p. 7 ) , in view of
Mulligan's wickedness.

Later, when Stephen chides

Mulligan for having said, at the time of Mrs. Dedalus's
death, "0, it's only Dedalus whose mother is beastly
dead," Mulligan goes on to give his medical student's
version of death, completely ignoring whatever hopes
Stephen may entertain concerning a future life for the
spirit of his mother (p. 10).
Mulligan's attitude toward the sanctity of the
relationship between man and woman is shown at the beach
when a young man, a friend of his brother, passes along
the latest gossip about a mutual acquaintance, Seymour,
and a red-haired girl named Carlisle.

The friend is

fascinated by the idea of the girl's father's wealth,
but all Mulligan can do is ask "Is she up the pole?"
(p. 23). This crude question is followed by an even
cruder statement: "Redheaded women buck like goats."
Philology can be mentioned here, also.

On page 6,

Buck refers to his real name: "Malachi Mulligan, two
dactyls.

But it has a Hellenic ring, hasn't it?

Tripping and sunny like the buck himself."

Riding his

train of thought to the beginnings of marriage, Buck
grabs his side, crying that his rib is gone, mocking one
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of the creation stories from Genesis.
himself as the Ubermensch,

Referring to

he behaves as though he

were the father of humanity (p. 24).
Buck's outlook on religion is clear from his very
first appearance—as the presiding priest at a Black
Mass.

To mention only a few of the many indications, he

bears a bowl of shaving lather on which a mirror and a
razor lie crossed.

He intones "Introibo ad altare Dei,"

solemnly mounts the gunrest, gravely blesses the area,
make crosses in the air, and gurgles in his throat (p. 5)
Later, when Haines is making an earnest attempt to
discuss the theological interpretation of Hamlet with
Stephen (God/Christ being one more piece of the father/
son puzzle), Mulligan, playing the fool, begins to chant
the"3allad of the Joking Jesus"(pp. 20-21).

Joyce

paints this picture immediately Mulligan hushes:
He capered before them down towards the
fortyfoot hole, fluttering his winglike
hands, leaping nimbly, Mercury's hat
quivering in the fresh wind that bore back
to them his brief birdlike cries.
(p. 21)
In spite of Mulligan's blasphemous delivery, the
timeless themes of the ditty come through to Haines: the
importance of a written record, questions about
immortality, about the personality of Christ, about his
parents, about his relationship with his father.
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That Mulligan's foolishness causes Haines to reason
soberly is an example of what Vico would call inadvertence.

The passage is one which has been referred to

earlier—"without human discernment or counsel, and
often against the designs of men" (NS 342).

The

Encyclopaedia Britannica states flatly that Vico discovered the irrational.

The phrase above is the

generally accepted locus of Vico's statement on
irrationality.

Caponigri speaks of an immediate,

complete, and even joyful sensitivity and receptivity
to the multiplicity, the variety, the partial, even the
conflicting and mutually contradictory forms of society
and culture, and for the limited, the unideal, even
the selfish, utilitarian, and brutal motivations which
inspire men's action and thus enter into the composition
of the social structure of humanity in its concrete
historical reality.

Caponigri says that Vico character-

izes this element as the Tacitean theme of his science,
but Caponigri believes that, in certain of its aspects,
it might even more be called truly Odyssean (p. 57).
Here, then, we have two other correspondences between
Vico and Joyce: an appreciation of the importance of
the irrational and a receptivity to every image which
the word Odyssean conjures up.
In Ulysses, Joyce goes far beyond the "trellis" of
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the Homeric narrative.

The first three chapters serve

only to introduce the multiplicity which is to come.
"The human mind," says Vico, "is naturally impelled to
take delight in uniformity" (NS 204). Uniformity implies
pattern, rhythm, and design.

One passage that treats

of these matters comes at the beginning of Chapter Three.
There is enough material for a thesis in the first three
paragraphs, but a few items may be mentioned here.

It

begins "Ineluctable modality of the visible" (p. 38).
Translated, "ineluctable modality" means "the inevitable
persistence of a general pattern among individuals."
Here, Stephen is thinking of things he sees; just a few
lines down, he refers to the ineluctable modality of
the audible.

There is doubtless much of Aristotle and

Pico in the passage, but the emphasis in patterns also
suggests Vico.

Stephen closes his eyes as he walks

along the beach so that he can more clearly hear the
sounds of his boots crushing wrack and shells.

His feet

take measured steps, and he taps with his walking
stick, here referred to as "ash sword."

The solid

sounds he makes remind him of the mallet of Los
Demiurgos, the creative principle in Platonic and Gnostic
thought.

The order (nacheinander) begets thoughts of

rhythm and philology.

Stephen thinks that if Dominie

(chiefly Scottish, "a schoolmaster") Deasy heard the
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same rhythmic crush, crack, crik, crick, it would
remind him of nothing more profound than "Won't you
come to Sandymount / Madeline the mare?"

However, for

Stephen, the presence of rhythm and pattern suggests a
design, and hence a designer.

"Am I walking into

eternity along Sandymount strand?"

he wonders.

The

one-thing-after-the-otherness ties in with the linking
cords to Eve.

And "Rhythm begins, you see.

I hear"

sets Stephen on the track of philology: "catalectic
tetrameter of iambs marching."

Oh, Joyce!

"Catalectic"

is a verse that lacks part of the last foot, and it is
Stephen's footfalls that remind him of iambs (I am's)
walking into eternity.
That Stephen ponders about his own beginning is
obvious from the early scene.

Mulligan holds his

shaving mirror out for Stephen to see himself, and
Stephen wonders "Who chose this face for me?"

(p. 8 ) .

Another kind of beginning, creation, comes to the fore
just after the Ballad of the Joking Jesus.

Haines asks

Stephen, "You're not a believer, are you?

I mean, a

believer in the narrow sense of the word.

Creation from

nothing and miracles and a personal God" (p. 21).
The idea of creation appears later, with a different
twist, when Stephen sees the two midwives walking down
to the shore (p. 39).

By the time the reader gets to
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page 50 and encounters the micturated fourworded wavespeech, he gets a sense of deja vu, for there are
definite parallels between Stephen and the two midwives.
Like him, their feet sink into the sand; like him, they
approach the sea, their mighty mother.

Unlike him,

however, they have availed themselves of the public
convenience for answering nature's call.
Sight of the two midwives sets Stephen once more to
think of his own beginning: "Creation from nothing.
What has she in the bag?

A misbirth with a trailing

navelcord, hushed in ruddy wool.

The cords of all link

back, strandentwined cable of all flesh" (pp. 38-39).
There follows a hilarious scene in which Stephen uses
his belly-button to dial the Garden of Eden: "Hello.
Kinch here.

Put me on to Edenville.

nought, nought one."

Aleph, alpha;

In a more serious vein, Stephen

returns to the question of his birth:
Wombed in sin darkness I was too, made
not begotten. By them, the man with my
voice and my eyes and a ghostwoman with
ashes on her breath. They clasped and
sundered, did the coupler's will. From
before the ages He willed me and now may
not will me away or ever. A lex eterna
stays about Him. Is that then the divine
substance wherein Father and Son are
consubstantial? (p. 39)
The linking cords to Eve are also connected with
the past, memory, time, and history.

After Stephen

chides Mulligan for speaking so flippantly
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on the occasion of his mother's death, Mulligan sings a
part of Yeats's "Fergus's Song" to him in an attempt
to restore Stephen's good humor: "And no more turn aside
and brood / Upon love's bitter mystery / For Fergus
rules the brazen cars" (p. 11).
The result of his singing the song is another
example of inadvertency, for Mulligan has intended that
the words about ceasing to brood will cheer up Stephen.
Instead, it is the phrase "love's bitter mystery" which
catches his attention.

The very fact of the song has

a meditative effect upon Stephen, for singing this song
to his mother is one request of hers that he honored
(p. 11).

Incidentally, the song is poetry, even as the

"Ballad of the Joking Jesus" is a kind of poetry.

Joyce

uses the poetry constantly, while Vico writes about its
primacy.
"Memories beset his brooding brain," we find (p. 11)
He remembers her death, and at the same time he remembers
stories she has told him about her own childhood.

Also,

he remembers his own experiences with her from the time
he was a child (p. 12).

Stephen's ambivalent feelings

toward his mother can be seen when he rebounds from
visions of his mother's deathbed to shout "Ghoul!
Chewer of corpses!

No, mother.

Let me be and let me

live" (p. 12). He is conscious of the linking cords,
but he resents them.
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However, later, Stephen is aware of being linked to
Cyril Sargent, his student whose sums won't come right,
and he is willing to acknowledge their ties.

"A child

only a mother could love" is Cyril, and, as Stephen
notes Cyril's gracelessness, he remembers his own.

He

believes that Cyril's mother loves her ugly duckling as
Stephen's mother had loved him and tried to protect him.
Consciousness of the blessing of a mother's love leads
Stephen to wonder "Was this then real?
think in life?"

The only true

He muses that his mother is gone,

scarcely having been, and he calls her "a poor soul gone
to heaven," thereby showing that Mulligan's barbs have
not fractured his belief in an afterlife (p. 28). As
Stephen watches Sargent do his sums, the thought comes
once more (but with a different twist): "He proves by
algebra that Shakespeare's ghost is Hamlet's grandfather"
(p. 29). The same thing repeated in a slightly different
form is one aspect of Vico's ricorso.
The ambivalence of Stephen's attitude toward his
link with Sargent, the bittersweet flavor of the realization that they are separated to a far greater extent
than they are joined, shows in the following passage:
Like him was I, these sloping shoulders,
this gracelessness. My childhood bends
beside me. Too far for me to lay a hand
there once or lightly. Mine is far and his
secret as our eyes. Secrets, silent, stony
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sit in the dark palaces of both our hearts:
secrets weary of their tyranny: tyrants
willing to be dethroned. (p. 29)
Stephen and Cyril are linked together in some ways,
thus forming a type of father-son relationship.

But just

as there are more sundering aspects to their relationship
than there are meshing ones, even so is Stephen sundered
from his father, though they are linked in some w a y s —
ways that seem less and less important to Stephen as
time passes.
One reason Stephen has difficulty creating himself
is that other people insist on imposing their versions
(the Authentic Version?) of him upon him.

Not only do

his parents (his mother representing the Church, and his
father the State, in addition to the usual images connected with parenthood) try to make him in their image,
but even a casual acquaintance like Kevin Egan in Paris
says to him, "You're your father's son.

I know the

voice," attempting to link Stephen with himself in a
program of Irish activism (p. 44).

Stephen resents

being grafted to a chain not of his own choosing.
A visit with Mr. Deasy, the headmaster, stirs
Stephen's thoughts on beginnings and identity.

Nothing

ever changes either with Mr. Deasy or with his office.
"As it was in the beginning, is now," muses Stephen
wryly (p. 30). Ricorso is evident (along with the
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linking chain idea) when Stephen thinks this way: "The
same room and hour, the same wisdom: and I the same.
Three times now.

Three nooses round me here" (p. 31).

Mr. Deasy, proud of his ancestors, says "We are all Irish,
all kings' sons" (p. 32).

Stephen, however, thinks of

ancient jerkined dwarfs, skillfull cutters (Kinch, the
knifeblade) of whalemeat, calls them "my people."
blood is in me, their lusts my waves," he says.

"Their

For

some reason, which the reader does not yet understand
(unless it speaks of the isolation of the artist),
Stephen goes on to say "I, a changeling . . . spoke to
no-one: none to me" (p. 46).
Mr. Deasy is obsessed with the idea of common sense.
He uses those very words twice, and another time he
says "There can be no two opinions on the matter"
(p. 33). Mr. Deasy is thereby seen as one of the undeveloped human beings which Vico refers to when he says
that common sense is judgment without reflection (NS 142).
Mr. Deasy and his unchanging office represent nature—
doomed to simple recurrence with no chance for the advancement of ricorso, with no window on the infinite.
It is during a conversation with Mr. Deasy that
Stephen utters one of the most famous lines in the book:
"History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake"
(p. 35). The redolence of ricorso permeates the whole
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passage.

Earlier, Stephen has referred to history as

"a tale like any other too often heard" (p. 26).
While Mr. Deasy finishes typing his letter, Stephen
listens to th.e noise of the boys playing games outside
the office window.

When they make a goal, he goes back

in time to visualize himself (when young) amongst them.
From that vision he moves to consider ancient jousts,
"time shocked rebounds, shock by shock" (p. 33).
"Rebound" is the key word, so far as ricorso is
concerned, not simple repetition, but repetition in the
same order with enough bounce ("irrepressible tendency")
to propel beyond the initial bounds.

Once more, as the

boys' shouting signifies another goal on the playing
field, Stephen wonders "What if that nightmare gave you
a back-kick?"

Mr. Deasy, true to form, piously remarks

"The ways of the Creator are not our ways.

All history

moves towards one great goal, the manifestation of God"
(p. 35).
Confusion about God and goals has already permeated
the book.

Mulligan is an aggressive nonbeliever; Haines

is a seeker; Stephen rebels against lifeless, meaningless
orthodox rituals, but he retains a wistfulness for
relationship with the divinity.

The woman who delivers

the milk, representing traditional orthodoxy, greets
the young men with "That's a lovely morning, sir.

Glory
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be to God."

Mulligan, reacting in his characteristically

cynical manner, refers to God as though the milkwoman
weren't there (as well she might not be, for she can't
understand what he says), using these words: "The
islanders . . . speak frequently of the collector of
prepuces" (p. 15).
Mr. Deasy's remark that all history moves toward
one goal, the manifestation of God, angers Stephen and
confuses him.

Or, rather, he was confused even prior to

Mr. Deasy's remark and wishes for a stinging retort.

The

only response that comes to his mind as he listens to
the boys and integrates all the related images, is a
gesture toward the window and a remark that God is "a
shout in the street" (p. 35).
Later on, as Stephen at the beach watches the live
dog investigate the dead dog, he gives a ricorso twist
to Mr. Deasy's platitude: "Dogskull, dogsniff, eyes on
the ground, moves to one great goal.

Ah, poor dogsbody.

Here lies poor dogsbody's body" (p. 47). Still later, in
a gruesome, cannibalistic vision of linking cords and
goals as Stepehn views the corpse of the drowned man,
he thinks "God becomes man becomes fish becomes barnacle
goose becomes featherbed mountain."

Seeing himself in

the chain of relationships, he says "I living breathe,
tread dead dust, devour a urinous offal from all dead"
(P- 51).
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When Stephen uses "dogsbody" in reaction to Mr.
Deasy's remark about God, the reader is kicked back to
the first reference in the book to dogsbody.

Mulligan

refers to Stephen as a "poor dogsbody" in need of handme-down clothes (p. 7 ) . And Stephen, looking into the
mirror, thinks others see him as a dogsbody to rid of
vermin (p. 8 ) . This last points forward to his mother's
shapely fingernails reddened by the blood of squashed
lice from her children's shirts (p. 12).
Just as Stephen has inverted Mr. Deasy's "God" into
"dog," these other references to dogsbody may refer to
the fact that man, supposedly made in the image of God,
has thwarted the design, has inverted the intent.
Stephen, as an artist, may feel that he has never had
the chance to grow into the image God meant for him
because other people were too forceful in imposing their
images on him.

Do men act more like animals than men?

"Eyes on the ground," are men doomed to endless repetition, with no window on infinity?

A person should be

godsbody instead of dogsbody.
Much as Stephen yearns to "write his own book," to
be his own person, to struggle free of imposed strictures,
he realizes that the past gives form and structure to the
present and direction for the future.

He knows that

others have influenced him and that he will influence
others.

In a passage pregnant with meanings, there
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appears this sentence: "Signatures of all things I am
here to read . . ." (p. 38). One of the meanings might
be that Stephen is eager to find the cord he wants to
link onto, those in the past with whom he would like to
claim kinship by virtue of their intellectual affinities.
This would be the backward thrust of the oscillatory
movement.

The forward movement may be seen as Stephen

thinks of himself as a writer.
read these written words?
says.

"Who ever anywhere will

Signs on a white field," he

By this we can see Stephen with a vision of his

mission in life: to read the signs from the past, to
run them through his intellect, and to set them down so
others can benefit.

The fact that he sifts what he has

learned before he passes it on is an example of the idea
of progress inherent in Vico's concept of ricorso.
does Stephen merely sift, of course.

Nor

He interprets, so

that by the time his readers read his version of ancient
thinkers, there is more content than there was before
the ideas passed through Stephen.
"Behind" and "shadow" help to express Stephen's
realization of the influence of the past upon his life
and others'.

As Talbot reads from Tennyson's Lycidas

(composed upon the occasion of the death by drowning of
a promising young man beloved of his parents) the line
"Through the dear might of Him that walked the waves,"

58

Stephen's thoughts run along these lines:
Here also over these craven hearts his
shadow lies and on the scoffer's heart and
lips and mine. It lies upon their eager
faces who offered him a coin of the tribute.
To Caesar what is Caesar's, to God what is
God's. A long look from dark eyes, a riddling sentence to be woven and woven on the
church's looms. Ay. (p. 27)
The multiplicity and variety show up here, as well as
the brutal, for Christ's shadow falls over scoffers like
Malachi, artists like Stephen, the boys at school.

It

is the first riddle in the book (the first one set out
as such, that is), unless "I am the boy / That can enjoy /
Invisibility" counts as a riddle, and it comes right
before "Riddle me, riddle me, randy ro / My father gave
me seeds to sow," which comes right before the riddle
whose answer is the fox who buries his grandmother under
the hollybush (p. 27). The reader will not find that
fox referred to directly for a while, but enough has
been said to make him wonder about the connection
between Stephen and the fox, and he also puzzles over
what the significance of the ash plant will turn out to
be.
The book is riddled with riddles, and part of the
fascination of reading it lies in recognizing new appearances of previous ricorso revolutions.

The "riddling

sentence" is to be "woven and woven" on the church's
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looms (p. 27).

Is one safe in assuming that a sentence

which is woven on the church's looms, perhaps into an
altarcloth, is an expression of truth?

This reference

to weaving might be a kick-back to an earlier reference
to weaving.

One such appears on page 22, where Stephen

is contemplating Mulligan's blasphemy.
says Stephen.

"Idle mockery,"

"The void awaits surely all them that

weave the wind" (p. 22). At this point, the reader
turns back to the previous page, where Mulligan was seen
headed "down towards the fortyfoot hole."
Turning, turning.

It seems that every word Joyce

writes tempts and almost forces the reader to keep turning back to check phrases from earlier passages, so that
he may more fully understand what he _is_ reading and be
better prepared for what is yet to come.

The reason the

sands of language are "heavy of the past" is that they
must bear the burden of everything a certain word has
ever meant, as well as what it currently means.

Joyce's

scholarship is such that he knows the meanings, and he
expects his "true believers" to throw their energies
into exploring what he sees.
Vico believes that it is impossible to know the
truth about a matter or a person until you know the truth
about his beginnings, which you cannot know until you
know the truth about the beginnings of his language.

60

Therefore, an investigation into the meaning of
Stephen's names may serve as a final example of Joyce's
use of Vichian theories and methods, as well as shed
light on some of the puzzlements.

Because the meanings

of Stephen's names are retrieved only to advance their
significance when they are encountered later, as
Caponigri has likened ricorso to a great hound who
circles to pick up the trace which it has lost for the
moment (p. 138), this last section will begin by introducing the Vichian dog.

Abandon all hope, ye who pass

through the gates of this descent into meanings.
On the beach, at the same time that Stephen muses
about language and sand, lies the carcass of a dead dog.
A live dog appears, and his barking frightens Stephen.
An etymological rundown on "bark" disproves forever
the old saw about "lots of characters, but not much
plot," in reference to a dictionary.

The primary

meaning of "bark" is "the harsh, abrupt sound uttered by
a dog."

The reader is referred to bherg in the appendix.

While running a finger down the column looking for bherg,
the sleuth comes across bhereg, "to shine; bright, white;
'the white tree,' the birch (also the ash)"—ah,
inadvertence!

After that serendipity, finding that

bherg means "to buzz" or "to growl" is indeed tepid.
Finding a clue to the ash is not the same as finding an
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answer to the riddle, but it surely whets the curiosity.
It's like having someone say, "You're getting warmer,"
when playing childhood guessing games.

A second meaning

of "bark" has to do with the outer covering of the woody
stems, branches, roots and main trunks of trees and
other woody plants.

The scent of the ash grows stronger.

Another meaning is listed as "a specific kind of
bark used for a special purpose, as in tanning or
medicine."
bark."

Also, "to treat medically, tan, or dye using

There is an unattested connection between this

"tan" and common Celtic tann, which means "heir apparent."
If Stephen is seen as a Christ figure, he certainly is
an heir apparent, as well as an apparent heir.

Also,

Mr. Deasy's "illdyed head" (p. 30) could suggest that he
is not a true tanist of his sept.

Sometimes chasing

rabbits yields greater rewards than straightforward
pursuit.
A Joycean moment later, the dog, who appears to
belong to two cockle pickers, is seen again, where, says
Joyce, he "ambled about a bank of swindling sand, trotting, sniffing on all sides.

Looking for something lost

in a past life" (p. 47). He also chases the shadow of
a gull.

He turns, bounds back, and comes nearer.

He

barks at the waves which serpent toward his feet, "curling, unfurling many crests, every ninth, breaking,
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plashing, from far, from farther out, waves and waves."
His master's voice brings him skulking back, and a bootless kick sends him across a spit of sand.
back in a curve.

Euge, Joyce!

He slinks

Viva Vico!

The dog dawdles, smells a rock, and, from under a
cocked hindleg, pisses against it.

He trots forward,

once more lifts a hindleg, and quickly pisses at an
unsmelt rock.

When Stephen thinks "The simple pleasures

of the poor," the reader who is retracing his steps
connects the dog's micturating with that of the midwives
and of Stephen.

When Joyce writes "His hindparts then

scattered sand: then his forepaws dabbled and delved.
Something he buried there, his grandmother," the reader
knows there is bound (pun intended) to be a connection
between the fox who buried his grandmother under the
hollytree and the dog who buried his grandmother under
the sand.

He also is waiting for a connection between

the ash plant and the holly tree.
The dog hasn't finished yet, for Joyce gives us
these words:
He rooted in the sand, dabbling, delving and
stopped to listen to the air, scraped up the
sand again with the fury of his claws, soon
ceasing, a pard, a panther, got in spousebreach, vulturing the dead. (p. 47)
That passage throws the reader back to page 29, where we
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find the following:
A fox, red reek of rapine in his fur, with
merciless bright eyes scraped in the earth,
listened, scraped up the earth, listened,
scraped and scraped.
So, here we have Stephen.
figure?

Is he a dog, a fox, a Christ

When: Stephen looks into Mulligan's shaving

mirror, he says to himself "As he and other see me"
(p. 8 ) . Perhaps the best way to decide just who Stephen
is, is to examine his names and epithets.
The first is "Kinch, fearful Jesuit" (p. 5 ) .
Shortly thereafter, we find "Kinch, the knifeblade"
(p. 6 ) . A Jesuit is a member of the Society of Jesus,
while the root of "knife" comes from gen.

Meanings for

"knife" of interest to one playing games with Joyce are
"to snap, hence 'to have a bite.'"
would snap and have a bite.)

(Cf. a dog, who

There follow several

references to "knot in wood," and the wood imagery suggests both ashplant and bark.

"Knot in cord" recalls

linking cords to Eve.
Gen, says the dictionary, can also be gene, "to
give birth, beget; with derivatives referring to aspects
and results of procreation and to familial and tribal
groups."

Therefore, "race, family, kin; king (<'son of

the royal kin'); gentile, gentle, generate, procreative
divinity, inborn tutelary spirit, birth, beginning,

64

genesis, good natured and evil natured, pregnant, puny,
child, seed, gonad, archegoniura, born, free."
"Blade" is "a sword, a swordsman; a gay, reckless
young man; the leaf of a grass or similar plant; the
upper surface of the tongue."

The root is bhel 3 ,

"to thrive, to bloom, probably from bhel 2 ."
words are "foil, foliage, flower, Florence."

Bhel 3
Bhel 2

words are listed as "to blow, swell; with derivatives
referring to various round objects and to the notion of
tumescent masculinity; bull; phallus, pall-mall, bald
[Cf. "gull"], bold, bawd, Leopold, fool, whale."
in a name?

What's

Almost too much.

A fearful Jesuit would be a coward, another term
for which is "cur," a dog, from M.E. "growling dog."
(Cf. "The boys of Kilkenney are stout roaring blades"
(p. 44) = tumescent, noisy young men = barking dogs.)
A

Ger

is "to cry hoarsely; to groan, lament, croon, growl,

crane."

Other references to Stephen's cowardice appear

when Mulligan asks Stephen whether he was in a funk the
night before, to which Stephen replies as follows:
• I was. . . . but here in the dark with
a man I don't know raving and moaning to
himself about shooting a black panther.
You saved men from drowning. I'm no hero,
however. (p. 6)
That Stephen is no hero is debatable.
he is the hero of the book.

Ironically,

If Stephen is seen as a
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Christ figure, he is more than ever a hero, "in mythology
and legend, a man often born of one mortal and one
divine parent, who is endowed with great courage and
strength, celebrated for his bold exploits, and favored
by the gods."
The next reference is to Stephen Dedalus, his legal
name.

"Stephen" means "crown."

first Christian martyr.

Saint Stephen was the

Stebh gives "post, stem; to

support, place firmly on, fasten; stick, rod, staff,
encircle, wreathe; step, a treading firmly on, foothold;
pillar, foundation; stoop, pound, stamp, grapevine, a
bunch of grapes.

(Re: the grapes—Dionysius, the once

and future king, the irrational, wine?)
The entry in The Oxford Classical Dictionary for
Daedalus is as pregnant with reverberating images as the
dog-on-the-beach episode.

Daedalus is a legendary

artist, craftsman, and inventor of archaic times.

In

Crete, he made the cow for Pasiphae [Cf. "ox" passages];
he made the labyrinth [Ulysses] for the Minotaur ["bull"
references]; he constructed a dancing ground ["tripudium"?
p. 50] and the famous thread for Ariadne [linking cords?].
He flew away on artificial wings; he also had a beloved
son who died while drowning.

Pliny tells us that

Daedalus was also considered the inventor of carpentry
and of such things as the saw [Cf. "teeth"], the axe
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[knife, blade], the plumb-line, the auger, and glue
[from horses' hooves; cf. equine imagery].

He also

invented the mast and the yards of boats.
This much from three names—only the beginning, of
course.

Others are: your absurd name, an ancient Greek;

jejune Jesuit; my love; gentleman; the real Oxford
manner; the bard; the loveliest mummer of them all; 0,
an impossible person; mosey; Sir; young fellow; Japhet
in search of a father; a believer; a horrible example of
free thought; [his] own master; the servant of two
masters and suffering servant; Toothless Kinch; superman; fenian; rebel; all Irish, all kings' sons; dun;
someone else; nephew; cousin; like Pico della Mirandola;
very like a whale; Lui, c'est moi; a dispossessed; wonder
worker; pretender; Hamlet; "Me sits there with his
augur's rod of ash" (italics added); "I am quiet here
alone.

Sad too.

Touch, touch me" (p. 49).

These, then, are Stephen's appellations as they
appear in the first three chapters.

It is easy to see

that there are ample grounds for viewing him as a fox,
a dog, and a Christ figure, and that the ash plant may
be the "tree" in Christ's life.

Joyce is not writing

obvious allegory, of course, but if we want to apply
some of these expanded meanings to the dog passages, we
would come up with something like this: The images go
round and round.
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"His master's voice that brings him skulking back"
could be God's calling Christ back from the dead.

It

could also be the Victrola dog who obeys his master's
voice—for the company whose products go round and round.
An additional fillip is the fact that an obsolete
definition of "skulk" is "a company of stealthily moving
creatures, especially of foxes."
The dog's fight with the sand could represent
Stephen's struggles to make words do what he wants them
to do, as well as the obvious reference to his burying
his mother.

"A pard, a panther, got in spousebreach"

has to be deciphered in reverse order.

"Spousebreach"

can only indicate adultery, so the other terms must refer
to the people.

"A pard" is a leopard, so the pard is

deemed to refer in part to Leopold Bloom.

"Panther"

also yields "the leopard, especially in its black,
unspotted form."

This throws the reader back to Haines's

nightmare about shooting the black panther and also to
puzzlement over the significance of "leopard shells"
(p. 30), the toothless lions (p. 36), and "La Vie de
Jesus by M. Leo Taxil" (p. 42).
One of the roots of the English word "pan" is
pet 2 , which yields "to spread, 'length of two arms
stretched out'; O.E., fathom (Cf. "Full fathom five thy
father lies"); platter, 'thing spread out.'"

Pan, from

Greek mythology, gives us "the god of woods, fields, and
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flocks, having a human torso with goat's legs, horns, and
ears."

This last throws the reader back to "I am caught

in this burning scene.

Pan's hour, the faunal noon"

(p. 50), which might recall "Afternoon of the Faun" and
point forward to Molly's approaching adultery with Boylan
(the bull; also "lecherous [goat-like] man").
On the other hand, it is Stephen who says he is
caught in the burning scene, Pan's hour, the faunal noon.
If we think of Stephen in his Christ role, then the
images circle around his being caught (nailed) on the
cross with his two arms spread out in the burning heat
of noon.

This vision is obligatory when the next page

holds "Come. I thirst.

Clouding over" (p. 51). When

the latest Vichian "Thunderstorm" is mentioned (p. 51),
the reader knows that other beginnings are being heralded,
and he stands on the edge of the rest of the book,
wondering how fierce the storm will be and whether there
will be a rainbow at the end.
The penultimate Joycean riddle of the first three
chapters appears in relation once more to Stephen's
concern for his teeth, which are very bad, he tells us.
He manipulates his loose ones, thinking of them as shells;
shells remind him of the money Mr. Deasy gave him, so he
tries to decide whether he should take some of those
shells and exchange them for improvement on these shells.
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His last thought in the teeth section is "Why is that,
I wonder, or does it mean something perhaps?"

Irony

explodes, because Joyce never writes a word that doesn't
have at least nine meanings.
As Stephen turns and spies the ship with its
associated crucifixion images, the reader remembers the
"dryingline with two crucified shirts.
Is "ringsend" the same as "cycle's end"?

Ringsend" (p. 42)
Is the "homing"

boat a reference to the fact that in Christ's death,
burial, and resurrection are pre-figured the window on
infinity, the salvation and destiny for which Providence
has designed man?

The goal toward which all creation

tends?
Many critics simplistically believe that Bloom's
physical return to Molly (corresponding to Odysseus's
return to Penelope) serves both to round off the narrative day's activities and the book's formal requirements,
exhausting the possibilities of the theme of homecoming.
However, there are several other kinds of homecoming
that might be considered.

For example, when a person

sees clearly into the truth of a situation and decides
to function calmly within its boundaries (as Bloom does
concerning Molly's post meridiem peccadilloes), when a
reconciliation takes place (or when a character—like
Bloom vis-a-vis Stephen—realizes finally that a hopedfor reconciliation is not likely to take place), when a
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protagonist gains insight regarding his own psyche
(as Stephen does just prior to his shattering the lampshade in the "Circe" episode or as Molly does as she
tallies Bloom's virtues against those of Boylan), a
type of homecoming has been accomplished.

A fruitful

field of inquiry would be a thorough investigation of
homecomings—physical, mental, emotional, spiritual—in
Ulysses.
The ultimate Joking Joyce may appear in the final
sentence of Chapter Three.

"A threemaster . . . silently

moving, a silent ship" is also—a muffled bark!
Perhaps it is time to call a halt.

Vichian ambiv-

alence has been demonstrated, as have Vichian concerns
and methods.

Fisch rightly believes that, though Vico's

New Science is confessedly incomplete in its execution,
it does claim to be perfect in idea or conception.

That

is, it doesn't treat every matter in every way, but it
is such that when later thinkers treat these subjects,
they will be able to look back to Vico and find the bud
from which their flowers grew.

It is this capacity of

a science to accommodate future experiments that marks
it as one that is "perfect in its idea" (p. xxxvii).
Joyce evidently finds in Vico's cyclical theories
the ideas and methods which will serve him to perfection as he attempts not to capture the whole of humanity
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and to pin it on a page, but imaginatively to present
the liberalizing realization of the paradoxes and
glories involved in being truly human.

The beginning

of all that Joyce's vision eventually encompasses can
be found in these first three chapters of Ulysses.

As

it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be,
world without end.
In Vico, Joyce finds a classical sense of order and
conservativeness in the stress on God, on family, on
social institutions.

Joyce's words are allusive and

referential, inviting adventurous and imaginative
readers to see "through" the words to the meanings
"beyond."

The ricorso pattern of progress suggests

linear development.

All of this is quite traditional,

of course, and every reader should keep in mind that
such a reading might well be the most adequate one.
However, Vico's classical sense of order is very
close in spirit to the order-seeking strategies of
critics of the structuralist persuasion, and structuralists also hark back to Vico.

Moreover, the current

literary scene offers a plethora of rival models,
radically different from the orderly Vichian model, as
will be shown in the following sections.

Chapter IV
Constructions and Deconstructions:
Philosophies or Fantasies?
Levine states that in 1975, in Paris, at the Fifth
International James Joyce Symposium, "two images of
Joyce finally came face to face in public."

But, she

continues, "they did not really speak to each other,
perhaps because they did not share the same language"
(p. 17). On the other side of that silence stands
Stephen Heath's reference to "the clash of languages"
witnessed at the Symposium.

One of the Joyces had

been established in the fifties and sixties in the "full
flowering of Anglo-American scholarship," writes Levine,
while the other Joyce "stands at the head of quite
another canon," one in which not totality and resolution are valued, but deconstruction and production
(p. 17).
It is the Paris journal Tel Quel, says Levine, which
is largely responsible for introducing the "new" Joyce,
and the name itself is important: "tel quel—as is, just
as it is, the way things are." Levine notes that whichever variant one might prefer, the implication is the
same.

Articles appearing in the journal will tell it

"like it is," with no excuses, no compromise (p. 17).
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Contemporary Deconstructionist literary theorists,
whose scholarship, for the most part, concedes Levine,
cannot be faulted and whose investigations frequently
are impressively thorough, nevertheless are aware of
themselves as constituting a refutation of the entire
classical metaphysics (p. 18). , Many of their theories,
while being diametrically opposed to familiar concepts
within the traditional view, are at least phrased in
language which has operated within that view.

Such

phrasing allows a person who works within the mainstream
of academic criticism to read and to understand what the
contemporary theorists are saying, whether or not he
subscribes to the current ideas.

Difficulties arise,

however, with the presentation of other theories, which,
hailed as genuinely new, impose upon the reader the
necessity of acquiring a new vocabulary and of considering literature from a different viewpoint.
Key texts for the Deconstructionists, says Levine,
are Ulysses and, even more so, Finnegans Wake. The way
in which they are read and valued will be linked to an
entire theory of literature, and the significant context for Joyce studies is no longer just the literary
tradition but a historical debate about the relationship
between art and society, language and power (p. 18).
Levine observes that the Deconstructionists delight
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paradoxically in the very difficulty of Joyce's texts.
The formidability of the Wake in particular is taken as
a starting point, and it becomes "a symbol of resistence
to traditional analysis," for which it is to be valued.
Moreover—also against the grain of traditional criticism—the Deconstructionist critics delight in "the texture
and opacity" of their own writing.

Levine states further

that the notion that language is transparent, that it
can represent and communicate, is increasingly resisted
(pp. 18-19).
There is now, says Levine, a sense in which criticism itself is seen as writing, or "e*criture," and not
as a descriptive tool at the service of a work of art.
In effect, she points out, the distinction between
artistic or literary language and critical language is
cast into doubt.

Contemporary theorists are not

concerned with categories such as "novel" or "fiction."
Instead, says Levine, the crucial term is something
quite different: text, which will apply to critical
discourse as well as to works of literature.

The

distinction (which originally was Saussure's, Levine
points out) is therefore between "utterance—the spoken,
and text—the written word," not between fact and fiction
(p. 19).
If, following Saussure, writes Levine, language is
no longer viewed as an ideally transparent mode of
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communication, then the relationship between words and
things has to be rethought.

For the thinkers involved

with Tel Quel, says Levine, this reconsideration comes
into sharpest focus around the idea of the subject, and
she presents the following words of Philippe Sollers:
"But then, who writes, what is it that is written?
Read—and see if you hold your own, if you stay, he
o
or she, the same."
Neither author nor reader, Levine believes Sollers
to be implying, is the stable entity he has been thought
to be.

The subject is no longer "there," Levine notes,

no longer a given which language struggles to represent,
but is itself the product of a particular discourse.

In

fact, she points out, the very idea of the subject has
become problematic and, like discourse, is "simultaneously razed and raised, bound up in the 'noughty'
logic (naughty and negative) of ongoing process"
(pp. 19-20).
This ongoing process of simultaneous razing and
raising, notes Levine, is what Stephen Heath sees as
"the drama which obsesses the last section of Finnegans
Wake."

Levine, convinced that the Tel Quel group is

obsessed by the same drama, says that on the one hand,
these critics hear the call back to the father, to a
fixed code which will establish order and mark out
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limits, while on the other hand, they sense a "hesitation," a practice of writing which, like an incestuous
desire, mixes up and confuses all the codes (p. 20).
Consequently, notes Levine, instead of an aesthetics
of harmony and consistency, a text is to be valued
precisely for its code breaking activity and for its
refusal of a center which might fix the text or the
subject in some privileged way.

As an example of the

new way of approaching a text, Levine cites a 1965
article by Helene Berger written to refute a comment
made in 1960 by Richard M. Kain and Robert Scholes on
an early Joyce fragment.

Berger, Levine says, effectual-

ly inverts the argument of the original American
editors.

Kain and Scholes, commenting on the fragment

which originally was published in The Yale Review under
the title of "The First Version of Joyce's Portrait"
and later translated into French, believe that the piece
should be read as a manifesto of the future Joyce, that
if one looks "beneath its effusive lyricism and the
tumidity of its prose," the fragment adds to the sense
3
of the continuity of Joyce's career.
Berger, on the contrary, says Levine, argues that
the fragment is interesting because it makes a break,
and the title of her article reinforces her contention:
"L'avant-portrait ou la bifurcation d'une vocation."

77

Scholes and Kain see Joyce as a young man who "to an
incredible degree" knew where he was going, but Berger
sees him as not always the born artist but as one who
insists that he is no artist, one who prefers politics
to art.

Pointing to the "hesitations" and "ruptures"

of the prose, Berger, notes Levine, reads and values the
piece as a symptom of uncertainty (p. 20).
A later article, Heath's "Ambiviolances," takes up
the critique of continuity, notes Levine.

Heath insists

that Joyce's works do not constitute a portrait of the
artist, and they cannot be understood in terms of the
development of the author or of a creative "subject."
Rather, they are related by "strategies of hesitation"
and linked together in an ongoing movement of deconstruction and reconstruction.

Therefore, from this perspec-

tive, says Levine, the image for Joyce's work is neither
a line of development nor the totality of a circle, but
the constant displacement of a spiral (p. 20).
Noting that the question "What kind of rhetoric can
one use with Joyce's later texts?" is bound to arise,
Levine further defines the problem in these words:
The notion of metaphor cannot be sustained
when the distinction between the real and
the figurative has been so radically undermined. Joyce's characteristic irony--and
not only in the Wake—operates "a dislocation of meaning without resolution." It
allows no privileged place of judgment. No
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one language or structure is permitted to
"block" the others. And so the ideal reader
gives his assent to their ongoing inconclusiveness. He chooses to become an actor
within them rather than their master. Thus
we return to the notion that criticism as
such no longer develops an argument about
a text but should ideally enter into and
transform the discursive functions it refers
to. (p. 21)
What Deconstructionist critics want to recapture, says
Levine, is not a unique meaning but the play of meaning.
Above all, they seek the pleasure of meaning, the
"jouissance du sens," never stopping at one meaning but
endlessly translating, transcoding, "transluding"
(p. 22).
Acknowledging that so far she has presented the
Tel Quel position as a set of interconnected critiques
(the attack on transparency, the attack on authority and
on the subject, the attack on totality), Levine is eager
to point out that there is also, as a corollary, a vital
sense of celebration at work.

She insists that it would

be a mistake to see the Tel Quel outlook as only negative, merely hostile to whatever has supported traditional literary analysis (p. 22).
Roland Barthes's concern with the pleasure of the
t e x t — a theme inscribed in a number of phrases—merits
special attention, as does Heath's notion of the
"jouissance du sens": the pleasurable, even the erotic,
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possession of meaning.

Translating is also "trans-

luding": playing within, across, perhaps even beyond,
the codes.

This way of reading, says Levine, insists

on the energetic playfulness of language (p. 22).
But this playfulness, Levine is careful to point
out, is of a very special kind, linked to the notion
that man's ongoing task is to reconstruct the world.
She mentions parenthetically that Umberto Eco, in "Le
moyen age de James Joyce," defines the task of reconstructing the world as the modern predicament in his treatment of Joyce's "medievalism" (pp. 22-23).

Thus, Levine

notes, deconstruction, play, the breaking of codes, and
their reformulation must be understood together.

The

common denominator, states Levine, would seem to be "a
concept of production—more precisely, the production of
meaning" (p. 23).
Because contemporary literary critics—both
Structuralists and Deconstructionists—employ concepts
and a vocabulary derived from the writings of the Swiss
linguist Ferdinand de Saussaure (1913), a detailed
presentation dealing with these concepts and key phrases
will be made.

Included will be a general introduction

to the structuralist movement and a focus on the
writings of Jacques Derrida, taken from Sturrock's
Structuralism and Since.

Sturrock remarks that structur-

alism is not a creed but a method, that it is not
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possible to be a Structuralist in the way it was once
possible to be an Existentialist; there are no structuralist nightclubs on the Left Bank or structuralist
clothes to wear.

He defines structuralism in these

words: "It is simply a method of investigating a particular way of approaching and, so structuralists maintain,
of rationalizing the data belonging to a particular
field of enquiry" (p. 2 ) .
The particular field of enquiry, however, may well
prove to be the universe itself, as Roland Barthes
suggests:
We know that the medieval septenium, in its
grandiose classification of the universe,
prescribed two great areas of exploration:
on the one hand, the secrets of nature (the
quadrivium) and, on the other, the secrets
of language [parole] (the trivium: grammatica,
rhetorica, dialectica). From the end of the
Middle Ages to the present day, this
opposition was lost, language being considered only as an instrument in the service
of either reason or the heart. Today, however, something of this ancient opposition
lives again: once again the exploration of
language, conducted by linguistics, psychoanalysis, and literature, corresponds to
the exploration of the cosmos.
Hawkes, writing about the importance of Vico to contemporary thought, says that the key to the new science lay
in Vico's perception that so-called "primitive" man,
when properly assessed, reveals himself as characteristically "poetic" in his response to the world, psssessing
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an inherent "poetic wisdom" (sapienza poetica) which
informs his responses to his environment and casts
them in the form of a "metaphysics" of metaphor,
symbol, and myth (p. 12). Hawkes (somewhat unfairly)
has this to say about the "mental language common to
all nations" which Vico speaks of (161):
The New Science links directly with those
modern schools of thought whose first
premise may be said to be that human
beings and human societies are not
fashioned after some model or plan which
exists before they do. Like the existentialists, Vico seems to argue that there is no
pre-existent, "given" human essence, no
predetermined "human nature." Like the
Marxists, he seems to say that particular
forms of humanity are determined by particular
social relations and systems of human institutions, (p. 15)
Vico, however, contrary to Hawkes's interpretation, has a
well-developed theory of Providence.

Hawkes is mistaken

when he says that Vico seems to argue that there is no
pre-existent, "given" human essence.

Rather it is that

Vico believes that man cannot understand the divine
because he has not made the divine.

Consequently, man,

according to Vico, should direct his intellectual
energies toward understanding those matters within his
proper realm, and leave matters of mystery to Providence.
Sturrock's professed aim is "to elucidate, without
fear or favour," the work of five French thinkers
commonly associated with structuralism and to determine
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what common ground the five share that justifies their
appearing together in one book (p. 3 ) . The five whom he
selects are Levi-Strauss, Barthes, Foucault, Lacan, and
Derrida.
Just as "All men are created equal, but some are
created more equal than others," so Sturrock says that
some of these structuralists are more structuralist
than others (p. 3 ) . With the exception of Levi-Strauss,
Sturrock notes that none of the other four thinkers
would be at all happy to be labelled a structuralist,
that each would view such categorization as a gross
violation of his freedom of thought (p. 3 ) .
Patrick Brady refers to "the original four Titans
of the structuralist adventure: the ethnologist Claude
Levi-Strauss, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, the
philosopher of history Michael Foucault, and the Marxist
theorist Louis Althusser."

These four, says Brady, were

succeeded by "four technically oriented analysts of prose
fiction . . . Roland Barthes, A. J. Greimas, Tzvetan
Todorov, and Claude Bremond" (p. 14).
Sturrock notes that Derrida came to prominence at
a later date than the others, and as a result has been
less closely associated with the structuralist movement (p. 4 ) .

In fact, says Sturrock, he has become,

"willingly or not, the undisputed inspiration of that
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follow-up to it now known as 'post-structuralism.'"
Moreover, says Sturrock, Derrida, like Barthes and
Foucault, is "a bitter opponent of transcendent systems
of thought which purport to offer their adherents
positions of dominance from which they can look down in
detachment and judge others accordingly" (p. 4 ) .
Sturrock, suggesting one way of separating the five
thinkers into two opposed categories, notes that LeviStrauss and Lacan are both universalists, "concerned with
the operations performed by the human mind in general,
not just with the workings of particular minds at
particular times."

In contrast, Barthes, Foucault, and

Derrida appear as relativists, "preoccupied with the
historical dimension of thought, its evolution through
time, and its implications for given societies" (pp. 4-5).
Sturrock explains that labelling the five men either
universalists or relativists is an example of only one
among many ways in which they might be compared and
classified.

Declining to pursue further the possibilities

of other combinations, Sturrock insists that there are
many points of intersection in their work.

He attempts

to justify his particular grouping in these words:
"These 'structuralists' may lack a common programme but
they do not lack a common ancestry.

It is principally

in the genealogy of their ideas that one should look for
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evidence of their kinship" (p. 5 ) . Common ancestry does
not guarantee a sense of kinship, of course, as
families and nations recognize, but Sturrock may be
granted poetic license to choose the structuring device
which best suits his purposes, just as Joyce chooses his
scaffolding.
This common ancestry is very much a matter of
vocabulary, says Sturrock, a certain terminology which
recurs in their work and also recurs in any elucidation
of their work by others.

The vocabulary bears out a

remark made by Barthes in his Critical Essays (1964)
which Sturrock quotes: "It is probably in the serious
recourse to the lexicon of signification . . . that we
must finally see the spoken sign of structuralism."
Conceding that Barthes's remarks do not fit the expected
form of a definition, Sturrock says that they may nevertheless be taken as one.

What Barthes is saying is that

a true structuralist is to be recognized by the use he
makes of a number of technical terms taken over from
structural linguistics (p. 5 ) .
This lexicon, notes Sturrock, derives from the
"extraordinarily innovative work" of Saussure, whose
theoretical work on natural or human language in the
early years of the present century "lies behind all of
modern structuralism" (p. 6 ) . Saussure inherited the
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traditional view, says Hawkes, that the world consists
of independently existing objects, capable of precise
objective observation and classification (p. 19). His
revolutionary contribution to the study of language, says
Hawkes, lies in his rejection of a "substantive" view of
the subject in favor of a "relational" one (p. 19).
Literary and linguistic theorists depend fundamentally on Saussure's insights into language, and particularly into the basic unit of any language, the
linguistic sign.

Primary is Saussure's notion that any

word in a language is a sign and that language functions
as a system of signs.

Saussure analyzes the sign into

its two components: a sound which he calls the signifier
(signifiant), and a mental or conceptual component
which he calls the signified (signifie).

In this anal-

ysis, things themselves, which linguistic signs can be
asked to stand for when the material world is referred
to, are ignored.

The signified is not a thing but the

notion of a thing, what comes into the mind of the
speaker or hearer when the appropriate signifier is
uttered.

In the case of a spoken

is uttered.

language, a signifier

In the case of a written language, a

signifier is a meaningful mark inscribed on a page
(Sturrock, p. 6 ) .
Two other pairs of contrasted terms also derive
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from Saussure.

In the study of language he distinguishes

first of all between what he calls langue and parole, or
"language" and "speech."

Language is a theoretical

structure, a body of linguistic rules which speakers of
that language must obey if they are to communicate.
Speech is the actual day-to-day use made of the system
by individual speakers.

The relation between one and

the other, and the question of which should take
precedence, has been much debated (Sturrock, p. 8 ) .
A second Saussurian distinction is that between
the synchronic and the diachronic axes of investigation.
He believes that it is possible to study language either
as a system functioning at a given moment (synchronic)
or as an institution which has evolved through time
(diachronic).

Saussure advocates the synchronic method,

differing from his nineteenth-century predecessors, who
had been so preoccupied by the history of particular
languages, by etymologies and phonetic change, that they
had never stopped to try to comprehend the principles
on which language functions (Sturrock, pp. 8-9).
Synchronic, or structural, linguistics thus introduces a revolutionary shift in perspective.

Concerned

to study particular systems or structures under
artificial and ahistorical conditions, it neglects the
systems or structures out of which they have emerged,
in the hope of explaining their present functioning
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(Sturrock, p. 9 ) .
Another influence on structuralism to be traced to
Saussure's linguistics is not a matter of vocabulary but
is a crucial premise of his theory of language that the
linguistic sign is "arbitrary."
so in two ways.

This arbitrariness is

First, the signifier is arbitrary

insofar as there is no natural link between it and the
thing it signifies.

But language is arbitrary at the

level of the signified, also, because, as a person who
translates from one language to another soon finds out,
one language has concepts that are absent from another
(p. 9 ) . The extremely important consequence which
Saussure draws from this two-fold arbitrariness is stated
in these words:
Language is a system not of fixed, unalterable
essences but of labile forms. It is a system
of relations between its constituent units,
and those units are themselves constituted by
the differences that mark them off from other,
related units. They cannot be said to have
any existence within themselves, they are
dependent for their identity on their fellows.
It is the place which a particular unit, be
it phonetic or semantic, occupies in the
linguistic system which alone determines its
value. Those values shift because there is
nothing to hold them steady; the system is
fundamentally arbitrary in respect of nature
and what is arbitrary may be changed.
(Sturrock, p. 10)
"Language is a form and not a substance" is Saussure's famous summation of his fundamental insight, an
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insight without which none of the work done by LeviStrauss and the others would have been feasible.

In

short, without difference there can be no meaning.

In

drama, for example, the value of a character is
estimated not by comparison with the world outside the
play but with other characters in the play.

The dif-

ferences between characters are the clue to their
dramatic significance, as the dutiful Cordelia would
lack all definition were she deprived of comparison
with Goneril and Regan (Sturrock, pp. 10-11).
Sturrock remarks that it should be apparent that
the question of language is "absolutely at the forefront" of the style of thought under consideration.
"We prefer now," he says, "to equate language with
thought; and instead of looking through it, at reality,
we look at it, in an attempt to understand how we first
of all acquire it and then use it" (p. 12).
Because language is not something that each person
brings with him at birth but is "an institution into
which we are gradually initiated in childhood as the
most fundamental element of all in our socialization,"
language can thus be described as impersonal, exceeding
individuals.

Any use of language to communicate with

others, he notes, "involves us inevitably in the surrender
of a portion at least of our uniqueness, since if our
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language also were unique no one would be able to
understand it" (Sturrock, p. 12).
A more considerable loss of individuality is
incurred when one yields not only to the primary order
of language, but also to the secondary order of literature, of discourse in general, where further, and
frequently severe, restrictions by way of conventions
are imposed to prevent language's being used with the
freedom which speakers might aspire to (Sturrock,
pp. 12-13).
In consequence, structuralism has come to stand
for a way of thinking which is opposed to individualism,
or even to humanism, because "intentional human agency
is given a reduced role in its interpretations of culture"
(p. 13). Sturrock continues in this vein:
Much has been written of "the disappearance
of the subject" under the structuralist
dispensation, meaning that structuralism
has carried its strong bias against
essentialism so far as somehow to deny the
existence of human beings altogether, and
to see the individual as nothing better than
an unstable, replaceable form within a
soulless system. (p. 13)
Sturrock believes that such an assessment is a bit
severe, but he concedes that there is much hostility
to all philosophies of individualism in the writing of
the thinkers he treats.

It is at this point that the
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concept of politics appears.

To a greater or lesser

degree, the five men all subscribe to what Sturrock
sees as "the strongly anti-bourgeois sentiments"
traditional among French intellectuals, for whom the
bourgeois is "a corrupt and thus typical member of the
middle class who has managed to disguise his own
insatiable greed for money and power as a noble philosophy of liberal self-development."

Thus, says Sturrock,

there is a political slant to the ideas of writers such
as Foucault and Barthes (p. 13).
Next Sturrock treats what he calls Derrida's
"patient, intricate campaign" to destroy the privilege
accorded in Western cultures to speech over writing.

A

written text is customarily attributed to an individual
author, but Derrida's argument is that the text has, in
fact, been set free from the individual who produced
it, who may very well be dead.

Derrida's position

Sturrock states this way:
An author can have no special authority over
what he has written and then published,
because he has committed it both to strangers
and to the future. The meanings it will
henceforth yield need not coincide with those
he believed he had invested in it: they will
depend on who reads it and in what circumstances, (p. 14)
"Celebrated" is the term Sturrock uses to describe
Derrida's deconstructions of the philosophical and other
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writings which he has analyzed.

Derrida, seeking to

bring to light internal contradictions in seemingly
coherent systems of thought, mounts a "powerful attack"
on the ordinary notions of authorship, identity, and
selfhood, since these contradictions demonstrate that
even when language is being used most consciously, it
has power beyond the control of both writers and
readers (p. 14). Derrida himself, Sturrock believes,
exploits the "alarming" productivity of language to
destabilize existing systems (p. 14). Derrida's
American disciple, Paul de Man, speaks at length of
these contradictions in Blindness and Insight.
Sturrock notes that all five thinkers are against
authority and against metaphysics.

They are not trying

to transcend common experience in pursuit of some hidden,
ultimate meaning which will explain everything, because
they do not believe that everything can be explained.
Teleological interpretations of history hold no charm
for them.

Moreover, they are "against the singular and

for the plural," preferring that "whole galaxies of
meanings" emerge from a limited set of phenomena, rather
than submit to the notion that the limited set must hold
one, unifying, dominant meaning (p. 15).
Reverting to the linguistic plane, Sturrock notes
that what these five thinkers have done is to advance the
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claims of the signifier above those of the signified.
This advance has come about because the signifier is
material, but the signified is "an open question."
Sturrock gives two reasons.

First, the same signifier

is sure to have different signifieds for two different
people.

Furthermore, the same signifier will have dif-

ferent signifieds for the same person at different
times.

It is for these reasons that structuralism is an

invitation to delight in the plurality of meaning and
to reject an authoritarian or unequivocal interpretation
of signs (p. 15).
The last linguistic matter which Sturrock treats
is that of the problem of the prose style in which
contemporary theorists present their case to the world,
a style in most cases of extreme difficulty (p. 15).
Sturrock believes that the difficulties with style
exhibited by these writers account for the bad name
which structuralism has in some quarters.

Those who

insist that clarity of exposition be a prerequisite in
any thinker are highly intolerant of these men (p. 16).
However, Sturrock points out, it is not that Barthes,
Derrida, or any of the others have aimed at clarity of
exposition and failed; they simply do not agree that
clarity is the universal virtue which their critics claim
it to be (p. 16). Writing in a country where clarity
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has been regarded as a national virtue, the mark (or
sign) of a truly French mind, Barthes argues that clarity
was adopted as a national virtue for the unworthiest of
reasons: the ascendant bourgeoisie quickly understood
that clarity of expression was a powerful tool "appropriate to the discourse of persuasion and autocracy"
(Sturrock, p. 17).
These writers, then, says Sturrock, know exactly
what they are doing when they write that which can be
read only with extreme difficulty; they are demonstrating
that there is far more to language than lucidity,
believing that lucidity gives a false impression that
language is in the firm control of writers.

Contemporary

critics prefer to show that language enjoys a large
degree of autonomy.

Consequently, ambiguity itself

becomes a virtue (p. 17).
Sturrock's final remark is that all five of the
thinkers in his book are also writers, "self-conscious
about the form of what they write, and knowledgeable
about the devices and effects of rhetoric."

With the

exception of Levi-Strauss, the others, Sturrock believes,
might claim to belong to literature as much as to
criticism, or history, or psychoanalysis, or philosophy.
Indeed, it is to the abolition of boundary lines between
disciplines that the contemporary theorists are
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committed, and their style is part of the attempt
(P. 17).
Incorporating all of Saussure's ideas and phrases
and adding others of his own is Jacques Derrida.

The

last essay in Sturrock's book is a consideration of
Derrida by Jonathan Culler.

Culler mentions three

Derridas: the philosopher, the interpreter, and the
thinker along "structuralist and post-structuralist
lines" (pp. 154-55).

As a philosopher, Derrida under-

takes a critique of metaphysics from within by identifying and reversing the hierarchies it has established.
As an interpreter—of texts as varied as those of
Rousseau, Saussure, Freud, Plato, Husserl, Kant and
others—Derrida is attentive to the ways in which texts
implicitly criticize and undermine the philosophies on
which they claim to be based.

He thus carries on a

double mode of reading, showing the text to be woven
from different strands which can never result in a
synthesis but which continually displace one another.
This new practice of reading and writing, Culler observes,
is making itself felt particularly in the realm of
literary criticism (Sturrock, p. 155).
Regarding the third area of Derrida's expertise,
Culler notes that Derrida's special importance lies in
the fact that he alone has written about the works of
the others, relating them to central problems of

95

structuralist and post-structuralist theory (p. 155).
For purposes of this paper, a Derrida consideration of
Ulysses will focus on aspects and techniques which
Deconstructionist theorists find to fit into their
scheme (as presented by Buttigieg, Levine, Sturrock,
and Culler) and ways in which Joyce is seen to be undermining what these critics believe that he set out to
achieve.
Before such a reading can be begun, there is one
more concept which must be presented: silence, absence,
void, spaces, and so forth.

Derrida's readings of

various texts, says Culler, are explorations of Western
logo-centrism.

The "metaphysics of presence" which

these texts simultaneously affirm and undermine underlies
all Western thinking, but Culler notes that it can be
shown to give rise to paradoxes that challenge its
coherence and consistency and therefore challenge the
possibility of determining or defining being as presence.
Culler offers the following passage from Derrida's
Writing and Difference:
[The framework of the history of metaphysics]
is the determination of being as presence
in all the senses of this word. It would be
possible to show that all the terms related
to fundamentals, to principles, or to the
center have always designated the constant of
a presence—eidos, arche, telos, energeia,
ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject),
aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness or
conscience, God, man, and so forth. (Sturrock,
p. 161)
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Culler follows the Derrida passage with three
examples which illustrate what is involved in the metaphysics of presence.

In the Cartesian cogito, "I think,

therefore I am," the " I " is considered to be a given
because it is present to itself in the act of thinking.
The proposition "I am, I exist" is necessarily true,
Descartes says, "each time I pronounce it or conceive it
in my mind."

Culler's second example is the familiar

notion that the present instant is what exists.

The

future will exist and the past did exist, but the reality
of each time depends on its relation to the presence
of the present.

That is, the future is an anticipated

presence, and the past is a former presence.

The notion

of meaning (when persons speak to each other) as
something present to the consciousness of the speaker,
which is then expressed through signs or signals, is
the third illustration.

Meaning is what the speaker

"has in mind" at the crucial moment (Sturrock, p. 162).
The view that reality is a series of present states
is powerful and persuasive, says Culler, but he correctly
points out a problem which this view characteristically
encounters: "When we invoke these states or moments of
presence which are supposedly so basic, we discover that
they are themselves already dependent in various ways
and therefore cannot serve as the simple givens on which
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explanation must rest" (Sturrock, p. 162).
Using Zeno's famous paradox concerning the flight
of the arrow—which at any given time is at a particular
spot and never in motion, but which common sense insists
is in motion—Culler says that it turns out that motion,
a fundamental reality of the world, is only conceivable
insofar as every instant, every present state, is already
marked with the traces of the past and the future
(Sturrock, p. 163).
An account of what is happening at a given instant
requires reference to other instants which are not
present, and thus there is a crucial sense in which the
non-present inhabits and is part of the present.

The

motion of the arrow, says Culler, is "always already
complex and differential, involving traces of the notnow in the now" (Sturrock, p. 163).
Derrida says that the fact that differences are not
present does not mean that they are absent, and it is at
this juncture that his critique of the metaphysics of
presence comes into sharpest focus, because language is
so suffused with the metaphysics of presence that this
seems to be the only alternative: either something is
present, or else it is absent.

The Derridean critique

of this metaphysics, however, notes Culler, involves
identifying elements, terms, and functions which (like
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"difference") are difficult to conceive within the
traditional framework.

When these terms are identified,

they work not so much to discredit the framework as to
indicate its limitations.

Difference resists discussion

in terms of the opposition presence/absence (Sturrock,
p. 163).
Derrida coins a term (differance) from the French
verb differer, which means both "to differ" and "to
defer."

Culler explains the word this way: "Differance

thus designates both a passive difference already in
existence as the condition of signification and an act
of differing or deferring which produces differences"
(Sturrock, p. 165).
A term that behaves similarly in English is spacing,
which designates both a completed arrangement and an act
of distribution or arranging.

Culler notes that Derrida

occasionally will use the corresponding French term
espacement, but that differance is more powerful precisely because difference is a key term in the writings of
Nietzsche, Freud, and especially Saussure.

In Positions,

Derrida has this to say, notes Culler:
Differance is a structure and a movement
which cannot be conceived on the basis^of
the opposition presence/absence. Differance
is the systematic play of differences, of
traces, of the spacing [espacement] by which
elements refer to one another. (p. 165)
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Derrida uses this concept of differance, says
Culler, in his critique of Saussure's treatment of
writing, which he relegates to a secondary, derivative
status as compared with speaking.

In Saussure's view,

writing is simply a means of representing speech, "a
technical device, an external accessory," and need not,
therefore, be taken into consideration when one is studying language (Sturrock, p. 166).
Derrida shows that the relegation of writing to a
position of secondary importance is crucial to the
Western tradition of thinking about language, where
speech is seen as natural and direct communication, while
writing is viewed as "an oblique representation of a
representation," says Culler.

In the Western tradition,

speaker and listener are present to one another, and
words issue from the speaker as spontaneous and nearly
transparent signs of his present thoughts, which the
listener can grasp.

Writing, on the other hand, consists

of physical marks which are divorced from the thought
which may have led to their production.

Also, writing

characteristically functions in the absence of either
speaker or hearer.

Therefore, writing seems to be "not

merely a technical accessory for representing speech but
more significantly a deformation or distortion of
speech" (Sturrock, pp. 166-67).
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The relationship between speech and writing, says
Culler, is therefore more complicated than it seemed at
first.

The hierarchical scheme that gave speech priority

and made writing dependent on it has now been upset by
the possibility that speech may not be independent of
writing, after all, and that writing may affect speech
in important ways (Sturrock, p. 167).
Culler calls attention to the fact that the structure or play of relations at work between speech and
writing is one which Derrida has identified in a number
of texts, especially in those of Rousseau, using a term
common in Rousseau, the "logic of the supplement"
(p. 167).

Citing Webster's Dictionary, Culler says that

a supplement is "something that completes or makes an
addition."

When Rousseau says that education supplements

nature, he means that education is needed in order to
allow someone's true nature to emerge as what it is
(pp. 167-68).

Culler explains more fully in these

words:
The logic of supplementarity thus makes
nature the prior term, a plenitude which was
there at the start, but reveals an inherent
lack or absence within it and makes education something external and extra but also
an essential condition on that which it
supplements. (Sturrock, p. 168)
The logic of supplementarity, as Derrida describes
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it, is powerful and pervasive.

"It makes possible,"

writes Culler, "everything which we think of as human:
language, passion, society, art."

The logic of the

supplement comes into play when something which has
been characterized as marginal with respect to a
plenitude—as writing is marginal to the activity of
speech or perversion to normal sexuality—is identified
as a substitute for that plenitude or as something which
can supplement or complete it.

It then becomes possible,

says Culler, to show that what were conceived as the
distinguishing characteristics of the marginal are, in
fact, the defining qualities of the central object of
consideration.

Consequent upon this insight is the

notion that writing, formerly considered to be the
marginal supplement, now proves, in the Derridean
construction (or deconstruction), to be the constitutive
condition of language itself (Sturrock, pp. 168-69).
These, then, presented more or less abstractly, are
some of the most important linguistic concepts and key
phrases which form the basis of Structuralist and
Deconstructionist "kinship."

In the following section

these ideas and terms will be related more directly and
concretely to Ulysses in a Derrida manner.

Derrida

would say that Joyce is blind to the real sabotage of
value that lurks in the pages of Ulysses, that the work
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turns on itself to reveal duplicity, that Joyce's
devices of coherence (such as those shown in the Vico
segment) are undercut by the text itself.

Passages

touted as examples of this kind of undercutting will be
given, and the conclusion of the paper will measure the
validity of the Derridean claim.

Chapter V
Towards Beginning Yet Again:
a Derrida Perspective
"Modes and categories inherited from the past no
longer seem to fill the reality experienced by a new
generation," remarks Hawkes (p. 7 ) . Consequently, the
new generation of literary theorists takes each cherished
notion inherited from the Western metaphysical tradition
and attempts to show ways in which that classical view
is subverted.

Where formerly words were thought of as

allusive and referential, now, says Hawkes, the work is
presented not as the "container" of a message, but as
"an intrinsic, self-generating, self-regulating and
ultimately self-regarding whole, needing no reference
beyond its own boundaries to validate its nature" (p. 86).
To illustrate Hawkes's contention in relation to Joyce,
there are remarks of Kenner to the effect that "Ulysses
is very largely 'about' its own audience" and "Finnegans
Wake is very largely 'about' the art of reading."
De Almeida says that the eighteen episodes in Ulysses
give the impression of having been written by eighteen
different people, technique tending more and more to be
the subject, and she quotes A. Walton Litz:" . . .

by the

time we reach 'Ithaca' the form of the episode is as much
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the substance as the actual interchanges between Bloom
and Stephen." 2
In the older worldview, a clear distinction is
drawn between two kinds of language.

Regarding this

matter, Susan Wittig suggests that interested persons
read an article by Tzvetan Todorov, "Artistic Language
and Ordinary Language."
In relation to the notion of blurred distinctions,
there is in contemporary criticism a concept which might
be called "The Dancer from the Dance" syndrome.

Mark

Shechner, writing about Stephen's inferring details
about Shakespeare's life from his plays—only to reinterpret the plays in light of a theory of life--says that
such an approach is not tautological but is the "very
essence of dialectical analysis" which aims at the
achievement of a portrait of the artist and his art as
4
a unified, interrelated whole.
Furthermore, says
Shechner, "Stephen answers for himself Yeats's question
about the dancer and the dance.

He cannot tell the

artist from the art" (p. 10).
In traditional fiction, boundaries tend to be neat
and clearly defined, but current critics look for evidences of order patterns which blur and fade and lose
their edges.

Barthes, as usual, expresses the ideal

most memorably:
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Society of the Friends of the Text: its
members would have nothing in common (for
there is no necessary agreement on the texts
of pleasure) but their enemies: fools of all
kinds, who decree foreclosure of the text
and of its pleasure, either by cultural
conformism or by intransigent rationalism
(suspecting a "mystique" of literature) or
by political moralism or by criticism of
the signifier or by stupid pragmatism or by
snide vacuity or by destruction of the discourse, loss of verbal desire. Such a society
would have no site, could function only in
total atopia; yet it would be a kind of
phalanstery, for in it contradictions would
be acknowledged (and the risks of ideological
imposture thereby restricted), difference
would be observed, and conflict rendered
insignificant (being unproductive of pleasure).
There are in Ulysses numerous examples that meet Barthes's
ideal.

For instance, Karen Lawrence says that Joyce

"abjures the notion of closure and shape to which fictions
usually submit," allowing the text to "overflow" all
neat aesthetic patterns.

This overflowing, says

Lawrence, signifies the arbitrariness and "plurasignificance" of life.

As an example of the way the opposite

of a cherished notion can be shown to be equally true,
Lawrence says that Ulysses is both "spectacularly
artificial" and, in its own way, "realistic," and the
style in which Joyce writes (bizarre form of exaggeration
and experiment) carries the message, reminding the
reader that all the "facts of life" cannot be assimilated
to the literary form of any "fiction."7
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In the older forms of fiction, authors strove to
present their characters as crisp and autonomous persons,
but contemporary theorists seek not what de Almeida
calls "the clear-cut individual roles of the Homeric
figures" but a blurring of distinctions.

In respect of

the three main characters, de Almeida says that Stephen
is allowed three fathers and three mothers, and, furthermore, "he resolves at the end to do without paternity
or, better, to be his own father (to his art)" (p. 31).
Anthony Burgess notes that one of the theological themes
of Ulysses is the mystery of the relationship between
"now-begetting father and unbegotten son," and he sees
Stephen as both Daedalus and Icarus, both father and
Q

son.

De Almeida further notes that Bloom as Odysseus

is also "Christus Bloom"; Stephen as Telemachus is also
"the holy ghostly artist"; and Molly, while most obviously Penelope the weaver, also encompasses the myth of
Gala-Tellus, Rhea, Anima-Matrix, Hera, la belle dame
sans merci, Aphrodite, and "most curious—the Virgin
Mary" (p. 33).
Northrop Frye attributes to Einstein the breakdown
of the sense of a clear separation between subject and
object, which, until 1905, had been such a marked feature
9
of the scientific attitude.
Since that time, Frye
notes, it has been impossible to separate the observer
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from what he observes; the observer has become an
observed object, too (p. 14). Kenner mentions three
other influential figures: Kurt Godel (1930), who
"proved closure also impossible to deductive thought:
always a hole at the bottom of the well-wrought bag";
Picasso (1909), who ends the ideal separation of subject
from painting; and Joyce (1922), who ends the ideal
separation of story from book of words.

All four, with

others, Kenner says, terminate a dualism between the
art of science and its materials (Ulysses, p. 154).
Writing about the human penchant for order, for
rereading in quest of patterns, Kenner further notes
that retrieving the marks of organization from a system
of allusion in Ulysses is a task imposed upon the reader,
"It is this compliance with our collaboration," says
Kenner, "this symbiosis of observer with observed, that
marks the radiant novelty of Ulysses."

The Dancer

from the Dance concept applies also to the separation
between text and critical analysis.

For example,

Shechner, noting that both paeans of praise and anxious
expressions of contempt are plausible and intelligible
responses to Molly, says that the criticism that has
sought to measure her thus far (1974) has been measured
by her (pp. 203-04).
For many years after its publication, Ulysses was
the focus of a storm of controversy concerning genre,
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and the battle rages yet, in some quarters.

Ellmann

calls it "largely" a roman a clef (James Joyce, p. 374).
For Kenner, Ulysses is "an epic in the Renaissance
sense, a manifestation of every province of rhetoric
and a compilation of every form of learning" (Dublin's
Joyce, p. 189). Elliott B. Gose, Jr., who is interested
to show that Bruno—with his emphasis on the pervasive
presence of paradox—had as great an influence on Joyce
as Vico, insists that Joyce created Ulysses as a comedy.
Frank Kermode says that the major modern novel (Ulysses)
12
is "a poem."
De Almeida disagrees with Kermode, calling Ulysses,
"despite its vein of lyricism and its parodic links
with a number of other genres," a novel (p. 41).
Speaking of Byron and Joyce, de Almeida says that the
two writers do not want to pay a "back-handed compliment
to the heroic" but to annul the form by being antiheroic and anti-epic, and, regarding blurred distinctions, she quotes approvingly a remark of Schlegel
which pleases Deconstructionists: "All the classical
13
genres are now ridiculous in their purity."
For decades, critics and readers alike have sought
a unique meaning for Ulysses, a search which is closely
related to the concept of genre, for if a person understands what kind of book he is reading, he will know
fairly well how to interpret it.

Few citiics today,

however, get exercised about discovering a meaning for
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Ulysses.

Structuralism, notes Rene Girard, recognizes

no meaning in itself, because all significance in this
perspective is differential. 14

Acknowledging Saussure

as the formulator of the differential definition,
Girard says that a genuine application of the definition
to any field requires "a radical critique and rejection
of those elements that have always appeared primary,
fundamental, and irreducible" (p. 119).
Deconstructionist critics are actively engaged in
these radical critiques and rejections, and one of their
chief techniques involves doing away with the notion of
the author.

De Man says that the fallacy of a finite

and single interpretation, of a unique meaning, derives
from the postulate of a privileged

observer; this leads,

in turn, to "the endless oscillation of an intersubjective demystification" (p. 10). De Man makes the following suggestion for returning to a more rational
methodology:
As an escape from this predicament, one can
propose a radical relativism that operates
from the most empirically specific to the
most loftily general level of human behavior.
There are no longer any standpoints that can
a priori be considered privileged, no
structure that functions validly as a model
for other structures, no postulate of
onotological hierarchy that can serve as an
organizing principle from which a deity can
be said to engender man and the world. All
structures are, in a sense, equally fallacious
and are therefore called myths. (p. 10)
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Here, within one paragraph, de Man presents the
views which refute

the traditional concepts of author,

subject, unique meaning, privileged point of view,
order patterns, autonomy of characters, teleological
progress, resolutions of plot or character, and the idea
of a transcendent realm with God at the center.

Whereas

for centuries, persons had drawn comfort from the
scriptural promise "With God, all things are possible"
(Matthew 19:26), now, with the advent of so radical a
relativism, the triumphant cry is "Without God, all
things are possible."
Consequently, much contemporary theory comes into
sharp focus at a juncture of the concept of an author
with that of the concept of language.

For Barthes, notes

John Halperin, language itself can be seen and used as
an instrument for the death and disappearance of the
15
author, one of Barthes's favorite themes.
Any
literary utterance, Barthes says, is "in its entirety
. a void process, which functions perfectly without
requiring to be filled by the person of the interlocutors
linguistically, the author is never anything more than
the man who writes, just as I_ is no more than the man
who says ]L. "
What appears in a book for Barthes, Halperin
continues, is not simply the voice of the author; it
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is, Barthes says, "a special voice, consisting of
several indiscernible voices"; literature is "precisely
the invention of this voice, to which we cannot assign
a specific origin."

Furthermore, says Barthes,

"Literature is that neuter, that composite, that oblique
into which every subject escapes, the trap where all
identity is lost, beginning with the very identity of
the body that writes" (The Discontinuous Universe, p. 7;
in Theory, p. 382).
Language speaks, argues Barthes, and not the author,
who exists "simultaneously with his text," who cannot
precede or transcend what he writes, who "is in no way
the subject of which his books is predicate."

Halperin

notes that the multiplicities of a literary text
coalesce not in the writer but in the reader, who gathers
together in his reading of the book the many voices
which constitute the text itself.

For Barthes, ulti-

mately, "life can only imitate the book, and the book
itself is only a tissue of signs, a lost, infinitely
remote imitation" (The Discontinuous Universe, p. 11;
in Theory, p. 382).
Here, Halperin points out, is an unmistakable
expression of Structuralism's reversal of the old
mimetic process, of the Structuralist emphasis on the
autonomy of the work itself, which is seen as a pale
imitation not of real life but of the many ingredients
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of which it is itself formed (Theory, p. 382).
De Almeida gives the following words of Jacques
Barzun: "Cultural periods are united by their questions,
not their answers.

Dominant problems addressed, not

the individual philosophies designed to solve these,
17
unite men in a given age."
What, then, are some of
the questions uniting the contemporary scene?

Michel

Foucault mentions two questions which had been pertinent
to traditional problems: "How can a free subject
penetrate the substance of things and give it meaning?"
and "How can it activate the rules of a language from
within and thus give rise to the designs which are
18
properly its own?"
Instead, Foucault continues, contemporary questions
raised will be such as these: "How, under what conditions
and in what forms can something like a subject appear in
the order of discourse?

What place can it occupy in

each type of discourse, what functions can it assume,
and by obeying what rules?"

In short, he says, current

theorists seek to deprive the subject (or its substitute)
of its role as originator, to analyze the subject as a
variable and complex function of discourse (Strategies,
p. 158).
Foucault says that the traditional role of the
author must be entirely reversed, and he paints a

113

portrait of this artist as "the genial creator of a
work in which he deposits, with infinite wealth and
generosity, an inexhaustible world of significations."
Furthermore, says Foucault, "We are used to thinking
that the author is so different from all other men, and
so transcendent with regard to all languages that, as
soon as he speaks, meaning begins to proliferate, to
proliferate indefinitely" (Strategies, p. 159).
(Ironically, Foucault—in a prime example of critical
blindness—is describing Joyce perfectly.)

Foucault's

presentation of the contemporary view is so trenchant
that it will be given in its entirety:
The truth is quite the contrary: the author
is not an indefinite source of significations
which fill a work; the author does not precede
the works, he is a certain functional
principle by which, in our culture, one
limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by
which one impedes the free circulation, the
free manipulation, the free composition, and
recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are
accustomed to presenting the author as a
genius, as a perpetual surging of invention,
it is because, in reality, we make him function
in exactly the opposite fashion. One can say
that the author is an ideological product,
since we represent him as the opposite of
his historically real function. (When a
historically given function is represented
in a figure that inverts it, one has an
ideological production.) The author is
therefore the ideological figure by which
one marks the manner in which we fear the
proliferation of meaning. (Strategies, p. 159)

Annie Dillard's uniting question also further
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demonstrates the prevalence of the blurring of distinctions: "What can we know, or what can we say of the
world?

Gradually, then, the question of the relation-

ship between tale, teller, and world fades into the
question of the relationship between any perceiver and
19
any object."
Dillard calls this matter a frequent
theme "—nay, obsession—" in contemporary fiction
(p. 53). Dillard's work is only one example of the
justification for Buttigieg's insistence that anyone
attempting an authentically new approach to Joyce study
the history of Western thought, for she proceeds to say
that a penetrating interest in anything ultimately leads
to what used to be called epistemology.

If one undertakes

the least mental task, says Dillard refreshingly, "if you
so much as try to classify a fern—you end up agog in
the lap of Kant" (p. 53).
The epistemological question remains a live issue
in America, Dillard notes, and she suggests that so
much interesting work is being done outside the field of
philosophy proper, and outside philosophy's terms, that
a new term—such as "cognition"—replace the term
"epistemology" to refer to this "new wealth of related
topics" (p. 53).
Dillard mentions the following thinkers who are
currently involved with investigations in related fields:
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Paul Weiss and Ludwig Von Bertalanffy in systems theory,
Gregory Bateson in information theory, Roman Jakobson
and Thomas Sebeok in semiotics, Noam Chomsky in linguistics, John Eccles and Wilder Penfield in brain
physiology, Claude Levi-Strauss and Mary Doublas in
anthropology, Ernst Gombrich in art criticism, and
Jerome Bruner and Jean Piaget in psychology.

Dillard

says that all of these thinkers, seeking a scientific
basis from which to proceed, want to understand the
processes by which the mind imposes order, want to
clarify the relationship between perceiving and thinking,
between inventing and knowing (pp. 53-54).
"What is really there?" and "What are we really
seeing?"—tend, says Northrop Frye, to become the same
"phenomenological" question (Code, p. 14). Brady credits
phenolenology and structuralism with preparing for the
emergence of the new science of semiotics, which, Brady
believes, "is destined to inherit many aspirations of
the parent movements" (p. 13).
The names of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty leap to
mind with the reference to phenomenology.

One way of

distinguishing between two types of structuralism
would be through an investigation of who keeps the idea
of subject and object, of who uses diachronic and who
synchronic notions of time.

Therefore, a fruitful
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field for study would be a Merleau-Ponty reading of
Ulysses.

While such is without the realm of this

paper's stated objectives, a few salient points of a
Merleau-Ponty reading can be suggested.
The following ideas appear in The Essential
Writings of Merleau-Ponty.

20

Merleau-Ponty insists

that to recognize ambiguity is not to capitulate to it;
he believes in the primacy of perception and in Husserl's
maxim that philosophy must return "to the things themselves"; he strongly defends the radical intentionality
of human consciousness, and he says "The world is both
shaped and revealed by the acts of perception in which
it is grasped" (pp. 8-10).

Both subject and object are

retained, and he seeks and finds meaning all along—
instead of being forced to acknowledge its importance at
the last, as current linguists do; he has a strong sense
of history, and he posits the perceived world as the
presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value,
and all existence

(p. 48).

Foucault takes just the opposite approach:
If there is one approach that I do reject,
however, it is that (one might call it,
broadly speaking, the phenomenological
approach) which gives absolute priority to
the observing subject, which attributes a
constituent role to an act, which places
its own point of view at the origin of all
historicity—which, in short, leads to a
transcendental consciousness. It seems to
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me that the historical analysis of scientific
discourse should, in the last resort, be
subject, not to a theory of the knowing
subject, but rather to a theory of discoursive
practice. 21
Foucault's position is so diametrically opposed to
that of Merleau-Ponty that Foucault might be used to
deconstruct a Merleau-Ponty reading of Ulysses.

In the

traditional view, the author was looked upon as a
morally purposeful writer using his powers to create
harmony and order, but such moral earnestness is scoffed
at today.

Foucault says that modern thought has never

been able to propose a morality, that for modern thought,
no morality is possible (The Order of Things, p. 328).
Joyce's name, says

de Almeida, "became synonymous

with the spirit of nihilistic modernism, with chaos,
alienation and futility" (p. 2 ) . The validity of these
assertions will be measured later.

Older tales have

clearly defined beginnings, middles, and ends, but Kenner
says this of Joyce:
Though he loved closed systems he was
attracted even more—had been at least since
Exiles—to a mental cosmos founded, as
Stephen tells us the church is founded,
on mystery, "and founded irremovably because
founded like the world, macro- and microcosm
upon the void. Upon incertitude, upon
unlikelihood." (Ulysses, p. 153)
Brady writes that even while structuralism
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continued to flourish, there was at the same time a
"strong current" of post-structuralism, a Derrida stage
launched primarily in 1967 with the publication of
L'Ecriture et la difference and De la grammatologie
(PSS, p. 16). Culler remarks rather mildly that Derrida
undertakes a critique of metaphysics, but Derrida himself
is not so restrained.

Clearly he aligns himself with

Foucault when he makes the following statement:
And I believe that perception is interdependent with the concept of origin and
of center and consequently whatever strikes
at the metaphysics of which I have spoken
strikes also at the very concept of perception. I don't believe that there is any
perception. (Languages, p. 272)
The philosophy behind such notions as void, duplicity
and doubleness, the being of absence, silence, space
and traces,freeplay and openness has been presented
in the Culler section of Derrida; what remains is to
note the presence in Ulysses of examples of these
concepts.

If structuralists and post-structuralist

critics like Derrida can amass enough evidence from
their perusals of Ulysses to show that there is more
of the Contemporary about Joyce than there is of the
Modernist, then they will tip the scales in favor of
claiming him for their own camp.
The themes relating particularly to a Derrida
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reading are so closely connected that it is virtually
impossible to separate them for individual consideration,
but the situation that obtains, Derrida would say,
merely reinforces his contention that boundaries are
best when blurred.

[re: Indians—"The only good boundary

is a blurred boundary."]

Not that Derrida is the only

one who treats these matters.

Strong and striking is

Shechner's statement that "nothing less than all of
human culture is founded upon absence," and he notes
that in recent years, particularly among the British
schools of psychoanalysis, the idea has taken hold that
creativity is arrayed against loss by restoring what is
absent, reconstituting what is damaged, and atoning for
what has been injured. 22

Herbert Marcuse, notes Jay

Cantor, says "The absent must be made present, because
the greater part of the truth is in that which is
23
absent."
The notion of eroticism in contemporary writing
grows out of the concept of absence, two examples of
which can be given.

First, here is Cantor quoting

Blanchot: "The word is not the expression of a thing
but rather the absence of this thing.

The word makes

the thing disappear, and imposes upon us the feeling of
universal want" (Space, pp. 42-43).

Barthes goes more
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fully into the erotic aspect of writing than do any of
the other current theorists, and perhaps, because this
may well be the facet of contemporary writing which
strikes the uninitiated as strangest, it is advisable to
let Barthes explain the notion at length:
Is not the most erotic portion of a body
where the garment gapes? . . . It is intermittance, as psychoanalysis has so rightly
stated, which is erotic: the intermittance
of skin flashing between two articles of
clothing (trousers and sweater), between two
edges (the open-necked shirt, the glove and
the sleeve); it is this flash itself which
seduces, or rather: the staging of an
appearance-as-disappearance. . . .
It is the
very rhythm of what is read and what is not
read that creates the pleasure of the great
narratives. (The Pleasure of the Text,
pp. 9-11)
Lacan, for another, poses the whole linguisticphilosophical question of the subject on the level of
94

the gap.

And finally, de Man has this to say:
All nostalgia or desire is desire of something
or for someone; here, the consciousness does
not result from the absence of something,
but consists of the presence of a nothingness.
Poetic language names this void with everrenewed understanding and, like Rousseau's
longing, it never tires of naming if again.
This persistent naming is what we call
literature. (p. 18)

There are a number of passages which would delight
Derrida were he to undertake a Deconstructionist reading
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of Ulysses.

The field is crowded, however, for many

good critical minds have already begun such an investigation.

Kenner's Joyce's Voices is a good place to begin

to survey traces, voids, absences, delays, and silences
in Ulysses, if one can "survey" something that is not
"there."

Such is the nature of language that we are

forced into using traditional metaphysical words to
express ideas that attempt to undercut that very view.
Kenner refers to the book's profusion of styles and
25
asks "What are we to make of that?"
The importance
to novel theory, to linguistics, and to philosophy of
grasping the significance of

style in Ulysses is set

out by Kenner in these words: "If we can understand the
apparent stylistic caprice that seems to invade and
subvert Joyce's massive novel, we may hope for a
radical understanding of numerous other matters
pertaining to fiction, to language, to understanding
itself" (JV, p. xiii).. The thesis of Kenner's slight
book is that the narrative idiom in the text need into
be the purported narrator's (JV, p. 18). An early passage from Ulysses which serves as a locus for Kenner's
contention will be given, followed by Kenner's
exposition:
Kidneys were on his mind as he moved about
the kitchen softly, righting her breakfast
things on the humpy tray. Gelid light and
air were in the kitchen but out of doors
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gentle summer morning everywhere. Made
him feel a bit peckish. [55/57]26
This is Kenner:
Here the two voices are just distinguishable.
"Peckish," from the notation of Bloom's
feelings, is a Bloom-word, but "gelid,"
responsive to the ambient light, is not.
It is not even a word we should expect
Bloom to know. . . . Joyce here offers the
first signallings of what we've described as
a technique for separating Bloom's thoughts
from the narrative gestures. (JV, p. 73)
Kenner finds that the two narrators which are
present in a passage such as the one mentioned "command
different vocabularies and proceed according to different
canons" (JV, p. 73). He further adverts that the intrusion of this consciousness is "perhaps the most radical,
the most disconcerting innovation in all of Ulysses,"
something new in fiction (Ulysses, pp. 64-65).

Referring

to this present-but-unnamed presence as "the second
narrator," Kenner paints him as "an ironic, malicious
figure."

In Joyce's Voices, Kenner gives the second

narrator a supernatural existence and history, calling
him "a counterpart of the fate" that presides over the
universe of farce, one who arranges banana peels or
helps weave the network of coincidences that enmesh
characters in fictions as disparate as those of Hardy,
Shakespeare, Swift, and Flaubert long before he appears
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in Joyce's works.

This narrator makes fun of inter-

locking motifs, and Kenner repeats what is perhaps the
best known of the instances: the setting down in the
midst of Bloom's meditation in "Sirens" a sentence
from Stephen's lecture on Shakespear

which Bloom was

not present to hear (JV, pp. 75-76).

Joyce's Voices

should be considered an introduction, or companion
piece, to Kenner's Ulysses, which was published only
two years later.
In his Ulysses, Kenner elevates and personifies
this presence by calling him "the Arranger," a name
the origin of which Kenner attributes to David Hayman,
who, in 1970, was the first critic to dwell on the
intrusions of the arranging presence (p. 65). Here is
Hayman's convoluted explanation of the appellation:
I use the term "arranger" to designate a
figure who can be identified neither with
the author nor with his narrators, but who
exercises an increasing degree of overt
control over his increasingly challenging
materials.27
By the time he writes Ulysses, Kenner contradicts what
he says in Joyce's Voices about the arranger as an
ancient, ghostly counterpart of fate.

In the later

book, Kenner presents a Joyce who originally set out
to write a conventional novel but who decided at some
point, for reasons which never can be fully fathomed, to
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knock "a few holes in his fabric, to promote a little
healthy incertitude."

It is at this moment, "about the

time of 'Wandering Rocks,"' that Joyce "invented the
Arranger" (Ulysses, p. 153).
Kenner seems unable to make up his mind about this
Arranger, for, after having given him a name, a birthplace, and a more or less stable birthdate, he has this
to say about the artificer: "Still, there is no sharp
break.

The Arranger was there all the time, and the

principles according to which he will now commence to
alter Ulysses were potential from the start, latent,
obeying an aesthetic of delay" (Ulysses, p. 71). The
occurrence of blurred boundaries and contradictions is
accepted, even expected, in contemporary literary
criticism, because one assumes that the writer purposefully chooses that technique, but the impression
reveived from reading Kenner's waverings is not one of
deliberation.

Is this an example of blindness and

insight?
Joyce's aesthetic of delay Kenner explains as
"producing the simplest fact by parallax, one element
now, one later, and leaving large orders of fact to be
assembled late or another time or never" (Ulysses,
p. 81). Parallax comes into play whenever the reader
recognizes a word that he has seen previously in another
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context.

He thus is alerted that he should be aware of

something, even if he does not for the moment see or
understand the connection.

In this regard, the aesthetic

of delay operates in a double fashion: the reader does
a doubletake when he sees the word a second time (its
use having been delayed), and his apprehending the
significance of its later use is likely to be delayed,
or deferred.

Furthermore, since Ulysses cannot be read,

but only reread, the aesthetic of delay operates once
again.
Kenner points out in the "Eumaeus" section a
perfect example of parallax:
Prepatory to anything else Mr. Bloom
brushed off the greater bulk of the shavings
and handed Stephen the hat and ashplant and
bucked him up generally in orthodox Samaritan
fashion, which he very badly needed.
[612-13/533]
Here, says Kenner, at the beginning of the third
section of the book, are "brush" and "shaving" and
"Buck," three words that appear on the very first
page of the book in a completely different context
(JV, pp. 35-36).

William M. Schutte has recently

completed his twelve-year project, Index of Recurrent
Elements in James Joyce's Ulysses, a book organized by
page and line number of the 1961 Random House edition,
intended, the author says, both for individuals who,
having read Ulysses

once, would like to explore "the
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complicated web of allusions" which form so significant
an element of the text and for more experienced Joyce
scholars who wish to locate quickly all the allusions to
28
a particular element.

This volume should be an espe-

cial boon for parallax sleuths.
Lawrence points out that the concept of omission
presupposes that something in particular is being
omitted (p. 51). Here, once more appears the idea of
the being of absence, of the presence of nothingness.
Kenner comments that Ulysses is largely a book of
silences, "despite its din of specifying," and he calls
"eloquent" the Blooms' and the author's "rhetoric of
avoidance."

Furthermore, Kenner says, "Some of the

most moving things the book has to say are things never
said" (Ulysses, p. 48). As an example of this poignancy,
Kenner cites an "unwritten" chapter which comes between
"Cyclops" and "Nausicaa," the hour of Bloom's visit to
the Dignam's house of mourning.

This chapter's absence,

Kenner writes, "corresponds to the one event of the day
that Bloom doesn't want to think about at all" (JV,
p. 91).
Regarding Joyce's rhetoric of avoidance, Ellmann
says that even in his youth Joyce preferred disdain to
combat (JJ, p. 68).

Joyce's artistic goal, notes Ell-

mann, was "nakedness, truth without pretences," but it
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was not a message that could be stated flatly.

Because

exhortation was not Joyce's way, Ellmann believes that
the young artist decided that "lofty impersonal power"—
a phrase he had used in a laudatory letter to Ibsen—was
more likely to succeed, even if sometimes such a stance
were mistaken for indifference,.

But, notes Ellmann,

"To proceed slantingly entailed reticence."
The tactic of silence carries into Joyce's later
years, also.

In 1920, when the artist and his family

moved to Paris, Joyce's private life, says Ellmann, was
suddenly a public concern.

His "gambols" in Trieste

and Zurich over, he adopted a restrained manner more
definitely than he had ever done before.

While other

writers practiced their mots, Ellmann says, Joyce
"measured his silences" (JJ, p. 499).
If one were to single out a particular chapter of
Ulysses for Deconstructive analysis, the most likely
choice would be "Circe."
episode" (JJ, p. 262).

Ellmann calls it "the climactic

The justification for selecting

"Circe" lies in the fact that both Joyce and critics of
Ulysses agree that it is his greatest artistic achievement up to the time of its publication.

In a 1920 letter

to his friend A. Francini Bruni, Joyce, notes Ellmann,
has this to say regarding "Circe": "I think it is the
best thing I have ever written" (J_J, P- 511).

In
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another letter to Bruni, written June 7, 1921, Joyce,
says Ellmann, quotes the following compliment which
came to him from Valery Larbaud: "The 'Circe' episode
alone would make the reputation of a French writer for
life" (JJ, pp. 526-27).

Even so would successfully

deconstructing "Circe" make the reputation of a contemporary literary theorist for life.

Shechner refers to

"Circe" as "an epiphany gone mad, one hundred seventytwo pages of sudden spiritual manifestation" (p. 105).
Referring to the numerous realities, the multiple
voices of Dublin gossip and the proliferating styles
which take over Ulysses, Kenner has this to say: "Still
we may suppose that there is after all a 'truth'
recoverable from beneath all these surfaces, a truth the
writer could put straightforwardly if he wanted to.
There is not.

The test is 'Circe'" (JV, p. 91). Beyond

dispute, the segment comprises and illustrates every
cherished notion which Deconstructionists advocate.
Ellmann calls attention to the significance of
Stephen's shattering the lampshade—"this ritual
defiance of space and time"—which is also his defiance
of the powers that govern the world, and he writes that
in "Circe" the bonds that keep things "next to or before
and after each other" are loosened.

Furthermore, Ellmann,

says, objects and creatures appear from nowhere, and
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"events that should be prior are subsequent and otherwise disarranged" (CJ, p. 66).

This is ahistoricity

at its fiercest.
Blurred margins can be seen in this remark of
Lawrence: "What we realize in the mode of 'Circe' is
that the unconscious JLS conventional and rhetorical:
in the unconscious, myth and melodrama, archetype and
stereotype merge" (p. 159). Traces and spaces come to
the fore in another passage by Lawrence: "In 'Circe' it
is as if we dive into the ellipses of the stream-ofconsciousness passages of the early chapters.

We see

the fears, wishes, and guilty feelings that the characters
have tried all day to suppress" (OS, p. 153).
"Closure" is an obscenity to Derrida, but sections
of theses, at least, must eventually conclude, and the
best way to conclude is by measuring the likelihood
that current theorists will succeed in deconstructing
"Circe."

Kenner maintains that "Circe" attends mostly

to things that don't happen (JV, p. 92). And Barthes
has this to say: "We all perhaps reveal more by the
words that we avoid than by the words that we use.

In

literature it would be extremely interesting to have a
statistical analysis of words avoided by an author"
(discussion after "To Write: An Intransitive Verb?" in
Languages, p. 146).
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Shutte's Index of words used by Joyce runs to four
hundred twenty-nine pages.

Therefore, the Deconstruc-

tionists' task is clearly defined (which concept they
hate).

First, they must demolish the words they see

(if they will concede perception), and next they must
polish off all of the words and events that are not
there.

It boggles the mind to consider the size of

that volume.

Chapter VI
Genre: A Penultimate Perspective
Ulysses is so polysemous that there is ample
justification for its being enlisted under several
flags; passages, ideas, and techniques can be found to
support any reading.

It can be seen as both Modernist

and Contemporary, and current Deconstructionist critics
are eager to tip the scales in favor of their position.
Do they have a valid claim?

The answer to this question

depends on a theory of art.

Ellmann says that one

theory of art and its practice which is usually drawn
from Joyce's writings is that the artist is too godlike
to take sides for or against his characters.

In this

view, Joyce, notes Ellmann, offers multiple perspectives
on the action, in the form of different styles and
different narrators, without choosing among them (CJ,
pp. 72-73).
De Almeida believes that Joyce, perceiving the
world as an interlocking complex of irreconcilable
opposites, refuses to choose between two available
choices in any given situation, attempting instead to
incorporate both to paradoxical effect.

By maintaining

a tension between the "antipoles of theme and situation,"
by displaying an inconsistency of tone, by giving
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prominence to no one style, by creating conflicting
impressions, Joyce, says de Almeida, gives substance to
"the idea of the opposite" everywhere (p. 177). These
are Bruno's ideas, as Gose points out.

Referring to

Joyce's rage for inclusion and freedom from commitment,
de Almeida says that Joyce is not so much indecisive as
determined not to choose, content to have the tension of
opposites itself as his first and last intention, as the
energy of his work (p. 177).
She's wrong, however, and E. D. Hirsch's major
arguments dealing with the author's intention and with
genre clearly offer a corrective rebuttal to de Almeida
and others who believe as she does.

It is to counter

multiple attitudes that Hirsch writes Validity in
Interpretation.

In 1967 he says that the task for a

historian of culture is to explain why, for the past
forty years, there has been "a heavy and largely victorious assault" on the sensible belief that a text means
what its author meant.

Hirsch notes that in the

earliest and most decisive wave of the attack" (launched
by Eliot, Pound, and their associates), the battleground
was literary; the proposition that textual meaning is
independent of the author's control was associated with
the literary doctrine that the best poetry is impersonal,
objective, and autonomous (p. 1 ) . Thence New Criticism.
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Hirsch further says that at a slightly later period,
and for different reasons, this same notion of semantic
autonomy was advanced by Heidegger and his followers,
by Jungian psychologists, and by scholars in some
branches of linguistics—especially those concerned
with the so-called information theory (pp. 1-2).
Hirsch's work has been conceived as a contribution
to general hermeneutic theory, with special emphasis on
the problem of validity, a problem which has been
neglected in recent years, he believes, largely because
the very conception of absolutely valid interpretation
has come to be regarded with "profound skepticism."

In

law, for example, the prevailing pragmatism holds that
the meaning of the law is what present judges say the
meaning is.

In biblical exegesis, Hirsch notes,

Bultmannians hold that the meaning of the Bible is a
new revelation to each succeeding generation, and in
literary theory, the most familiar form of the doctrine
insists that the meaning of a literary text is "what
it means to us today" (p. viii).
"Radical historicism" is the name Hirsch applies to
such theories, and he valiantly takes arms against the
foe.

"Psychologism"—a similar but still more radical

form of skepticism—is treated in his second chapter and
in Appendix II, and a third type of theory, which he
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calls "autonomism"—the doctrine that literary texts
belong to a distinct ontological realm where meaning is
independent of authorial will—is discussed throughout,
though chiefly in Chapter One.

All three related views,

Hirsch says, deny the possibility of validity in any
absolute or normative sense of the word (p. viii).
Concerned to show that he addresses more than a
literary problem, important as that is, Hirsch perceptively writes that the wider implication of such
hermeneutical skepticism—casting into doubt the right
of any humanistic discipline to claim genuine knowledge—
are usually overlooked by its inherents.

Crediting

Dilthey's observation that all humane studies are founded
upon the interpretation of texts, Hirsch, insisting that
valid interpretation is crucial to the validity of all
subsequent inferences in those studies, has this to say:
The theoretical aim of a genuine discipline,
scientific or humanistic, is the attainment
of truth, and its practical aim is agreement
that truth has probably been achieved. This
the practical goal of every genuine discipline
is consenses—the winning of firmly grounded
agreement that one set of conclusions is more
probable than others—and this is precisely
the goal of valid interpretation. It must
not be dismissed as a futile goal simply
because the subject matter of interpretation
is often ambiguous and its conclusions
uncertain. Certainty is not the same thing
as validity, and knowledge of ambiguity is not
necessarily ambiguous knowledge. (pp. vii-ix)

135

"Something to be done, a task, and a search" for
this paper now involves application of Hirsch's theories
to the current literary question of whether there
appears in Joyce's works enough internal evidence to
validate the Deconstructionist contention that he is
more Contemporary than Modern.

Once the validity of

this assertion has been established or denied, Hirsch's
dicta will once more be cited to support a final assessment of the probability of Deconstructionist success.
Just as valid interpretation is crucial to the
validity of all subsequent theories derived from that
interpretation, so is Hirsch careful to indicate the
crucial distinction which must be made between meaning
and significance.

Failure to observe and honor this

distinction lies at the root of many relativistic
theories and much contemporary literary critical confusion.

Observing that the word "meaning" has been

given two distinct senses, Hirsch discriminates in the
following manner:
There is a difference between the meaning
of a text (which does not change) and the
meaning of a text to us today (which changes).
The meaning of a text is that which the author
meant by his use of particular linguistic
symbols. Being linguistic, this meaning is
communal, that is, self-identical and
reproducible in more than one consciousness.
Being reproducible, it is the same whenever
and wherever it is understood by another.
However, each time this meaning is construed,
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its meaning to the construer (its significance) is different. Since his situation
is different, so is the character of his
relationship to the construed meaning. It
is precisely because the meaning of the
text is always the same that its relationship to a different situation is a different
relationship. (p. 255)
Thus Hirsch combats contemporary theorists who, like
Derrida, Foucault, and other members of their fraternity,
desire to dismiss the author from any position of
importance—in fact (contra stability, center, and
permanence), from any position, period.

The danger in

this view Hirsch argues, sensibly, is that, once the
author has been banished as the determiner of his
text's meaning, no adequate principle exists for judging
the validity of an interpretation (p. 3 ) . He believes
that the theory of semantic autonomy forced itself into
unsatisfactory ad hoc formulations because "in its zeal
to banish the author it ignored the fact that meaning
is an affair of consciousness not of words" (p. 4 ) .
Therefore, Hirsch insists, if a theorist wants to save
the ideal of validity, he has to save the author as
well, because the author is the only

compelling norma-

tive principle that could lend validity and the critic's
first task will be to show that the prevailing arguments
against the author are questionable and vulnerable (p. 6)
Because the very act of making a rational,
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intentional decision—regardless of the import of that
decision—connects one with the classical Western view,
contemporary critics who want, paradoxically, to claim
Joyce and bury him at the same time, delight in finding
passages in his works which they believe justify their
relativistic perspective.

These writers ascribe to the

theory mentioned by Ellmann that the artist is too godlike to take sides for or against his characters.
However, to accuse the artist of refusing to choose
"is to malign God as well as Joyce," says Ellmann, who
properly insists that even when Joyce offers multiple
perspectives, his own view shows through: "One always
knows where Joyce is, even though he never says" (CJ,
pp. 73-74).

The questions arise, then, "Where is Joyce?

What are his intentions?"

Of course, the very mention

of intention inflames many contemporary theorists.
Roland McHugh quotes a letter he received from Geoffrey
Hart in 1968: "Most modern critics will say, rightly or
wrongly, that it doesn't matter a damn what any author
intended, except in so far as that intention is borne
out by the work itself."

Furthermore, Hart says, the

contemporary critical question is "Who cares what he
thought?

What are the book's intentions?"

(FW Ex., pp.

73-74).
After one has studied Structuralist and Deconstructionist theory, such a question begins to sound sensible,
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but it is at the point of trying to answer the query
that current literary philosophies turn into fantasies.
The best scholars and writers among contemporary
theorists write so well that one is tempted to praise
whatever they publish, simply because it is presented
with such skill.

A choice example of this kind of fine

writing is Derrida's "Living On: Border Lines," which
3
appears in Deconstruction and Criticism.
While not exactly one hundred pages of "epiphany
gone mad," it is very close to it.

One of the frustra-

tions of moving away from considering traditional works
in traditional ways is that new writers cannot be
encapsulated, nor can Derrida's "Living On" be explicated
here so that any of its power can be felt.

To say that

he practices in "Border Lines" what he preaches (as
presented earlier by Culler, especially regarding the
theory of supplementarity) sounds ridiculously mild and
pale in the face of Derrida's pyrotechnics.
All that can be done is to recommend highly that
the passage be read in its entirety for full appreciation,
At the conclusion of this appreciative reading, however,
when the first flush of awe at Derrida's wit, scholarship, and skill has subsided a bit, the reader wonders
what has actually been said.

What is the meaning?

The suspicion grows that the only meaning is the
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productivity of language, that Derrida writes solely
for the pleasure of writing.
The piece is a tour de force, and if Derrida
thinks that anyone reading it would ask "What is the
book's intention?" without wondering about the controlling, presence of its author, he is indeed mistaken.
While loudly proclaiming the death of the author,
Derrida—operating from blindness sans insight?—writes
so that the reader cannot but be aware of the vital
presence of the author.
A useful comparison can be made with the final
section of Ulysses, Molly's uninterrupted musings.

It,

too, is a tour de force, and the reader gasps at Joyce's
artistry, always fully aware of the author's controlling
presence.

However, the impression one receives from the

Molly segment is that meaning rides above and beyond
the words on the page.

Granted, Derrida composes a

convoluted essay, while Joyce

composes a narrative

(albeit a tortuous one). Nevertheless, power for power's
sake is what comes across from Derrida, while power for
creativity's sake is what Joyce demonstrates.

This

referring, this affirmative singing to something higher
than oneself, is one of the reasons that destructive
theorists cannot claim Joyce, as Hirsch's theories
help show.
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Validation, says Hirsch, shows not only that an
interpretation is legitimate but that its likelihood of
being correct is greater than or equal to that of any
other known hypothesis about the text (p. 169). He is
careful to note the difference between verification (to
show that a conclusion is true) and validation (to show
that a conclusion is probably true on the basis of what
is known).

In an explanatory note, Hirsch points out

that in transcendental philosophy "validation"
(Geltungsprufung) applies to a priori certitude, whereas
"verification" means empirical verification.

He

assumes, however that most readers agree with him in
thinking that in everyday usage a "valid" conclusion
implies one that has been reached by acceptable reasoning,
although it may not be certainly true (p. 171).
"Probability judgments are informed guesses," writes
Hirsch, and he cautions that they contain "no magical
potency capable of converting an inaccessible unknown
into something known" (p. 175). Because a probability
judgment reaches conclusions about something inaccessible
to experience, says Hirsch, it follows that the judgment
must somehow assimilate its unknown object to that which
is known (p. 175).

This is the genre classification.

One of the chief ways that contemporary literary critics
try to get at Joyce is through a charge that he undercuts
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reader expectation when he begins Ulysses more or less
as a conventional novel and then disappoints those
expectations.

It is for this reason that a thorough

acquaintance with the theory of the novel is helpful, as
Buttigieg suggests.

If Joyce sets out to write a

novel with a linear plot and a clearly defined beginning,
middle, and end but later, for an unknowable reason,
decides to avoid closure of any sort, then the Deconstructionist charges are justified.

As an example of this

purported undercutting, Hawkes remarks that Joyce, in
the seventh ("Aeolus") section, perhaps from a desire
to generate tension or irony or social comment, changes
the message of the book thus far—which has been "This
is a novel"--to "This is a newspaper" (p. 137).
Different critics place the beginning of the frustration
in reader expectation at different points in the book.
Kenner, for one, finds it in the eleventh episode, called
"Sirens."

Here, he says, "something changed, and so

radically that the author's staunchest advocate, Ezra
Point, was dismayed."

In the "Sirens" section, Kenner

notes, the reader no longer sees the foreground characters directly, in order to see past them—perhaps to
Homer.

Rather, he says, "our immediate awareness now is

of screens of language, through or past which it is
not easy to see" (JV, p. 41).

Such duplicity, then,
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would lead Joyce towards the contemporary worldview.
However, if there were a method by which Joyce's
intention can be deduced, a method by which he can be
shown to have conceived, not a conventional novel, but
a work of much greater complexity, then the grounds on
which the current theorists stand to attack Joyce will
shift; Joyce will deconstruct their deconstruction.
This happens, for example, if Ulysses comes closer to
being a Menippean satire than it comes to being anything
else, as Northrop Frye mentions in Anatomy of Criticism.
In assimilating an unknown object to a known one, Hirsch
gives three criteria which he sees as decisive in determining the reliability of a guess about an unknown trait:
the narrowness of the class, the number of members in
it, and the frequency of the trait among those members.
Pointing out that increased reliability is achieved
through the narrowing of the class, and conceding that
the copiousness of instances must obviously diminish
as the class narrows, Hirsch nevertheless insists that
his criteria can be used effectively even when the
narrower class has merely two members, one being known
and the other being the unknown object under scrutiny
(p. 179).

This is Hirsch's explanation:

For a class is narrowed and its members made
more uniform by increasing the number of
class traits. When more and more of these
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traits are identical, the unknown traits of
our object will have more and more likelihood of being identical with the known
traits of the sub-class. When we narrow
the class, we decrease the instances, but
at the same time we increase the defining
traits of the class, and that is the chief
goal. This process of narrowing the class
is the decisive element in validating
interpretations. (pp. 179-80)
Regarding Joyce, the known quantity is Menippean
satire, and the unknown is Ulysses.

Heeding Hirsch's

insistence on the importance of matching traits, one
seeking to classify Ulysses might easily follow an
example set by F. Anne Payne, who measures Chaucer
against the genre of Menippean satire.

Payne, citing

Frye, draws heavily upon Mikhail Bakhtin's The Problems
of Dostoevsky's Poetics, which she calls "The only fullscale analysis I know of the Menippean qualities in the
works of a great author."

He illuminates the

importance of such an analysis in these words:
The failure to recognize that a work
belongs to a particular literary genre
causes universal difficulties to critics;
at its worst, it causes us to attack pear
trees for not producing apples. (Chaucer
and Menippean Satire, p. 3)
Payne presents fourteen points that Bakhtin uses to
describe the salient traits of what he calls "minippea,"
and she adds seven more of her own (pp. 7-11).

Some of

Bakhtin's points which Payne paraphrases succinctly are
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these: the comic element, freedom of invention; an
organic combination of free fantasy, symbolism, and
mystical-religious elements with (from one point of view)
extreme, crude underworld naturalism; the provoking and
testing of a philosophical idea; the investigation of
unusual psychic states; sharp contrasts and exymoronic
combinations; parody and a variety of styles and tones.
A dialogue between two characters (speaking from two
differing, clear-cut levels of perception), one of whom
is a know-it all, appears frequently, says Payne (pp.
7-9).
These characteristics would be immediately obvious
in Ulysses, even to a first-time reader.

There is one

further trait of Payne's that fits Ulysses so neatly
that it will be given fully:
One character of the satire is frequently
involved in an endless quest; the other
character of the central dialogue comments
on his activities, in a sense "helps" him.
The quest is endless; there is a satirization
of any norm which tries to provide an end.
(p. 10)
In the passage appear traits that apply both to the book
and to its author.

Stephen is involved in an endless

quest, and Bloom, commenting on his activities, helps
him, or at least tries to help him.
also true.

The opposite is

One small example of the satirization of any
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norm which attempts to provide an end is the section in
which the headmaster so smugly speaks of God and history,
thinking that he has defined the boundaries of each.

A

large example is the whole book, in which Joyce's endless quest appears in two guises: the search for the
soul (more will be said later) and the unremitting attack
on injustice in all its forms, an attack aimed particularly against the philosophicus gloriosus.
Major works in the genre of menippea, says Payne,
are Candide, Gulliver's Travels, Brave New World, the
Satyricon, and Gargantua and Pantagruel.

Less familiar

is the work of Lucian, "the first writer whose complete
Menippean satires survive and perhaps the most brilliantly funny of all of them" (p. 3 ) . Frye says that no
one will challenge the statement that the literary
ancestry of Gulliver's Travels and Candide runs through
Rabelais and Erasmus to Lucian (p. 308). Picking up
the trail here, Edward A. Bloom notes that the trail
from Lucian to Joyce is a long one but that it is
"blazed plainly with its diversity of tone and theme
and purpose."
In addition to the books which Payne mentions,
Ellmann lists the following which Joyce had in his
Trieste library, all of which pertain to menippea:
Apuleius's Fabula de Psyche et Cupidione, Burton's The
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Anatomy of Melancholy, Chaucer's Complete Works, Landor's
Imaginary Conversations, Plato's Five Dialogues, Sterne's
Tristram Shandy, and Lucian's I Dialoghi degli iddii, dei
morti, ed altre opera.

Possession of books does not

validate designation of genre, but these brief remarks
indicate the fecundity of such a line of research.

"God's

plenty" would be the rewards of using the Menippean
model as a standard by which to measure Ulysses.
Therefore, not only is the suggestion that Ulysses
be viewed as an example of Menippean satire a valid,
legitimate one, but because of the prevalence of so
many matching traits that can be demonstrated and in
accordance with Hirsch's probability theory, the
likelihood of this interpretation's being correct is
greater than that of any other hypothesis about the text.
As has been amply documented, current theorists
reject every suggestion of genre designation on principle,
no matter how persuasively any particular example may be
presented.

Nor is Hirsch unaware of the charges that may

be laid against such interpretation.

In a section enti-

tled "The Self-Confirmability of Interpretations," he
notes that word patterns and stylistic effects which
support one interpretation can become different patterns
and effects under a disparate interpretation, that the
same text can sponsor quite different data, and that
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each set of data will very powerfully support the
interpretive theory that sponsored it in the first
place.

This relationship Hirsch calls "incestuous"

(p. 166). One hears echos of the Deconstructionist
idea of supplementarity and doubling.

An interpretive

hypothesis, therefore, which Hirsch calls "a guess
about genre," tends to be a self-confirming hypothesis
(p. 166).
When de Almeida quotes Schlegel—"All the classical
genres are now ridiculous in their purity"—she does so
in order to show that Joyce, recognizing the truth of
the statement, sees himself in the writing of Ulysses
as fulfulling a need to destroy the genre of epic
completely before anything new and truly epic can be
written, and she goes on to write about Joyce's
"destructive parody" (Homer, pp. 47-48).

Once again, de

Almeida draws the wrong conclusion from her perceptive
insights, and she bogs down in universal critical
difficulties, attacking pear trees for not producing
apples.
The question of genre is a thorny one, of course,
and de Almeida is not the first critic to draw blood
from a wrong conclusion.

Part of the difficulty arises

from the fact that there are two types of genre—the
extrinsic and the intrinsic—and failure to distinguish
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between them is as crucial as failure to differentiate
between meaning and significance.
Extrinsic genre is characterized by arbitrariness;
it cannot define a work of art or constitute its
essence.

An intrinsic genre pattern, however, reveals

some class-like traits, and would, therefore, be
constitutive, leading to the heart and essence of a work.
"That sense of the whole by means of which an interpreter can correctly understand any part in its
determinancy" is Hirsch's pithy summation, and he
remarks that one of the main tasks of interpretation
is the critical rejection of extrinsic genres in the
search for the intrinsic genre of a text (pp. 88-89).
Perhaps Mikhail Bakhtin can offer some hope of
resolution for this thorny problem when he says that
genre terms when applied to modern literature are
intended to designate the essence of a genre and not to
categorize in accord with the specific canon of a genre
7
as defined in antiquity.
Menippea constitutes an
intrinsic genre capable of governing the implications
of the book.

This satire is a mirror complex enough to

reflect the work as a novel and more, including as it
does the affirmative norm which undergirds the intelligence behind all the variety, unifying it.
The presence in Ulysses of so many styles, so many
techniques, so much obvious drawing from a deep well of
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intellectual heritage has always challenged critics to
identify the sources which Joyce employs.

This

identification leads to various theories of art, as one
learns from de Almeida.
Noting that Joyce stays poised on the verge between
the comic and the serious, between parody and profundity,
between triviality and quadriviality, de Almeida insists
that it is useless to try to identify a place where the
line between earnestness and mockery falls.

She thinks

that Joyce would be both the last to deny the significance of anything in his book and the first to deny the
ultimate significance of any one thing in Ulysses
(p. 152).

To support her relativistic approach, de

Almeida recounts a remark that Joyce once made when he
was being questioned too closely on these significances:
"I am afraid I am more interested, Mr. Connolly, in the
g
Dublin street names than in the riddle of the universe."
That remark was surely aimed at getting rid of Mr.
Connolly, but in keeping the streets meticulously named
— cultivating his own mean and sure estate—Joyce shows
that the riddle of the universe is precisely what does
interest him—from street names to the universe.

This

particular cultivation is part of any satirist's norm.
De Almeida believes that Schlegel's theory of
romantic irony remains the best description of the
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perspective which nurtures Joyce's detached manner
(p. 153). Yet, in the same paragraph, de Almeida,
defining romantic irony, seems to undercut her relativism.

First she quotes Schlegel once more. "Its mood

[im Innern] surveys everything and rises infinitely above
everything" that is limited, even "above its own art,
virtue, or genius; and in its externals and executions,
it mimics the manner 'of an ordinary good Italian buffo'"
(Homer, p. 153). Schlegel could just as easily have
been describing Ulysses, and Joyce would appreciate
having humor ascribed to the work.
De Almeida goes on to note that romantic irony
implies buffoonery, without a doubt, but she says
that it is of the transcendental variety, that the ironic
expression "transcends the external world that may not
be there, the self's substitute creations, and the
creator's own self-consciousness in the act of creation"
(p. 153). The valorizing reference to transcendence
suggests that de Almeida is slipping from her
Deconstructionist roots, but she goes on to refer
to the "inherent paradox" involved in the idea of superior self-contemplation, mentioning Fichter's concept of
"intellectuell Anschauung," where artistic selfconsciousness is meant to control—not merely accompany—
inspiration, and the artist is not supposed to lose
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himself in his work no matter how subjective its matter.
It is upon this pattern, de Almeida states, that
Schlegel builds his theory (Homer, p. 153). No less does
Joyce.

Irony is the major trope of all satire.

The prime example of this irony, says de Almeida,
is Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, where, writes Alfred E.
Lussky, "the poet is said to be smiling down upon his
g
own masterpiece from the heights of his genius."
De
Almeida strongly suggests that the cornerstone of
Stephen's aesthetic theory in Portrait (on the Flaubertain artist who "like the God of the creation, remains
within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork,
invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring
his fingernails") would be a "recitation" of Schlegel's
central thought (p. 154). Fully aware that Joyceans
will be quick to point out that Joyce uses this statement on the artist to mock the youthful Stephen and to
illustrate his aestheticism, de Almeida insists, nevertheless, that many of Stephen's notions on art, even in
Ulysses, can be traced to Schlegel.

Furthermore, she

says that Joyce's own "quizzical treatment" of Stephen
everywhere "subsumes the perspective of romantic irony"
(p. 154).

If Ulysses is seen as Menippean satire,

however, Joyce's treatment of Stephen is not "quizzical."
and the ironic perspective fits naturally into the class
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traits of the genre.
While the idea of transcendent immanence which
Fichte, Schlegel, and Stephen espouse gives rise to
one theory of art, it also supports—by bringing in the
notion of artistic self-consciousness—a second theory
of art to which Ellmann believes Joyce subscribes.
This theory, says Ellmann, has less to do with the
qualities of the aesthetic object and more to do with
the writer's life.

To think of artistry alone is for

Joyce a mark of the aesthete rather than of the true
artist.

True beauty, notes Ellmann, was "as Plato said,

the splendor of truth, and truth required that there
should be between the writer's life and his work an
umbilical relation" (CJ, p. 74). Hirsch is happy here;
Deconstructionists are dejected.
If contemporary critics are going to reject the idea
of Joyce's intentionality in creating Ulysses as a satire,
then they are free to continue their Deconstructive
onslaught against the text.

They hope eventually to stack

up sufficient statistical quantifying evidence to allow
them to carry the day, and, indeed, it would be comforting to believe that the mere accumulation of favorable
documentation would ultimately enable a theory to be
proven.
Unfortunately, however, that method, appealing as
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it is, will not work.

Hirsch cogently states that the

only certain formula for choosing between two hypotheses
is to prove that one of them is false (p. 180).
Certainty is rare in this world, though.

Hirsch notes

that usually neither of two opposing views can be
falsified, and both continue after their separate
fashions to account for the evidence.

At this point, we

have to make our way through "a thicket of probability
judgments" on the basis of the evidence we have (p. 181).
If it is true, as Joyce has said, that between the
writer's life and his works there exists an umbilical
relation, the implication is plain that Deconstructionists
will have to capture Joyce as well as his works, and any
evidence from his life which can be legitimately related
to his writing will tip the scales in favor of one of
the opposing camps.
coup?

Can current theorists carry off this

The task may be more Herculean than they realize,

for, as Stephen muses, there are "linking cords back to
Eve."

Chapter VII
Conclusion
In summary, then, for longer than sixty years
Joyce's Ulysses, the most polyphonic work of the
Modern period, has been approached from every
conceivable angle in major studies by esteemed scholars.
For more than half of this period, criticism was carried
out along the lines of traditional Western metaphysical
thought.

Surveying this classical philosophical perspec-

tive and its concomitant artistic endeavor has shown the
cultural heritage and the common basis upon which great
works of art have rested or from which they have departed.

In either event, the stability of the base has been

assumed as a given, a first principle.
An investigation into the influence of Vico's New
Science on the first three chapters of Ulysses has
revealed the ever-expanding meanings of Stephen's names
and epithets and has exemplified the type of critical
approach taken to the book by theorists seeking a "key"
to the work in the decades immediately following its
publication.

Recognition that V i c o — a major influence

upon Joyce—stresses a classical sense of order—a
strategy which appeals to Structuralist critics, as well
as to more traditional commentators—has revealed some
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of the complex dimensions of Joycean criticism.

It is

a measure of the continuing importance of Vico that his
ideas still generate critical comment and furnish
material for creative activity so many years after his
death—his concept of myth falling as it does within the
framework of many modern writers, and central to my own
position is Vico's program's being seen as "the supreme
ricorso of the human spirit."
Also, we have seen that a rupture develops between
the traditional worldview and new ways of thinking which
necessitate new concepts and a new vocabulary, and an
acquaintance with this new lexicon enables the reader to
survey literature from a viewpoint diametrically opposed
to that which had prevailed for the previous two thousand
years.

The posing of pertinent questions is seen to be

more challenging and rewarding than is the timeworn
search for answers.

One also realizes that a commensu-

rable shift in theory of the novel is to be expected in
the wake of the shift in philosophy and linguistics.
Encountering the ubiquitous question of whether
contemporary literary critics—who completely disavow
the whole traditional Western metaphysical view—will
succeed in moving Joyce from his firm position as one
of the last great writers of the Modern period to a
point within the Contemporary purview has been shown to
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yield an even sharper awareness of the complexity of
current debate focusing on Joyce and his works.
Also, surveying in a general Derridean manner
several contemporary critical approaches to Ulysses
which attempt to show that Joyce demolishes every
cherished notion inherited from the past has presented
the opportunity and responsibility to decide whether
the Deconstructionist defense of demolition in order to
reach a "pure" base from which to begin a fresh assessment of the work can be justified.
Then, in presenting a perspective more specifically
Derridean (the French critic's theoretical concepts of
nothingness, silence, void, absence, and so forth as
they apply to passages in Ulysses), Hirsch's probability
theory has been offered as a touchstone by which may be
gauged the likelihood that Joyce will submit to being
totally within the Deconstructionists' camp.

These

several stages of analysis constitute the main portions
of this study of Joyce.
Trying to keep in mind the ground covered, what,
now, might one say in a final effort to reach some
general attitude towards this remarkable swirl of
critical controversy relevant to Ulysses?

A considera-

tion of genre is also necessary, because one of the
chief Deconstructionist ploys for capturing Joyce is
through the contention that he sets out to write a
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conventional novel but at some point undercuts reader
expectations by veering into strange territory, using
even stranger techniques of style and composition,
thereby undermining the very tradition which these
critics consider as his foundation.
Far from beginning Ulysses as a conventional novel
but subsequently deliberately deciding to avoid closure
of any sort (as Deconstructionists claim he does), it
can be argued that Joyce intends from the beginning to
write a satire and that he succeeds in doing what he
sets out to do.

Genre appears at the forefront because

Ulysses comes closer to being Menippean satire—a long
prose satire hanging within a narrative framework—than
it comes to being anything else.

This form rests upon

states of mind—characters often being mouthpieces—as
well as upon the intellectual appeal towards some
affirmation—the norm upheld in all great satire.

Within

the Menippean framework, Joyce's search for the soul
serves as the unifying intellectual and normative
principle riding beneath the multifariousness and apparent chaos so strikingly evident in the book.

This is

not apart, of course, from theorists who claim all
novels to be best defined as this same quest (Lukacs as
one example).
A recognition of the text as Menippean satire opens
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the way for a final measuring of Ulysses as a work which
continuously resists final measurement, because it
projects the wandering soul of Joyce, and no theories—
ancient, Modern, or Contemporary—can ever capture the
essence of a soul, the form of forms, as Joyce has
Stephen define it.

Focusing on the concept of authorial

intention, (with a brief suggestion of the ease with
which Ulysses may be shown as Menippean satire) forces
a confrontation with the contemporary contempt for the
idea of an intentional author.

Derrida and Foucault

must be faced in this fray, but Vico is still a contender
to be reckoned with.
Lionel Rubinoff notes that Vico provides the
foundation for an epistemology which accounts for the
possibility of a rapproachment between theory and
practice in a manner that has served as a paradigm for
all subsequent attempts.

For Vico, he writes, intro-

spection is a process that occurs simultaneously with
the critical reconstruction of past thought as expressed
in historical behavior; that is, mind is what it does,
and it is only by experiencing what mind does that we can
come to understand what mind j.s (p. 107).
In relation to Joyce, that means that if we have an
idea about what he is doing, we can better understand
his reasons for doing it.

Payne reinforces this notion
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regarding Ulysses as menippea when she remarks that the
author's meaning inheres in his form and is consequently
difficult to approach (p, 4 ) . Difficult perhaps, but
not impossible, and the search leads us momentarily back,
via ricorso, to the idea of genre.

Just as Joyce uses

Homer and Vico as he plans and composes Ulysses, so
Hirsch says that pre-existing type conceptions are
apparently as necessary to the imagination as they are
to the requirements of communication.

Speaking of the

tendency of the mind to use old types as the foundation
for new ones, Hirsch gives a pithy statement of E. H.
Gombrich: "Variants can be controlled and checked only
2
against a set of invariants."
Gombrich's statement can apply both to the concept
of genre and to the Deconstructionists.

According to

their own tenets, significance resides in the space
between different points of view, but contemporary
writers seem blind to the fact that one element must
be stable in order for the differences to be remarked.
A rebel must know what he is rebelling against, and the
more clearly defined the enemy, the more clearly defined
the rebellion.

If Deconstructionists are determined to

do away with their cultural heritage, against what
backdrop will they be delineated?
Derrideans, anti-genre and anti-author, strongly
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advocate the theory of art that the meaning of a text
is "what it means to us today," but they are confused,
as Hirsch's distinction between meaning and significance
makes clear.

The significance can change from year to

year, from reader to reader, even from one reading to
the next, but the meaning is put there by the author
when he makes the marks (signifiers) on the page.
Therefore, once he releases the work, the meaning is
set—closed, as it were.

Deconstructionists, of course,

hate the idea of permanent closure.

Kenner, discussing

the question of identity and place, expresses their view
plainly:
"On nothing is Ulysses more insistent than on the
fact that there is no Bloom there, no Stephen there, no
Molly there, no Dublin there, simply language."

He

points out that to say this is by no means "to surrender
to the artificer's whimsical virtuosity" (Ulysses,
p. 156).

Kenner makes these statements in order to

affirm the impossibility of closure, to prove his
contention that writer and reader are co-creators, that
Joyce only begins the book, that "the endless work of
finishing it he determined to hand to his readers, for
their endless pleasure."

Kenner's most misleading state-

ment is this: "For only the arrangement could the author
claim responsibility" (Ulysses, p. 157). This ignores
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tone completely.

Without the controlling consciousness

behind each magnificent work, the art object would not
exist.
Does Joyce, however, decide against closure of any
sort?

Does he refuse to choose?

It is important to note

that contemporary critics appear justified in saying that
he does.

Deconstructionists see themselves not as

inventors but as archeologists uncovering treasure
obscured by decades of accumulated detritus.

They

actually do find (for the most part) what they purport
to find, but they miss the mark when they ignore every
instance which does not bolster their theories.

Joyce

is on neither side; he is on both sides, an eclectic
combination with awesome consequences.

Being on

neither side, remaining open on all issues, valorizing
relativity (as Deconstructionists do) is easy.

It is

being on both sides, seeing satirically both balm and
bane wherever one looks, yet living in the resulting
tension, that is difficult.

Joyce accomplishes the

latter.
While an earlier concept was called the Dancer from
the Dance, in this section there will be another called
Both/And, because Joyce can be seen as Both/And in relation to almost everything, reflecting the duplicity of
himself, of others, and of the world.

The Both/And
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pattern is constitutive of menippea, in which many pairs
of opposites shade off into each other, in the center of
which lies mystery—or perhaps the answer to "love's
bitter mystery."

Deconstructionists, happy with a theory

of art which sees the writer detached both from his work
and from the Western metaphysical tradition, are
delighted to come across a quotation such as the one
de Almeida chooses as the frontispiece for her book.

In

a letter which Joyce wrote to his son Giorgio in 1935,
he expresses himself in these words: "My eyes are tired.
For over half a century they have gazed into nullity,
where they have found a lovely nothing."

They

must do

a doubletake, though, when they realize that Joyce's
nothingness in "lovely."

Such a view is characteristic

of the Both/And pattern.
It is also altogether possible that Joyce was
not being perfectly straightforward in his remarks to
Giorgio.

Joyce's brother Stanislaus, notes Ellmann, for

many years kept a diary, and an entry for February 2,
1904, referring to the seeds of Portrait, has these
words: "It is to be almost autobiographical, and naturally as it comes from Jim, satirical" (_JJ, pp. 152-53).
Should we be surprised that the author of a satire should
himself be satirical?
How then does one explain Joyce's seeming pessimism?
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The idea of a lovely nothing is not original with Joyce,
and he may well have been familiar with the words which
Rousseau gives one of his heroines, which de Man sets
out: "Le pays des chimeres est en ce monde le seul digne
d'etre habite et tel est le neant des choses humaines
qu'hors l'Etre existant par lui-meme, il n'y a rien de
beau que ce qui n'est pas" (italics added).
Also characteristic of a Both/And pattern of
contraries

are

and his works.

the remarks of critics about both Joyce
Helping to counter the view of Joyce as

nihilistic, Ellmann recounts Yeat's remark that in no
one he had met, with the exception of William Morris,
was the joy of life so keen as in Joyce, (CJ_, p. 75).
Robert M. Polhemus refers to "the joyfulness, morally
suspect though

it might be, that animates so much of
4
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake."
The joyfulness would not
be suspect, however, if readers were more familiar with
the affirmative norms of menippea.
Speaking of further contraries, Gose notes that
in order to integrate the views of Bruno and Freud into
his thought and art, Joyce has to balance the realistic
and the idealistic, the psychological and the spiritual,
the grotesque and the comic.

But the grotesque is only

one pose, notes Gose, pointing out that Joyce creates
Ulysses as a comedy according to his early notion of
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that form, a notion he expresses in "The Paris Notebook"
of 1903: "The feeling which is proper to the comic art
is the feeling of joy" (p. viii, Preface).
Gose stressing the influence of Bruno's paradoxes
on Joyce's works, approaches Ulysses in the fresh way
which Buttigieg yearns for, and he indicates the Both/And
aspect of Joyce's comic vision.

He states the matter

this way:
Now that the initial outrage at the
"filthiness" of the book has been succeeded by the relaxed acceptance of a more
permissive age, now that the solemnity of
Freudian symbol-hunting has lost its cachet,
I believe it is time for a fuller look at
Ulysses as joyful comedy. (p. viii, Preface)
Gose further remarks that just as Joyce's concept of man
encompasses both the animal and the divine, so does his
idea of the comic include both purging and affirmation,
both the reductive and the sublime (p. viii, Preface).
One is tempted to coin a third category to follow
upon that of the Dancer from the Dance and Both/And.
The tertiary term would be More.

Whatever contemporary

critics see, Joyce sees more; whatever skills they have,
Joyce has more; Ulysses may be a novel or a poem or a
roman a clef or a dozen other things, but it is always
still more.
hand.

The term can also be applied to the task at

As has been noted, the internal evidence which

165

can be appealed to in deciding whether Joyce is to remain
Modern or convert to Contemporary will support the
claims of both camps.
Additionally, Hirsch notes that internal evidence
is the kind least likely to enable a decision on its own
grounds.

A validation requires consideration of all the

known relevant data, and we want to know how the hypotheses stand with respect to all the pertinent evidence.
There always exists, says Hirsch, relevant evidence
beyond the internal, and failure to use it simply makes
our guesses unreliable and all attempts at adjudication
well-nigh impossible (p. 192).

In other words, there is

more to explicating a text than scrutinizing its signifiers, and we need to know more about Joyce before being
competent to measure the probability that Deconstructionists can capture him.
Hirsch states formally what all men everywhere have
always known.

John Ciardi said the same thing more

recently in a radio broadcast: "When you guess without
the facts, you probably guess wrong."

Even that most

logical of philosophers, Charles Sanders Peirce, notes
Dillard, says "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy
what we do not doubt in our hearts."

Hearts and heads

have always known that the meaning of an artifact
derives from its creator.

To Plato's principle that all
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knowledge is recognition of what is already known, Vico
adds that all knowledge is recognition of what has
been produced.

The core of Vico's thought, says

Rubinoff, consists of the doctrine verum et factem
convertuntur, truth and fact are convertible; the condition of being able to know anything truly, as opposed
to merely perceiving or having certainty of it, is that
the knower himself should have made it.

In this view,

says Rubinoff, history cannot therefore be more certain
than when the one who creates it also narrates it (NS,
pars. 331, 349; in Vico, p. 97).
Concerning the creator of Ulysses, we may say that
Joyce makes his world; he understands it better than
anyone else can; he wants his readers to come as close
as possible to understanding what he is doing and why.
The final part of this paper will consider the facts
of Joyce's life, statements made by him and about him,
and anything else which is pertinent to answering the
question of whether Joyce is to remain the last of the
Modernist writers or the first of the Contemporary.
Although the use of quotations is a universal technique
of validation, it is not, says Hirsch, an adequate
technique by itself.

Quotation he calls the first,

primitive stage of the process, serving to demonstrate
merely that a particular interpretive hypothesis is
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legitimate and could therefore be correct (p. 169).
Because there is, as Joyce says, an umbilical
connection between his life and his works, quotations
from him and about him are pertinent to the question of
validity.

Burgess expresses the situation in these

words:
There is a penumbra surrounding the book, full
of signs which lead us out to Joyce's own
experiences. Fiction itself is Protean, a
disguise of real life. Often the interior
monologues of both Bloom and Stephen seem
like the iceberg surface, with submerged
mountains of references we can only reach by
forgetting that Ulysses is a work of art and
using it as an encyclopaedic guide to real
history. (ReJoyce, p. 103)
Burgess asks whether this invalidates the work as
literature.

He thinks not, pointing out that true

naturalism calls for shadows and mysteries and clues
which may or may not be taken up.

"If we cannot under-

stand everything in Ulysses, nor can we understand
everything in real life," says Burgess (ReJoyce, p. 103)
The "mysterious center" which appears at the heart of
paradox is a characteristic not only of what Burgess
refers to as true naturalism but also of menippea.
Not only is there an umbilical connection between
Joyce and his works, but in each of them there exists
the same connection between the form and the content.
Referring to Joyce's "anatomizing" of "ubiquitous
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associative connections," Kenner says that the technique
is the "clue to that air of meticulous contrivance
remarked on by every reader of Ulysses."

He goes on to

mention the hundreds of motifs "linked without a fumble"
and the symbols that grow out of the text "but seem to
demand separate acts of abstraction from the reader."
"A huge and intricate machine clanking and whirring for
eighteen hours" is precisely what Ulysses is at one
level, notes Kenner, though there is, of course, much
more to it than that.

Kenner believes it essential

first of all to see it like that, and not as a solemn
mystery, because the "tesselated mosaic" reveals its
laughter.

Kenner passes along a complaint which Joyce

made to Ezra Pound, when explanations of how this motif
linked with that were being published on every hand:
"If only someone, if only one reviewer, would say the
book was funny" (DJ, pp. 166-67).

The comic is the

first element of menippea which Bakhtin notes, and the
pervasive presence of this constituent in Ulysses
cannot be over-emphasized.
Ellmann, writing of Joyce's studies of Aristotle
in Paris in 1903, notes that the artist enlarged the
Poetics by "making pat" the difference between tragedy
and comedy, arguing that comedy is superior to tragedy
in that it makes for joy while tragedy makes for sorrow,
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"the sense of possession in the one," says Ellmann,
"being superior to the sense of deprivation in the other"
(JJ. , p. 124). Ulysses is essentially comic; it is
written affirmatively, with a Jesuit's precision, by an
intentional author.

The book is Joyce's gesture to the

world, aimed—"naturally as it comes from Jim"—
satirically, not only at forging the conscience of his
race but also at changing the complexion
of literature.

and direction

Such a thesis requires an unabashed and

unabashable return to the idea of a stable subject
[author?], in accord with Hirsch's notion that any concept of validity is connected to a concept of the
author.

Though this might at first appear to be a

regressive stance, it must be pointed out that such a
note is by no means a lonely cry in the contemporary
wilderness.

Girard, an unusually level-headed French

critic, says that the current type of formalization
remains "totally blind" to what is "truly decisive" in
great literature, and he lays the blame for this condition on the fact that structuralism and all its
"legitimate or illegitimate offspring" always "subordinate
identity to difference" (PSS, p. 124).
Averring that everything the current methodologies
can do, Dostoevsky

can do better and expressing the

belief that current research might be very significant
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some day if it can catch up with the superiority of
great fiction, if "the lost substance of our studies"
can be recovered, Girard gives his explanation for the
loss of substance in these words: "We have been plundered
by disciplines that still terrify us because they claim
a scientific status which is not really theirs."

He

further notes that another danger lies in the fact that
contemporary readers and scholars turn for their
prophets to men of great talent, but men who also are
the greatest disparagers of texts—either openly or in
secret—and he names Freud, "who saw literature as the
archetypal lie," and Levi-Strauss, "who is convinced
nothing really significant has happened between the
neolithic and the industrial revolutions" (PSS, 125-26).
So much for Deconstructionists, at least according to
Girard.
In a portion of Contraries entitled "Jocoserious
Joyce," Joyce Carol Oates also offers this perspicatious
paragraph concerning the type of humor in Joyce's opus:
Ulysses is certainly the greatest novel in
the English language, and one might argue
for its being the greatest single work of
art in our tradition. How significant, then,
and how teasing, that this masterwork should
be a comedy and that its creator should have
explicitly valued the comic "vision" over the
tragic—how disturbing to our prediliction
for order that, with an homage paid to
classical antiquity so meticulous that it
is sure, a burlesque, Joyce's exhibitionististicicity is never so serious as when it is
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most outrageously comic. Joyce might have
been addressing his readers when he wrote to
Nora in 1909; "Now . . . I want you to read
over and over all I have written to you.
Some of it is ugly, obscene, and bestial,
some of it is pure and holy and spiritual:
all of it is myself."6
This is an example of Both/And at its most extreme.
Burgess says that the idea should emerge that
Joyce is a very traditional writer, that he is very
close to novelists like Cervantes, Fielding, and Sterne,
"masters of the mock epic" (p. 23). Furthermore, there
is a great deal of Rabelais in him and "not a little
Dickens," and Burgess firmly believes that Joyce belongs
to the comic-heroic tradition of Western Europe, a
tradition based on a kind of qualified humanism.

In

this view, Burgess notes, man is interesting and
important enough to be examined in great detail and at
great length, "but he is not by any means the Lord of
the Universe."

The universe can be a mystery or an

antagonist, and against it, Burgess writes, the comicepic hero opposes all he has—"and it is not m u c h —
merely free will and a capacity for love" (ReJoyce,
p. 23).
A portrait of the artist as humanistic lover is not
usually (if ever) on display, but there is ample evidence
to indicate that such a canvas deserves wider circulation.

The stereotyped Joyce picture shows a sharp,
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nihilistic mocker.

Not that mockers cannot be comic,

but Polhemus writes that the fault of the mocker lies
not in his belittling humor but "in his blindness to his
own kinship with the life he mocks" (pp. 321-22).
Joyce, however, is not a mocker; he is a true comedian,
according to the definition which Trevor Griffiths gives
in his play Comedians:
A real comedian—that's a daring man. He
dares to see what his listeners shy away from,
fear to express. And what he sees is a sort
of truth, about people, about their situation,
about what hurts or terrifies them, about
what's hard, above all, about what they want.
A joke releases the tension, says the unsayable,
any joke pretty well. But a true joke, a
comedian's joke, has to do more than release
tension, it has to liberate the will and the
desire, it has to change the situation.7
Griffiths, by noting the element of attack (liberating
the will and desiring to change the situation), describes
not just any comedian, but a satiric comedian, such as
Joyce.
We can deal with almost any situation if there is
enough distance between us and the problem, but Joyce's
satire "comes too close for comfort."

As Deconstruction-

ists gleefully point out—and correctly, in this instance
— J o y c e irradicates the boundary between book and reader,
between writer and audience.

A meaningful engagement

with Ulysses is an adventure into deep regions of the
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mind, body, and soul, both Joyce's and the reader's.
Writing the book changes Joyce, and reading it changes
his readers.

This is not to concede to current theorists,

of course, their contention that the writer has no
control over his creation once it leaves his hands.
Just the opposite.
The responsive, perceptive reader comes to feel as
though he has in some mysterious way become an "accessory
after the fact," a co-worker in Joyce's task.

Such a

relationship Booth stresses when he remarks that if any
one norm of effective satire were to be proposed, he
would argue for that whose verbal aptness retains a
connection with familiar experience or makes distant
experiences as familiar as though we had participated in
them ourselves.

Pointing out that satire, after all, is

generally prompted by the realistic and the topical, he
says that "undue opacity becomes a threat to meaning"
(pp. 22-23).

Derrida's "Border Lines" exemplifies such

undue opacity, and it is peculiar that contemporary
critics, praising the opacity of Ulysses, claim that
Joyce spent ten years of his life writing a book whose
meaning eludes the powers of apprehension on the part
of his readers.
Bloom notes that the literary quality that brings
the satirist closest to us is his tone, a "persuasive
verbal pitch," a tonality compounded of intellect and
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imagination, and connected by emotions, "especially of
mockery or violent retort" (p. 23). That description
largely limns Joyce.

Bloom further comments that the

humor of indignation, notable for linguistic explosiveness, is so overwrought at times as to appear vengeful
if not downright sadistic, responding to outrageous
breaches of custom by seeking comparable levels of
reversion in obscenity and scatology (p. 23). Joyce
responds to injustice in these ways, and he expects his
readers to see beyond (Sorry, Derrida) the obscenity on
the page to the reason behind its being there.
remember our animal beginnings.

We must

Swift makes this lesson

all too clear for this (greater) satirist to ignore.
This is Bloom's summation of the matter:
And yet, as a matter of Aristotelian theory,
indignation at human wrongdoing is sustained
by pity for those who have suffered at the
hands of the unworthy. The intensity of
moral rage, according to this notion,
coincides with the depth of sympathetic
human identification. (p. 23)
Joyce is usually accused of being apolitical, and,
indeed, his own words support the accusation; this, too,
divorces him from contemporary theorists.
As an artist I am against every state. Of
course I must recognize it, since indeed in
all my dealings I come into contact with its
institutions. The state is concentric, man
is eccentric. Thence arises an eternal
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struggle. The monk, the bachelor, and the
anarchist are in the same category.
Naturally I can't approve of the act of the
revolutionary who tosses a bomb in a theatre
to destroy the king and his children. On the
other hand, have those states behaved any
better which have drowned the world in a
blood-bath?8
Joyce's own early politics were socialist, Ellmann notes,
socialism being a movement Joyce supported chiefly
because he thought that it could prevent the Church from
dominating politics.

In a 1903 letter to Stanislaus,

notes Ellmann, these words appear:
You have often shown opposition to my
socialistic tendencies. But can you not
see plainly that a deferment of the
emancipation of the proletariat, a reaction
to clericalism or aristocracy or bougeoisism
would mean a revulsion to tyrannies of all
kinds. . . . For my part I believe that to
establish the Church in full power again in
Europe would mean a renewal of the
Inquisition. (J_J, P- 204)
Indignation at the power of the Catholic Church in
Ireland which keeps her children oppressed propels
Joyce's satire always.
Stanislaus evidently shot back a reply indicating
that he was ignoring all of Joyce's subtle defenses of
socialism and charging Joyce—who, notes Ellmann, "had
once pooh-poohed love as a matter for clerks"—with
becoming a universal lover (JJ, pp. 204-05).

Joyce in

reply, states Ellmann, "labored to make socialism an
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integral part of his personality" in these words:
It is a mistake for you to imagine that
my political opinions are those of a universal
lover: but they are those of a socialistic
artist. I cannot tell you how strange I
feel sometimes in my attempt to lead a more
civilized life than my contemporaries. But
why should I have brought Nora to a priest or
a lawyer to make her swear away her life to
me? And why should I superimpose on my child
the very troublesome burden of belief which
my father and mother superimposed on me.
(JJ, p. 205)
All of these quotations, of course, form only the
beginning stage of a measuring process, as Hirsch
correctly notes.

An earlier section shows ways in which

Joyce can be seen as a nihilistic mocker, and this one
suggests the possibility of his being seen in a kindlier
light.

Regardless of the severity of the light, these

presentations demonstrate merely that each interpretive
hypothesis is legitimate and could, therefore, be correct.
However, at this rate, quantifying evidence might be
offered until Finnegan wakes, and still no decision could
be made on the final disposition of Joyce.

Regarding the

assertion of impossibility of closure on the ambiguous
question, Deconstructionists would point with pride,
while more traditional critics such as Merleau-Ponty would
view with alarm.
Is there no more excellent way to measure disparate
claims?

Hirsch suggests a way out of the deadlock:
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Since verbal (and any other) meaning is
a structure of component meanings, interpretation has not done its job when it
simply enumerates what the component
meanings are. The interpreter must also
determine their probable structure and
particularly their structure of emphases.
Relative emphasis is not only crucial to
meaning (perhaps it is the most crucial
and problematical element of all), it is
also highly restrictive; it excludes
alternatives. It may be asserted as a
general rule that whenever a reader confronts
two interpretations which impose different
emphases on similar meaning components, at
least one of the interpretations must be
wrong. They cannot be reconciled. (p. 230)
To say that verbal meaning is determinate is not to
exclude complexities of meaning such as those obvious
in Ulysses but only to insist that a text's meaning is
what it is and not a number of other things.

The

fundamental flaw in what Hirsch calls the "theory of the
most inclusive interpretation" is that it overlooks the
problem of emphasis.

Hirsch pulls the theoretical

ground right from under Deconstructionists when he says
that inclusivism is neither a genuine norm nor an
adequate guiding principle for establishing an interpretation (p. 230). Frye's vivid suggestion is more to
the point: "An open mind, to be sure, should be open at
both ends, like the foodpipe, and have a capacity for
excretion as well as intake"

(Code, p. 44).

Paradoxically, then, it begins to appear that it is
Deconstructionists—fond as they are of openness—who
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are determined not to choose, not Joyce.

Therefore, any

time that Joyce can be apprehended in the process of
deciding or emphasizing one element or concept over
another, his intentional, rational act of choosing
constitutes evidence more weighty than Deconstructionist
denial of limitation.

The very act of narrowing implies

judgment, an idea inherited from the classical tradition.
Consequently, each time that Joyce does so much as choose
one word over another, one style from among several
others, he is exercising a moral choice, because he
obviously believes that his final decision is "better"
than any of his alternatives.
Herein appears a "double" instance of his remaining
more Modern than Contemporary: the narrowing does not
appeal—at least in theory—to Deconstructionists, and
the suggestion of morality--indicative as it is of an
idea of transcendence—leads to lividity.

Of course,

in practice contemporary writers compose precisely the
same way Joyce or Merleau-Ponty or Vico or Plato composes
—carefully.

Who would dare assert, after having read

"Border Lines," that Derrida dashed it off uniieedingly?
Derrideans, vis-a-vis blindness and insight, cannot
avoid using techniques and traits inherent in the very
system they so vigorously seek to vitiate.
Joyce says he is not political, but he writes
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revolutionary works aimed at changing readers, writers,
and the assemblage of great books.

Deconstructionists

call this doing one thing while saying another "undermining" the foundation on which he builds, and they
further accuse him of blindness, of being unaware of the
import of his actions.

However, the genius and care in

pondering, reading, writing, and endless rewriting on
Joyce's part effectively refute the charge of unawareness.

Derrideans claim that Joyce is blind to the real

sabotage of value that lurks in the pages of Ulysses,
that the work turns on itself to reveal duplicity, that
Joyce's devices of coherence are "undercut" by the very
words he puts on the pages.
Ironically, it is the Deconstructionists who are
blind, for they cannot see beyond the games, puzzles,
erudition, and almost total multifariousness to Joyce's
deeper cohesion, as it appears in his purposeful choice
of satire.

They experience the obvious variety in the

text, but they miss its meaning: order within the satiric
framework united by the questing soul of Joyce.

The

order is an affair of consciousness, and the appearance
of disorder an artistic right.
Both Joyce and Deconstructionists propose to reconstruct the world, but contemporary critics emphasize
destruction and allegories of defeat, while Joyce,
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remaining chiefly in his Modern position, caught
between and recognizing the pull of both traditional and
contemporary views, reconstructs affirmatively, comically, and courageously.
Vico's notion of truth as a creative process to be
apprehended through community serves Joyce masterfully
as the wider scaffold on which to construct his treatment of the community of Dublin, of the world, of the
universe both abstract and concrete, both theoretical
and practical.

Moreover, the satire is an unending quest

for improvement in these communities through "affirmative
action."

Vico's notion of truth as a creative process

is also an affirmation of true piety.

A pious Joyce is

rarely, if ever, portrayed, but that view is a possible
one.
Vico's approach has been likened to that of the
Baal Shem Tov, who writes that the man of true piety
"takes unto himself the quality of fervor . . . for he
is hallowed and become another man and is worthy to
create and is become like the Holy One, blessed be He,
when he created His world" (Rubinoff, Vico, Part I,
note 15, p. 103). As God made man and the world into
which he was first placed, so man must remake and renew
the world as well as himself.

Joyce is this kind of

maker, and I believe that it is some sort of vision of
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himself like this that he was referring to when he
wrote Lady Gregory that his faith was not like that of
other men's.
The exuberant acceptance of multiplicity and paradox
demonstrates clearly that Joyce, looking back to Homer
and Vico for inspiration, emphasizes traditional values
over contemporary ones.

Not that he claims to have

laid hold of pat answers to Modern and Contemporary
questions, of course, but that he is convinced that the
search for truth is always worthwhile, even amidst
uncertainties.

No more should contemporary readers ever

think they have taken the final measure of Ulysses and
its author.

The mystery that is at the heart of menippea

permeates the work, and, to adapt a phrase of Wallace
Stevens, there is a continuous dazzle that never yields
to clarity (Living by Fiction, p. 92).
Because some of the major premises of Ulysses (such
as structural levels) are so deeply indebted to Western
thought, Derrideans will not be able to capture Joyce,
who, recognizing the labyrinthian flux of all things and
the nightmare of human history, nevertheless writes in
a comic, satiric vein that is not apart from reason, not
apart from the searching, questing, thinking Cartesian
man (as the Deconstructionists say he is) but who uses
his reason to create an affirmative satire, to look
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through the window on infinity.

The "ricorso of the

human spirit" offers more than nature can, more than
Deconstructionists see, more than anyone will ever be
able to measure completely.

It is Joyce's affirmative

spirit that will forever elude the Deconstructive
embrace.
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12

Puzzles and Epiphanies: Essays and Reviews, 19581961 (New York: Chilmark Press, 1962), p. 216; in Homer,
p. 2.
13

Friedrich Schlegel, "Lyceums-Fragmente No. 60,"
Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms, trans. Ernst
Behler and Roman Struc (University Park: Pennsylvania
State Univ. Press, 1968), p. 127; in Homer, pp. 47-48.
14

"French Theories of Fiction: 1947-1974," in
PSS, p. 119.
15

The Theory of the Novel (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1974), p. 382; henceforth cited as Theory.
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"The Death of the Author," originally published
in Aspen Magazine, Section 3, No. 5-6 (1968), and
reprinted in The Discontinuous Universe: Selected Writings in Contemporary Consciousness, ed. Sallie Sears and
Georgianna Lord (1972), pp. 7-12; the cited passage
appears on p. 9; in Theory, p. 382. (My cited passage
appears on p. 832, but all of the bibliographical information appears on p. 387. Halperin expresses appreciation
for Richard Howard's translation.)
17
Classic, Romantic and Modern, pp. xx, 14; in
Homer, p. 169.
18
"What Is an Author?" in Textual Strategies,
edited and with an introduction by Josue V. Harari
(Ithaca, NY: Corness Univ. Press, 1979), p. 158.
19
Living By Fiction (New York: Harper and Row,
1982), pp. 52-53.
20
The Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty, ed.
Alden L. Fisher (New York: Harcourt, 1969).
21
The Order of Things (New York: Random House,
1970), p. xiv; first American edition; published in the
United States by Pantheon Books; originally published
in France as Les Mots et les choses by Editions Gallimard.
Night, pp. 227-28; for further reading, Shechner
suggests the panel discussion on creativity of the 27th
International Psychoanalytic Congress, Vienna, July 29,
1971, appearing in the International Journal of
Psychoanalysis 53 (1972): 21-30. Also mentioned are
Melanie Klein's "Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected
in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse" and
"Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States"
in her Contributions to Psychoanalysis, 1921-1945
(London: Hogarth, 1950).
23
Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press,
1941), p. x; in The Space Between, Foreward, Stanley
Cavell (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981), p. 43: henceforth cited as Space.
Lucien Goldmann, "Structure: Human Reality and
Methodological Concept," in Languages, p. 122. Lacan is
being quoted from the discussion following Goldmann's
presentation.
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25
Joyce's Voices (Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press, 1978), p. xiii); henceforth cited as JV.
26
JV, p. 73; Kenner says that the first number
refers to the reset Random House edition of 1961, the
second to the British Penguin edition of 1969 (JV,
p. 18).
—
27
Ulysses: The Mechanics of Meaning (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: n.p., 1970), p. 70; in Kenner's Ulysses,
note 7, p. 71.
28
Index of Recurrent Elements in James Joyce's
Ulysses (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1982).
29
The Consciousness of Joyce (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1977), p. 3; henceforth cited as CJ. Noting
that Joyce had a copy of Le Medecin de campagne, in which
Balzac had taken for his own device and also given his
hero the Carthusian motto "Fuge . . . Late . . . Tace,"
Ellmann writes that Joyce prescribes for his own autobiographical hero, and for himself as well, "silence,
exile and cunning" (CJ, p. 3 ) . In another place, however,
Ellmann, referring to Joyce's composition of Portrait,
writes these words; "In bringing the book together he
found unexpected help in Balzac, who made Lucien de
Rubempre say, in Splendeurs et miseres des courtisanes,
"J'ai mis en pratique un axiome avec lequel on est sur
de vivre tranquille: Fuge . . . Late . . . Tace'" ["I
have put into practive an axiom with which it is possible
to live contentedly: Exile . . . Cunning . . . Silence";
writer's translation] (JJ, p. 365). Why did he scramble
the arrangement when he translated them: Also, Ellmann
says (JJ, note 30, p. 786) that Stuart Gilbert "kindly"
brought this passage to his attention. How kindly? Did
Balzac use the exact phrasing in two books? For a
Joycean, parallactic twist, it may be noted that the
Carthusian contemplative order of the Roman Catholic
Church was founded in the 11th century in Chartreuse,
France by St. Bruno.
Chapter VI
1

Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1967), p. 1.
2

The Finnegans Wake Experience (Berkeley: Univ.
of California Press, 1981), p. 73.
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DeconstructIon and Criticism (New York: Seabury
Press, 1979), pp. 75-176.
4
Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1957; third printing, 1973), pp. 308-12.
5
Chaucer and Menippean Satire (Madison, Wis.:
Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1981), p. xi.
Satire's Persuasive Voice (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1979), p. 200.
7
The Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans.
R. W. Rotsel (Ann Arbor, 1973), p. 11.
Q

Cyril Connolly, The New Statesman and Nation,
xxi (18 Jan. 1941), p. 59; in Homer, p. 153.
a

Tieck's Romantic Irony (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ.
of N. Carolina Press, 1932), pp. 18, 23; in Homer, p. 154,

Chapter VII
"Vico and the Verification of Historical Interpretation," in Vico and Contemporary Thought, eds.
Georgio Tagliacozzo, Michael Mooney, and Donald Phillip
Verene (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976),
p. 96; henceforth cited as Vico.
2

Art and Illusion (New York, 1960), p. 25; in
Validity, p. 104.
3

"The land of the imagination is in this world
the only one worth living in, and such is the nothingness of the human condition that there is nothing—
other than Being itself—so beautiful as that which is
not" (La Nouvelle Heloise, Pleiade ed. II, 693; in de
Man, p. 17.
4

Comic Faith (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,
1980), p. 319; henceforth cited as Comic.
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
Vol. 5 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1934), 157; in
Living by Fiction, p. 132.
Contraries (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981),
p. 171.
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Comedians (London, 1976), p. 20; in Comic, p. 327
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"Conversations with Joyce," trans. Joseph
Prescott, College English, xv (March 1954), 325-7; in
Ellmann, JJ, p. 460.
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